And with our blood, did we redeem Europe's freedom, honor, and peace?

A.S. PUSHKIN ("To the Slanderers of Russia")

At the end of many coalition wars of the past, when assessing their course, results, lessons, and consequences, the question of what each of the victorious countries contributed to the defeat of the common enemy often came to the fore. This was a topic of intense and heated debate among politicians, military leaders, diplomats, journalists, and historians.

The different positions in the Soviet Union and in the West on this issue became even more pronounced after the victory over fascism, which was reflected in the extensive military-historical literature published in all the countries that fought in the war, as well as in neutral countries. Today, this literature includes hundreds of thousands of titles alone.

In many such publications, the readers are persistently led to believe that the most important battles of World War II took place not on the Soviet-German front, and that the outcome of the armed conflict between the two coalitions was decided not on land, but primarily at sea and in the air, where the armed forces

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The US and British forces were engaged in intense combat operations.

Here is one typical example in this regard. American General X. Pattison, in the preface to E. Zimke's book "From Stalingrad to Berlin", noted:: "One cannot agree, as the Russians claim, that the Red Army was the main architect of victory in World War II." The author of this book himself stated without a shadow of embarrassment that "the contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory in Europe was important, but not decisive, "because"...The war in the East was a land war on one front, while in the West the Allies fought on two land fronts and conducted a campaign in the air and at sea.

In their publications, Western authors willingly used this simple technique: they simply did not mention or mentioned very briefly the many battles and skirmishes of our troops, as well as the events that took place on the Soviet-German front and during the Far Eastern campaign of the Red Army.

Such an example is typical. In 1991, the United States created a National Committee to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Victory in World War II. Soon this committee published a huge edition of a colorful anniversary booklet prepared with the participation of historians. It opens with a "Chronicle of the most important events of the Second World War". And in this very detailed list, the Soviet-German front is only briefly mentioned twice: on June 22, 1941. (the beginning of Hitler's aggression against the USSR) and May 8, 1942 (the beginning of the new Wehrmacht offensive in the East). None of the major battles or operations won or conducted by Soviet forces against the German fascist invaders are mentioned. There is also no mention of the Red Army's campaign against militaristic Japan in the Far East. It is as if the fate of global civilization was decided not where our soldiers fought, but somewhere else on a different theater of war, on a different continent.

As for the opinions of some contemporary Russian publicists, writers and historians - adherents of the so - called "new thinking" - over the past decade, their interpretation of the results of our Victory has increasingly focused on denying its significance and the decisive contribution of the USSR to the defeat of the Hitler bloc, as well as on the allegedly unjustifiably huge price of Victory. Some biased publicists, writers, and unscrupulous historians, without any reference to true documents, provide fantastic figures about the total human losses of the USSR and the Red Army: from 30 to 50 million soldiers killed alone.

Such speculations, designed for a gullible and unsophisticated reader, do not stand up to serious, well-founded criticism. When the authors of these "writings" were accused of falsifying documents and engaging in outright forgery, they responded by accusing their opponents of Stalinism, dogmatism, and rigidity.

Therefore, it is necessary for all these authors (both Western and Russian) to remind us of the irrefutable historical facts. There is no way around them, as they convincingly demonstrate the great feat of the Soviet people and their decisive contribution to the world-historic victory in World War II, as well as to the salvation of all humanity from Hitler's darkness. I believe that our younger generation would find it interesting to learn about this.

But first, a few words about the real, not imaginary, losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War, and the ratio of these losses to those of the enemy. By the beginning of 1990, based on the results of the work of special commissions of the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Department of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences (in one of which we participated), which had access to important archival sources, including the names of the Red Army's non-returning demographic losses(*) from 1941 to 1945, the total non-returning demographic losses of the Soviet Armed Forces, including the border guards, were determined.

* Irrecoverable demographic losses include those who were killed, went missing, were captured and did not return, died from wounds, illness, accidents, etc.

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and internal troops. They amounted to 8,688,400 people.

As for the irretrievable losses of the Wehrmacht, its allies, and various paramilitary formations of foreign citizens who took part in the battles on the Soviet-German front, they amounted to 8,649,500 people(*).

