Economic Survey of Poland, 2010

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Summary
Poland’s economic performance in 2009 was strong, given the global
downturn. Although excess demand was substantial prior to the crisis, the
external imbalance was modest relative to some neighbours’ and contagion was
contained. Macro-policy responses to the slowdown were largely appropriate,
and the sharp depreciation of the zloty cushioned the impact of the foreign
shock, but contributed to the postponement of euro adoption. The slowdown
even cooled off residual inflationary pressure, while the swift turnaround
in wages helped limit job losses. A number of issues should be addressed,
however, to strengthen Poland’s position in a globalising world and ensure
sustainable growth, given the prospects of future euro adoption, persistently
large EU transfers and desirable inflows of foreign direct investment.
The risks of a boom in the medium term are growing. Poland has become
the largest recipient of EU cohesion funds, with EU transfers set to reach an
annual average of 3.3% of GDP in the coming years. Combined with the impact
of large inward FDI inflows, there are widespread high growth expectations,
but destabilisation risks, especially as euro-adoption prospects are likely to
induce a sharp fall in the cost of capital. Macro-policies should rely on a precise,
forward-looking assessment of all the implications of such a combination and
be used pro-actively to head off any nascent imbalances. Heightened credit
demand and supply might also be contained by tighter prudential regulation.
Fiscal discipline must be restored. The 2003-08 economic expansion was
not used to improve the structural budget balance, though early retirement
pensions were slashed. Recent cuts in the tax wedge, welcome as such,
were, however, not totally compensated and thus initially pro-cyclical. The
cyclical and structural worsening of the fiscal position together threatens
the Constitution’s public-debt threshold. Consolidating public finance should
be achieved by: broadening the tax base; reducing the generosity of support
to farmers; extending the retirement age, especially for women; further
diminishing early retirement; saving on disability benefits; and improving
public-administration efficiency. At the same time, progress in pension reform
should be preserved and consistency between the domestic and Maastricht
definitions of the public debt ensured. The January 2010 consolidation plan
includes some of these features as general proposals, but its effectiveness will
depend on an early implementation of concrete measures.
The ground for euro adoption must be prepared. The euro would speed
convergence only under an appropriate institutional framework. Developing the
capacity to stabilise the economy once monetary and exchange-rate policies
are abandoned is the priority. Fiscal policy should be based on both a general
government structural deficit rule and a multi-year nominal expenditure rule,
with the creation of an independent fiscal council assessing and monitoring
its effectiveness. Product markets should be made more responsive to shocks
through more efficient utilities regulation, downsizing public ownership and
easing regulation in retail distribution and professional services. The minimum
wage should not be increased relative to the average wage but be differentiated
across regions, based on local labour-market conditions. Labour mobility should
be fostered by further deepening the rental market for housing and developing
urban zoning plans.
Broad structural reforms are needed to benefit more extensively from
globalisation. Poland has made impressive progress in developing international
economic linkages. Yet much remains to be done to attract foreign investors,
absorb FDI efficiently and improve export performance. The role of the state
should be reduced through a transparent process of privatisation and a faster
removal of administrative burdens. Infrastructure needs to be modernised,
especially for transportation and broadband Internet. The innovation system
should be beefed up by better matching demand and supply for skills,
greater competition between higher education institutions and more support
for commercial R&D. The foreign investment agency’s power should be
strengthened and export promotion efforts streamlined. Financial development
could be enhanced through consolidation of the co-operative banks and
improvement in the legal framework for collateral. Finally, support policies for
small and medium-sized firms should be rationalised. ■
What explains
strong relative
performance
during the crisis?
Despite a severe slowdown, Poland was less affected by the global recession
than other OECD countries, especially in Eastern Europe. Indeed, it is expected
to have recorded the best real growth outcome in the OECD in 2009 (at 1.7%),
before recovering steadily towards 3% growth in 2011. Resilient final demand
and the solidity of the financial system helped to contain the contagion of the
economic crisis, which hit some other countries in the region so harshly. At the
outset the economy had been suffering from significant excess demand, which
has been eliminated by the slowdown, but external imbalances were not so
large as to threaten stability.
Incipient capital outflows based on reduced appetite for the heightened risks
nevertheless triggered a significant depreciation of the zloty, which cushioned
the downturn, but also contributed to the postponement of euro adoption.
