"The Great Patriotic War lasted four years. However, in order to write its complete, and most importantly, authentic history, researchers did not have even half a century. Probably, it will take no less time to analyze the actions of the 40th army in Afghanistan, which lasted more than nine years..."

With these words begins the book "Limited Contingent" by the former commander of the famous 40th Army, now a deputy of the State Duma, Colonel-General Boris Vsevolodovich GROMOV. How does that war look today, exactly ten years after the withdrawal of troops? And who are they, those soldiers, sergeants, ensigns and officers who bore on their shoulders the incredible weight of combat orders, which the native state was ashamed of? Who are they: inglorious performers or still heroes, soldiers-internationalists?

Colonel-General Boris GROMOV, Hero of the Soviet Union, answers the questions of our special correspondent, Colonel Vladimir Larchenkov.

Boris Vsevolodovich Gromov. Born on November 7 in Saratov. From 1955 to 1962, he studied first at the Saratov and then Kaliningrad Suvorov Military School. In 1965, he graduated from the Leningrad Higher Military Combined Arms Command School. He commanded a motorized rifle platoon, a company. After graduating in 1972 with honors from the Military Academy named after M. V. Frunze, he was appointed to the post of battalion commander, then-regiment, chief of staff of the 9th Motorized Rifle Division of the North Caucasus Military District. From January 1980 to July 1982-Chief of Staff, Commander of the 5th Motorized Rifle Division of the 40th Army in Afghanistan. In 1984, he graduated with a gold medal from the Military Academy of the General Staff. From March 1985 to April 1986 - General for special assignments of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR for Afghanistan. From June 1987 to February 1989, he was Commander of the 40th Army. 1992-1995-Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Since December 1995-Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation. In December 1997, he was elected chairman of the public movement of veterans of local wars and military conflicts "Combat Brotherhood".

In 1989, he was awarded the rank of Colonel-General. Hero of the Soviet Union (1988). Awarded the Order of Lenin, Red Banner (twice), Red Star, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR"

- And yet, Boris Vsevolodovich, victory or defeat? With a shield or on a shield? After all, for those who are just under thirty today, Afghanistan is "painted" only with black paint...

- I have already said more than once that no one has ever set a task for a Limited contingent to win a military victory in Afghanistan. All the combat operations that had to be conducted during these long nine-plus years were always either retaliatory or preemptive. Therefore, I am deeply convinced that there are no grounds for claiming that the 40th Army was defeated in Afghanistan, or that we won a military victory in the DRA. Let me remind you. In 1979, Soviet troops entered the country without hindrance, fulfilled, I emphasize, all the tasks assigned to them, and then, in accordance with the Geneva Agreements, day after day, note, they returned to their homeland in an organized manner. True, the motherland met its heroes, alas, more than modestly. And this still allows some figures to talk about an inglorious campaign, about some kind of military failure... And what really happened? The main military opponent of the Limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was, as is known, the armed opposition detachments. So, the difference between them and our troops has always been that the units of the 40th army did what they thought was necessary, and the Dushmans-only what they could.

And about "with a shield or on a shield" - I will say this. Definitely with a shield. But "on the shield" - 14,613 "Afghans", our combat friends, whose names will remain in the memory of those who had the honor to belong to the glorious military brotherhood called the 40th army until their death...

- You are one of the few officers and generals who had to go" across the river " three times. Probably, even regardless of the position. You, Boris Vsevolodovich, have always assessed the situation in a new way. Presumably, the 40th army and the Ministry of Defense thought about the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan long before April 14, 1988 - the date of signing the Geneva agreements?

- I really had to serve in Afghanistan at the very beginning of the war, during the entry of Soviet troops-from 1980 to 1982, and at the height of hostilities-in 1985-1986, and during the preparation for the withdrawal of troops of a Limited contingent: from 1987 until February 15, 1989.

When we first entered Afghanistan, the vast majority of soldiers and officers, including myself, absolutely sincerely considered themselves internationalists. We went to help the friendly people consolidate the gains of the April Revolution. Of course, at first we just didn't understand a lot of things. But this did not prevent us from reflecting on the high duty of soldiers-internationalists. Our views changed gradually: the longer we were in Afghanistan,the more questions each of us had. By the mid-eighties, we already clearly understood that without a limited contingent of troops, the leadership of the DRA could not hold its positions. At the same time, the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, headed by Gorbachev, began to review its policy towards Afghanistan. We were even ordered to shift the focus from direct combat operations to cover service, defense of important strategic points and protection of communications.