So, the ratio of this type of loss between the Red Army and the enemy is slightly not in our favor. The reason for this is that, as already mentioned, the irrecoverable demographic losses also include information about those who were captured and did not return from captivity. According to our data, during the war, 4,559,000 Red Army soldiers were captured by the enemy (according to German data, the number ranged from 5,200,000 to 5,700,000), and only 1,836,000 returned to their homeland. The vast majority of the remaining soldiers, ranging from 2,500,000 to over 3,000,000, perished in German captivity as a result of their deliberate mass extermination...

Of the 4,126,964 prisoners held by the Soviets, 580,548 died over the years, while the rest returned home.

But if the Soviet authorities had also destroyed 2.5 to 3 million of the enemy's captured soldiers, what would have been the ratio of irrecoverable demographic losses? Of course, it would not have been in favor of the German fascist invaders.

This is why the claims of some homegrown falsifiers of history about the allegedly low level of military art among Soviet commanders, who could only fight with "big blood," are untenable.

The armed struggle was the most important form of struggle, in which all other forms were focused, and in which the outcome of the deadly battle against the reactionary and fascist forces was ultimately decided. Here, the leading and decisive role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the defeat of the Nazi regime was most clearly demonstrated. The Soviet-German front was the main front of the Second World War. It was home to the majority of the experienced and well-equipped units of the Nazi Wehrmacht, as evidenced by the data in the table.

The table shows that during the war, an average of 70% of the fascist army's divisions were active against the Red Army. Out of four Wehrmacht soldiers, three were constantly fighting on the Soviet-German front, while only one was fighting on the Western front.

Distribution of German divisions in 1941-1945

Date

Total number of divisions

Number of divisions on the Soviet-German front

Total, %

Number of divisions on other fronts

Total, %

Number of divisions in the occupied territories and in Germany

Total, %

22.06.41

217,5

150

70,3

2

0,9

62,5

28,8

1.05.42

237,5

181,5

76,5

3

1,2

53

22,3

1.07.43

297

196

66

8

2,7

93

31,3

1.01.44

318

201

63,2

19,5

6,2

97,5

30,6

1.06.44

326,5

181,5

55,6

81,5

25

63,5

19,4

1.01.45

314,5

179

57

119

38

16,5

5

* It should be noted that many German documents contain incomplete information, as they only refer to losses in combat units and only to people of German nationality.

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"It can be said without exaggeration," wrote Lieutenant General B. Zimmermann, former head of the German Western Front Staff, after the war, "that the Eastern Front persistently drained all combat-ready manpower and military equipment from the German armies in the West... Since 1943, the German forces on the Western Front had been composed of elderly soldiers equipped with outdated weapons." In 1941, Hitler's headquarters transferred 17 divisions from the Western theater of operations to the Eastern Front. In 1942, this number increased to 69, in 1943 to 46, and in 1944 to 80 divisions.

During the most difficult period for the USSR, most of the German allies' troops were on the Soviet-German front: 37 divisions in June 1941 and 72.5 divisions in November 1942. During the same period, there were no more than 8-9 divisions of the Third Reich's allies in other theaters of the World War (in North Africa and later in Sicily).

After the opening of the second front in Europe on June 6, 1944, most of the German divisions continued to fight against the Soviet forces on the Eastern Front (between 55.6% and 57%). Even at the end of the war, the Red Army faced 196 enemy divisions, while the Western Allies faced only 106. In the East, the enemy also used most of its weapons and military equipment: 52-75% of artillery, 60-70% of tanks and assault guns, 50-65% of combat aircraft, etc.

Of the total number of human losses suffered by the German fascist army in World War II, more than 73% were on the Eastern Front. It was here that the main forces of the fascist bloc were defeated, with 607 divisions, while the Anglo-American forces defeated only 176 divisions (in North Africa and Western Europe). The Soviet Armed Forces also accounted for the vast majority of enemy military equipment destroyed during the war. During the 47 months of fighting on the Soviet-German front, the enemy lost 62,000 aircraft, or more than 75% of all its aircraft losses during 1939-1945, while in Western Europe it lost 8,000, in the Mediterranean theater it lost about 9,000, and in the Balkans it lost slightly more than 7,000. The Wehrmacht also lost most of its artillery pieces in the East, with 167,000 (74% of total losses), tanks and assault guns, with 48,000 (up to 75% of total losses), and over 2,500 warships, transports, and auxiliary vessels.