The prominent role played by foreign-owned banks may have protected the
financial system, while still limited financial development explains the low
penetration of the complex financial products that were at the core of the global
crisis. In this context, the flexible credit line agreed with the IMF in April 2009
helped to restore capital-market confidence. The real trade balance improved
as a result of the exchange-rate depreciation: domestic producers became
more competitive in both home and foreign markets, and import volumes fell
more abruptly than exports, despite relatively robust private consumption.
Domestic demand was supported by fortunate pre-crisis cuts in taxes and
social contributions, and infrastructure investments related to EU funds and
the 2012 European football championships. The labour market adjusted quickly
through a rapid slowdown in real wages after hefty increases in 2008, thus
limiting employment cutbacks.
As the downturn led to prospects of excess supply, the central bank (NBP)
swiftly cut official rates by 250 basis points. Unconventional measures were
also adopted to ensure liquidity in the domestic interbank market. Maturities
for NBP repurchase agreement operations were extended, the range of accepted
collateral broadened, and swap lines were negotiated with other European
central banks. While excessive borrowing in foreign currency had been actively
discouraged already in 2006, the Polish Financial Supervision Authority convinced financial firms to retain their 2008 profits in order to strengthen
their capital base and reinforced the supervision of both banks’ balance
sheets and their funding links with foreign parents. Guarantees for individual
deposits were also raised to reassure depositors, and some other measures
were introduced to strengthen the stability and maintain the liquidity of the
domestic financial system. On the fiscal side, beyond the partly uncompensated
tax cuts implemented since 2006 and the impact of automatic stabilisers, an
anti-crisis plan worth about 0.7% of GDP was implemented, including such
measures as co-financing of front-loaded investments related to EU funds,
allowing firms to temporarily accelerate the depreciation of certain assets and
facilitating the tax deductibility of R&D spending. ■
How to ensure a
balanced recovery
going forward?
Poland has become the largest beneficiary of EU cohesion policy in absolute
terms. Over 2009-15 EU transfers will represent an average of 3.3% of GDP per
year (including Common Agricultural Policy transfers). They provide a unique
opportunity to modernise the economy, but absorbing them efficiently and
managing the macroeconomic repercussions will be a challenge. While various
leakages will dampen the demand effect, these transfers are expected to
raise real growth by an average of 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points per year. Unless
there is available slack, this will generate inflationary pressure, especially if
this period coincides with euro-adoption prospects that might raise investors’
confidence, leading to a real exchange-rate appreciation, a shift in activity in
favour of the non-tradable sectors and an enlarged trade deficit.
In this context, the authorities will have to strive to maintain a balanced
growth path. Structural policies to accompany EU transfers should focus on
ensuring a smooth labour- and product-market reaction to the stimulus. Due
to co-financing rules, EU funds tend to boost national budgetary expenditure
and could induce a pro-cyclical fiscal stance, in turn requiring an offsetting
fiscal tightening. Macro-policies should be based on precise assumptions related to the
EU-transfers path, and the risks of overheating should be carefully monitored.
As Poland has successfully avoided a major negative output gap, and given
the projected pick-up in growth, the 3.50% level of the main official interest
rate implies an accommodative stance going forward. In principle, it would
be best if fiscal policy were tightened decisively without delay. Should such
a consolidation not be forthcoming, however, it would fall to monetary policy to
tighten at an early stage, with the exact pace depending on economic prospects
and forthcoming data. Moreover, the continuity of monetary policy should be
enhanced by introducing overlapping terms to the appointments of Monetary Policy
Council (MPC) members, as recommended in previous Surveys. ■
What measures to
credibly consolidate
public finances?
The authorities did not use the exceptional 2003-08 expansion to improve the
fiscal position in a sustainable way, resulting in the need to use privatisation
receipts in the recent period of lower stock prices so as to meet fiscal targets.
Indeed, the measures taken in 2007-09 to reduce the tax wedge across the board
are welcome, since they tend to boost employment, though the tax wedge
remains larger than the OECD average and progressivity remains relatively
low. However, as they were not totally financed in the budget, they resulted
in a pro-cyclical fiscal expansion between mid-2007 and mid-2008, with the
underlying general government balance deteriorating by around two percentage
points of GDP.