However, even without prompting from above, I personally, as a commander, had first of all to think about minimizing the participation of our troops in combat operations, avoiding unnecessary losses. And the fact that all our losses were by and large really in vain, we had to make sure almost every day. Nevertheless, on the account of the 40th army and by today's standards, the military, of course, has more than a dozen serious victories. However, the government of the DRA, perhaps, did not manage to consolidate any of them. However, perhaps they didn't want to. But behind every such victory was the courage and true heroism of our soldiers.

I can state with full responsibility: the military was the first to understand that there was only one way out of this situation: Soviet troops must leave Afghanistan, and the leadership of the operational group of the USSR Defense Ministry, the command of the 40th Army, and I, at that time the representative of the Chief of the General Staff, regularly reported this "up". So today I am convinced that if the opinion of the military, who, by the way, until the last moment objected to a military solution to the Afghan crisis, would have been listened to in time, then later politicians would not have had to puzzle over how to get out of the current situation with less losses, political first of all (they thought little about others). regulations. But it happened as it happened: thousands of mothers lost their sons, thousands of wives lost their husbands, thousands of girls and boys lost their fathers...

- On February 15, 1989, at 10 a.m. local time, a column of the 201st Motorized Rifle Division's reconnaissance battalion crossed the state border line separating Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. This column was led by you. After many years of hard war, it seemed that it was possible to put an "end"to it. And it turned out to be an "ellipsis". Is that true?

- First, about the "point". Indeed, I was the last Soviet officer to leave Afghanistan, and I still remember the thoughts and feelings I felt on the bridge before Termez. They were, of course, ambivalent. On the one hand, it is a relief: the withdrawal of troops is completed, and not a single fighter remains behind me. The weight of a huge responsibility seemed to be lifted from my shoulders in an instant. And the colossal tension that I had to live with in recent years is now behind me.

On the other hand, there is a bitter feeling of annoyance: for nine years and two months of bloody soldier's labor, we have achieved practically nothing in terms of the highest "international" goals. I would like to emphasize once again that we cannot say that we lost the war. If the task of military victory was set before a Limited contingent, it would certainly be fulfilled. Another question is what would be the price of this victory and who would need it as such.

It was also a shame because we did not achieve results in the sphere of the highest political interests of the USSR. After all, Afghanistan was (and still is) of great importance for our state from the point of view of strategic, or, as they say now, geopolitical interests. And we left, leaving the country to its fate, which eventually led it to new troubles. As a result of the latest miscalculations of politicians, we got a completely flaming Afghanistan, and almost next to it-bloody Tajikistan, and again the 201st division at war. So it really turned out to be an "ellipsis".

- So, our stay in Afghanistan was useless for both sides?

"You can't say that either. Despite the obvious mistakes of the politicians of that time, our troops honestly and completely fulfilled the tasks assigned to them. Have we provided assistance to the DRA government in resolving the internal political situation? Rendered. Did we manage to stop all kinds of bloody actions of the armed opposition? It worked. We served as a barrier against a very likely invasion of the territory of the republic from outside? Served. And then we should not forget that in recent years we have fulfilled about sixty percent of the tasks of a peacekeeping nature: we helped build housing and industrial facilities, and train the Afghan army, which, alas, does not exist today. We even took on a kind of balance of orphanages. And how much material resources were left free of charge after the withdrawal of troops? By the way, if someone believes that the 40th army conducted exclusively combat operations day and night, then they are very deeply mistaken. As its commander, I will say that more than 70 percent of the forces and means of a Limited contingent were constantly used only for the transportation of humanitarian goods through the country. No, our stay there wasn't useless. And here it is not necessary to confuse the lack of the desired results of a general political nature and the specific actions of the soldiers of the OKSVA. Who we were there - only time and ordinary residents of this country will judge.

"But our guilt is not small before these people, is it?"