The fact that the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Nazi bloc is also confirmed by the outcome of those great battles, in which the Red Army inflicted fatal wounds on the fascist aggressor.

The largest defeat of the German Reich since the beginning of World War II, the complete collapse of the blitzkrieg, occurred, as is well known, near Moscow (in the winter of 1941-42), when about 50 of Hitler's best divisions were decisively defeated. This obvious fact is no longer disputed in the West, although references to the "vast expanses of Russia," unfavorable climatic conditions (autumn muddy roads and then severe frosts), the alleged numerical superiority of the Soviet forces, their widespread use of new technology, and so on, continue to be made when determining the main reasons for the collapse of the German military machine in the battle for the Soviet capital.

The inadequacy of such judgments lies primarily in the fact that the enemy troops were stopped by the Red Army before the autumn thaw and especially before the severe frosts. Hitler's plan for a "blitzkrieg" attack on the USSR, which was thwarted by the Soviet people, was designed for a period of 1.5 to 2 months, before the onset of the autumn and winter "unfavorable weather conditions." In addition, the difficulties caused by these "adverse climatic factors" were also experienced by Soviet soldiers. Therefore, "autumn muddy roads," "severe frosts," and "heavy snowdrifts" were not decisive factors in the confrontation between the two sides.

As for the alleged huge numerical advantage of the Soviet troops before the counteroffensive near Moscow on December 5-6, by the beginning of that month, the enemy's Army Group Center, along with its air force, had 1,708,000 personnel, about 13,500 guns and mortars, 1,170 tanks, and 615 aircraft in the Moscow direction. The Red Army units involved in the counteroffensive had about 1,100,000 men, 7,652 guns and mortars, 415 rocket launchers, 774 tanks (including medium and heavy tanks), and 1,000 aircraft (including 169 outdated designs). Thus, the German-Fascist forces outnumbered the Soviet forces by 1.5 times in terms of manpower and by 1.5 times in terms of artillery.

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1.4 times, in tanks - 1.6 times. And only in aviation, the Soviet group had some advantage (1.6 times).

After the Moscow disaster, Hitler's command did not abandon its plans. Taking advantage of the absence of a second front in Europe, it launched a major offensive in the southwestern direction in late May 1942, which culminated in the Battle of Stalingrad.

The Soviet troops passed this new and difficult test with flying colors. At Stalingrad, the Nazi Empire suffered a defeat that history had never seen before. It is well known that 22 enemy divisions, totaling over 330,000 troops, were encircled and defeated.

The significance of the victory at Stalingrad, which shook Nazi Germany and its armed forces to their core, is so evident that many Western authors have given it a high rating. However, there has long been a tendency in foreign historiography to downplay the significance of the defeat of the Nazis on the banks of the Volga and its impact on the subsequent course of World War II. This is evident in the desire to downplay the significance of the victory at Stalingrad or, at best, to place it on a par with the military success of the Anglo-American forces at El Alamein (Egypt). Thus, in the Encyclopedia of World War II, published in the United States in 1989, the authors devoted 168 lines to the Battle of El Alamein, and only 93 to the Battle of Stalingrad, modestly "keeping silent" about its consequences and impact on the course of the war. In the Russian translation of T. Harbotl's dictionary of military history "Battles of World History" published in 1993, revised and supplemented by the English military historians J. R. R. Tolkien. According to Bruce and P. Young, " The El Alamein operation was one of the decisive battles of World War II." The text about the Battle of Stalingrad does not provide any assessment of the significance of the victory won by the Red Army.

Meanwhile, a simple comparison of the forces that were active at Stalingrad, where the enemy had 50 elite divisions in November 1942, including 26 German divisions, and at El Alamein in October of the same year, where the British were opposed by only 12 Italian-German divisions, including 4.5 German divisions, once again demonstrates which front had a decisive impact on the course and outcome of the armed struggle against the fascist aggressors. In addition, the enemy's total losses in the Battle of Stalingrad were 30 times greater than their losses at El Alamein.

The enemy suffered incomparably greater losses at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and the Dnieper than in all the battles with our Western allies during the entire Second World War.