Subsequent attempts to cut spending and raise revenues through an ambitious
privatisation programme have not been sufficient to contain the debt level
decisively below the precautionary thresholds of 50% and 55% of GDP, which are meant to trigger correcting measures. Indeed, adding the effect
of the slowdown to the deterioration of the structural position resulted in a
general government deficit of over 7% of GDP in 2009. General government
debt is projected by the OECD to reach 56.5% of GDP in 2010, threatening the
Constitution’s 60%-of-GDP debt limit in 2011 if no consolidation measures
are undertaken. As a result, in order to get around that constraint the
government recently debated whether to shift back part of the contribution
to open pension funds into the social security’s first pillar. This would have
reversed a significant part of the pension reform designed in 1999 and led to
the replacement of explicit pension liabilities (government bonds purchased by
pension funds) with implicit ones (notional accounts indexed on government
bond yields). The recent shelving of that idea is welcome, given that it would have
undermined the commitment to the reformed pension system and may have
lessened incentives to lower the deficit down the road.
In late January 2010 the Prime Minister presented the Plan for the Development
and Consolidation of Finances 2010-11, which remains to be approved by
the government. Some of the foreseen consolidation measures are broadly
in line with the recommendations included in this Survey: strengthening
fiscal institutions; completing the pension reform; broadening tax bases;
and generating substantial privatisation revenues. The Plan is essentially a
set of proposals (without any accompanying draft legislation, many of them
being subject to further public debate) to contain the increase in the general
government deficit and public debt, and create conditions for meeting the
long-term development objectives pursued by the authorities. Its success will
depend on the degree of ambition shown in the implementing legislation,
which is expected to be adopted by the end of 2010. The concomitant update
of the Convergence Programme, which projects a reduction of the Maastricht
deficit from 7.2% of GDP in 2009 to below 3% in 2012, without providing
quantified concrete measures, is disappointing to the extent that the main part
of the effort is back-loaded to 2012, threatening the overall credibility of the
commitment to resolutely restore sound public finances.
Greater fiscal discipline is a pre-requisite to both internal and external balance.
Ensuring sound public finances will require structural reforms. For example, Poland’s numerous farmers benefit from an overly generous special social
security system, which provides inappropriate incentives to stay in the sector
(at least officially) and weighs on public expenditure. Reforming this extensive
safety net will be sensitive, however, and costly. With the long-term objective of
aligning it with the general scheme, subsidies should be gradually reduced by better
linking contributions to incomes, while adopting complementary measures to develop
transport and telecommunication infrastructure, and enhance access to education in rural
areas. Increasing employment rates at older ages, which are among the lowest
in the OECD, would also greatly facilitate the management of fiscal policy. The
tightening of access to early retirement achieved by the 2008 bridge-pension
reform is an important and welcome step; it is officially expected to save
PLN 2 billion in 2009 and PLN 6 billion in 2010. Although the “50+ Programme”,
designed to raise older workers’ labour-market participation, also goes in the
right direction, the statutory retirement age for women should converge steadily with
that for men, which should itself be indexed according to increasing life expectancy. Early
retirement should also continue to be reduced. For example, while all pensions paid
from the general scheme will become actuarially neutral from 2014, some
special regimes applying to certain occupations, beyond farmers, such as
miners, soldiers and police officers still encourage early retirement.
Cutting the structural deficit should also be achieved by broadening the tax base.
In that regard, calculation and publication of the list of tax expenditures would
be useful in identifying areas where savings could be made. The VAT treatment
of certain professional services should be improved (such as by the requirement
to use cash registers as envisaged in the consolidation plan) in order to enhance
tax collection, while the option of choosing to pay a lump-sum income tax
without keeping accounting books should be restricted in order to link tax
receipts more closely to earnings. Farmers should also be made liable for the
income tax rather than the lump-sum agriculture tax. These measures should
be accompanied by better administrative enforcement. Moreover, receipts
can be raised in less distortionary ways such as by reforming property taxes and
introducing a carbon tax.
On the spending side, although Poland has managed to reduce the inflow of
disabled pensioners by tightening eligibility criteria, a re-evaluation of the large
stock of benefit recipients with permanent eligibility built up under earlier lenient criteria
could generate additional savings. Moreover, cutting the wage bill and increasing
public-administration efficiency by linking career development to performance more
systematically would also help to restore fiscal sustainability. All these measures
would help Poland meet the Maastricht deficit and debt criteria, which must be
satisfied for successful adoption of the euro. ■
How to best prepare
for the adoption
of the euro?