- We are primarily to blame for abandoning Afghanistan, which needed our help even after the withdrawal of troops. Russia, as the legal successor of the Soviet Union, was supposed to support President Najibullah, by the way, the smartest man. Who brought him to power and how it was done is another question. But he was as loyal to the Soviet Union and Russia as the tens of thousands of Afghans who supported their president. As a result of our political shortsightedness, they were kicked out of their country and are now roaming the cities of Russia. Only in Moscow and the region there were about one hundred thousand forced emigrants. Representatives of the Afghan community in the capital - it has 15 thousand people-have repeatedly addressed me as a deputy of the State Duma of the country, which they once believed. And we have created a special commission that should decide on their status or find another optimal solution to their problems. We are doing this because we consider it our duty to help people whose troubles are caused by our state.

- Our state is responsible not only for the troubles of Afghans, so to speak, indigenous, but also for the mutilated fate of thousands of our "Afghans"...

- yes. In 1989, I naively assumed that when our troops left Afghanistan, the president would certainly thank the soldiers of the 40th army on behalf of the state. We did not wait for this. They met us more than modestly, and it was bitter in my heart.

The commemorative signs and certificates that marked us, the "Afghans", are, of course, a good thing. But this is not what the state recognizes the military prowess of its army. In my opinion, it was necessary to gather together representatives of all periods of service as part of a Limited contingent at the highest level, say the kindest words to them, admit political mistakes, but loudly declare to the whole country: there is no blame on the army, the courage and heroism of soldiers are worthy of all respect, those who died in that war-eternal memory orphaned children are a special concern of the state... And if the whole country heard these words, I am convinced that many things in the lives of former "Afghans" would change for the better.

But it was different... And we got what we got: thousands of broken lives, disbelief in justice, bitterness. The state did not even consider it necessary to help somehow organize tens of thousands of young guys who were left to their fate, who were faced with the need to independently search for ways to survive in this life. The state, while verbally guaranteeing social protection to its soldiers, simply deceived them.

- We are well aware, Boris Vsevolodovich, that our state's debts to its army, and to the "Afghans" in particular, are immeasurably greater than to the IMF. Because these debts are primarily moral. And debts must be paid sooner or later. How do I do this today?

"Indeed, better late than never. I believe that first of all, the state should help those people who have lost their health there, "across the river". This opportunity exists, despite any financial difficulties. After all, there is an accurate record of disabled people. You should start with the disabled of the first group, then the second... No significant expenses are required for the state here. You can never forget the mothers and, I emphasize, the wives of the victims. There are people who, unable to withstand the moral blow from the state, simply went around the world. We know them too.

- "We" is the social movement "Fighting Brotherhood", which you lead?

"And the Battle Brotherhood, too. Our movement's main task is to promote the social protection of veterans of all local wars and military conflicts.

- Boris Vsevolodovich, "Fighting Brotherhood" is a public movement. Does this mean that its participants dissociate themselves from politics?

"We'd love to, but how can you hide from politics today?" Yes, and life today, and most importantly, the future largely depends on it. Therefore, we are already doing everything possible to ensure that representatives of our movement actively participate in political life both at the federal and regional levels. There is only one condition - to express as much as possible the interests of honest, decent people who sincerely care about the fate of the state. That is why the "Fighting Brotherhood" became one of the collective members of the all-Russian public political organization "Fatherland", which was headed by Yuri Mikhailovich Luzhkov.

- 10 years of withdrawal of troops and the end of the war-the date is more than significant. The same year marks the 20th anniversary of the introduction of parts of the OKSVA. You probably have something to say to those who went through Afghanistan...

- At the recent coordination council of the "Fighting Brotherhood", we were discussing, among many issues, the topic of, so to speak, the twentieth anniversary. I looked at the people who gathered in the hall and saw that they were still the same, slightly older, but inwardly, spiritually, if you will, fortunately, they had not changed one iota. And I would like to tell the people who went through this war that not everyone in our country has forgotten about those years, about their courage and military friendship, about their suffering and today's problems. And I would also like to say to all the "Afghans": know, dear military friends, they remember you, they think of you. There are also those who do not sit idly by waiting for better times. I do not doubt for a moment that hard times will pass and our state will still bow down to those who went through that war, who sacrificed themselves in various hot spots, and pay tribute to them. And I ask you to preserve your high sense of duty, honor, and self-respect. Remember, we were and will continue to be strong only through our unity. Only through joint efforts can we solve our problems. We need to stick together.

- Thank you very much, Boris Vsevolodovich, for the conversation. Please accept our best wishes for success to you and your fellow soldiers in your noble and much-needed cause.