Under these conditions, when it became clear to everyone that the Soviet Union was capable of destroying the fascist empire on its own, the ruling circles of Great Britain and the United States finally decided to open a second front in Europe. However, as has already been mentioned, even after the Allied landings in Normandy, the main forces of German imperialism were still fighting against the Red Army, and during the course of the war, Hitler's command repeatedly withdrew troops from the Western front and transferred them to the Soviet-German front due to the heavy losses in the battles in the East. From June 1944 to April 1945, the Red Army defeated at least 400 enemy divisions. During the same period, the Anglo-American forces defeated no more than 60 enemy divisions in Western Europe. Meanwhile, in the Belorussian Strategic Operation alone, Soviet forces defeated more than 80 enemy divisions (including reserves).

The final feat accomplished by the Red Army soldiers during the Berlin operation has not gone unnoticed by both contemporary Western authors and Russian writers. In Russia, where dozens of new publications have appeared, writers such as A. Solzhenitsyn, V. Astafyev, G. Vadimov, philologist B. Sokolov, and historians father and daughter A. and L. Mertsalov have all contributed to the discrediting of the heroic deeds of our soldiers and commanders, particularly Marshal G.K. Zhukov.

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the accusation is the fruit of a rich fantasy or "kitchen strategy": they took Berlin wrong, they say, and fought here with "big blood", paying for it with hundreds and even a million (?!) fallen Russian guys.

Following the foreign "authors," almost all of the above-mentioned deniers unanimously repeated the malicious "tall tale" that during the assault on Berlin, G.K. Zhukov, in order to protect the tanks, sent his soldiers into the minefields ahead of the armored vehicles. However, it is well known that an anti-tank mine requires a pressure of at least 250-270 kg to detonate. Therefore, this fabrication is intended for naive individuals.

As for the accusations of the Red Army's large and senseless losses during the Berlin operation, the main weapon against this feat was simple forgery.

Let's turn to strict statistics. And it shows that the irretrievable losses of the three Soviet fronts that stormed the German capital amounted to 78,260 people. Of course, these victims are a national tragedy, but where are the "hundreds of thousands" and even more so the "million"?

During the Berlin operation, which involved more than 3.5 million people on both sides, more than 52,000 guns and mortars, 7,750 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and 10,800 combat aircraft, the Soviet Armed Forces defeated 93 Nazi divisions and several separate units, destroying an enemy force of almost one million.

It is impossible not to touch upon the role of I. V. Stalin in the leadership of the armed struggle as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. "Our duty," wrote Konstantin Simonov more than 30 years ago in April 1965, "is to objectively study and analyze this role with all its positive and negative aspects, using documents and eyewitness accounts, without exaggerating or underestimating either the good or the bad, or the very large scale of this individual." As is well known, Stalin was a very complex and contradictory figure, endowed with unlimited power and a harsh, unstable personality. There are numerous facts and documents that attest to Stalin's direct involvement in the extermination of personnel (including military personnel), as well as other negative aspects of his leadership. The Supreme Commander's grave mistakes and miscalculations during the early stages of the war, largely due to his lack of understanding of military operations, caused significant harm and directly contributed to the initial setbacks and defeats of the Red Army.

However, there is another point that is undeniable. According to the assessments of many of his contemporaries, including prominent figures from Western countries, Stalin was an exceptional political and military leader who possessed a natural analytical mind, great erudition and talent, outstanding organizational skills, a strong memory, a firm will, and a cool head. To reduce him to the level of a primitive, paranoid dictator, as some proponents of "new thinking" are currently doing, is an anti-historical and untrue portrayal.

Summarizing his overall assessment of Stalin's role in the war, Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov wrote: "I. V. Stalin made a significant personal contribution to the victory over Nazi Germany and its allies. His authority was extremely high, and therefore, Stalin's appointment as Supreme Commander was positively received by the people and the troops. Of course, at the beginning of the war, before the Battle of Stalingrad, the Supreme Commander made mistakes, which, as we know, everyone makes. He thought deeply about them, and not only did he experience them internally, but he also sought to learn from them and avoid them in the future.

...The Supreme Commander-in-Chief skillfully fulfilled his duties in this high office."

We have only briefly recalled, based on historical facts and documents, the main battles and engagements of the Second World War. And they took place on the Soviet-German front. The struggle on this front was the main content of the Second World War. Most of the armed forces and resources of the Fascist Reich were concentrated here. Here the present and future of humanity, of the entire world civilization, were decided. And it was here that the heroic Red Army inflicted a crushing defeat on the armies of Hitler's Germany and its European allies.

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