Entering the euro area should enhance trade and financial integration,
intensify competition and accelerate convergence in living standards. Reduced
transactions costs, the disappearance of currency risk and lower interest
rates will all tend to support economic growth. However, the potential gains
are not something the authorities can take as given: they must first design
the institutional settings that would allow the realisation of these gains and
ensure smooth management of the significant impacts of the whole process.
In November 2009, the Polish authorities established an organisational
structure for euro adoption. Preparing the ground through implementing a series of
key structural reforms would enhance real and nominal convergence, thus making an
eventual announcement of the date for adopting the euro more credible. Setting another
adoption date prematurely risks damaging the authorities’ reputation.Given the level of the remaining income gap vis-à-vis the euro area, the
substantial room for further real and nominal convergence raises important
issues. Economic catch-up tends to be associated with real exchange-rate
appreciation, thus creating inflationary pressure in a monetary union. Lower
real interest rates will boost investment and domestic durables consumption,
providing an important demand stimulus that will attract foreign suppliers
and investors, leading to a deterioration of the trade balance and possibly a
distorted allocation of resources. Closing off the possibility of managing specific
shocks via interest- or exchange-rate changes puts fiscal policy at the centre
of macro-stabilisation, while it is up to structural policy changes to ensure the
economy can better absorb economic shocks.
Fiscal policy therefore needs to be made more counter-cyclical: at a minimum
the working of the automatic stabilisers should not be obstructed and
possibly enhanced by measures that would increase progressivity in the
tax/benefit system. A rule specified in terms of a ceiling on the structural
general government deficit consistent with the medium-term objective of the
Stability and Growth Pact of a deficit no greater than 1% of GDP could help
achieve this by, for example, preventing a pro-cyclical easing being masked
by exceptional revenues during an expansion. A complementary expenditure
rule with multi-year limits on the value of general government expenditure,
excluding cyclically sensitive items (in particular, unemployment benefits),
would strengthen the government’s capacity to stabilise the economy.
The creation of an independent fiscal council to monitor and assess the
implementation of these rules would enhance the overall credibility of the
fiscal framework. Indeed, implementing such a deficit rule would require an
analysis of the cyclical and structural components of the overall deficit, which
should be kept at a safe distance from potential political pressures, as such
analysis raises complex technical issues. Fiscal policy also has to be carried
out more transparently. Objectives and communication should not apply only
to the state budget, but refer explicitly to the Maastricht definition of the
general government balance. Likewise, the consolidated public debt should be
monitored based on the same definition as Eurostat. In particular, the National
Road Fund, which is being increasingly used to finance the heavy transport
infrastructure needs and whose debt might already amount to more than 2% of
GDP in 2010, should be included in the national definition.
More competitive product markets and greater flexibility in labour markets
would enable faster price adjustments and reallocation of resources in
response to shocks. Stringent product-market regulations are restraining
competition in various areas, including network industries, retail distribution
and professional services. Regulated prices that are below cost-recovery levels,
especially in utilities, should be corrected and efficient regulation developed to stimulate
the needed investments to modernise these sectors. Public ownership in the
potentially competitive segments of network industries (electricity, gas, airline, rail and
post) should be phased out. In retail distribution, the administrative costs related to the
registration and issuance of licenses and permits should be reduced. Finally, regulations
on educational requirements and licensing in professional services raise barriers to entry
and should be eased.Reducing wage rigidities will also facilitate any future need to correct real
exchange-rate overvaluation. Although the labour market is not excessively
rigid and the wage-bargaining system is largely decentralised, the government
remains heavily involved in minimum-wage negotiations. Since 2005, the
minimum wage has increased by 14% relative to the average wage, leading
the ratio between them to exceed the OECD average. Policy makers should refrain
from further raising the minimum-to-average wage ratio and remove the rule that it has to reach 50% in the future compared with 40% in 2009, since the current level may
already be harming employment prospects for low-skilled workers. Also, given
the strong regional disparities in unemployment rates and low internal labour
mobility, the authorities should consider introducing differentiated regional minimum
wages based on local labour-market conditions. Also, while some laudable
measures are being taken to deepen the rental market, which will help to
stimulate regional labour mobility, more could be done in this direction by continuing
to exert pressure on local authorities to develop urban zoning plans.
In the run-up to the euro, real interest rates might fall significantly below their
natural levels, threatening to destabilise the economy, as the experience of
other EU countries suggests. Too low interest rates and a rapid discounting of
the resulting permanent income gains by households provide incentives to raise
spending significantly, possibly triggering a credit boom through the expansion
of consumption and housing loans. Moreover, such circumstances, combined
with positive market sentiment and rising inflows of foreign investment, could
result in a strengthening of the currency that may be too rapid relative to
fundamentals. In turn, this would harm external price competitiveness and,
at the same time, distort the allocation of resources towards construction,
real estate and other sheltered activities, slowing aggregate productivity gains
if competition in these non-tradable sectors is limited. This process could be
magnified by the impact of EU transfers if the decision is taken to adopt the
euro before implementing the fiscal and structural reforms discussed above.
Some additional changes might offset these destabilising effects of a boom-bust
scenario. These include policies to promote competition in services. Beyond
those, macro-prudential regulations could be strengthened to contain uncomfortably
high credit demand and supply. This could be achieved through both dynamic
provisioning for banks and higher capital requirements, which would reduce
the pro-cyclicality of credit supply. The probability of a housing
and/or consumption boom could also be reduced by: introducing limits on both
loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios; removing support for housing demand,
such as the reduced VAT rate on new purchases and the tax breaks applying to
mortgage interest rates; and by ensuring vibrant competition in construction.
Moving property taxes to a market-value basis could lead to a useful increase in
receipts while providing more efficient market signals to construction activities.
However, if all these changes prove to be insufficient, fiscal policy would need
to be more pro-active. ■
What policies to
make the most of
globalisation?
Poland has made tremendous progress in increasing international linkages
in capital, product and labour markets, as reflected by significant shifts in
specialisation towards sectors with underlying comparative advantages. Yet,
while maintaining macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite, a wide range
of reforms could enhance participation in the globalisation process beyond
EU integration, so as to better allocate resources, exploit economies of scale and
speed up technology diffusion. These include the product- and labour-market
reforms discussed above that would help to respond to the ongoing structural
changes that characterise globalisation. Given that investment needs easily
exceed the flow of available domestic saving, attracting FDI is key. However, the
positive effects of foreign capital inflows depend on the capacity of domestic
firms to absorb them, and an appropriate institutional setting is necessary to
extract all the benefits. Also, while globalisation tends to magnify economic
inefficiencies, major obstacles that prevent firms from developing their full
potential in export markets should be removed.The privatisation process should be reinvigorated and its credibility strengthened.
Poland is the OECD country where the grip of the state on the economy is the
tightest, and privatisation was largely stopped in the mid-2000s. While sales
of public firms directly attract foreign investors, privatisation also represents
a commitment to market-economy principles, which tends to raise investors’
confidence. Beyond generating public revenues, greater private ownership
would provide more scope to boost investment in a fiscally constrained
environment, in addition to improving the governance of state-owned
enterprises and productive efficiency more generally. The government
recently designed an ambitious privatisation programme involving the sale
of 802 firms aimed at generating proceeds representing 2.7% of annual GDP
between mid-2009 and end-2010. The plan fell short of its objectives for 2009,
in part no doubt because of stock-market weakness. To ensure success this
year reasonable asking prices will have to be set. In any case, the whole approach
should be transparent and consistent, and avoid overly generous compensation to
the specific interests affected by the sales. Investors might not be inclined to
participate in partial privatisations that leave open the possibility of future
state intervention. In particular, the “golden veto” legislation by which the Treasury
was allowed to maintain a privileged position in strategic state-controlled
enterprises for public interest reasons may have de facto restricted FDI and
lowered the market value of these companies. The Sejm has just passed a
new law that abrogates the 2005 Golden Veto Act, which had been viewed by
the European Commission as incompatible with EU law. In its place the new
legislation, based on a December 2008 EU Directive, allows the government to
implement various measures to protect critical energy infrastructure.
Improving the business environment has appropriately received increased
attention by policy makers. However, despite the creation of a system of
one-stop shops, starting a company is still too costly and takes too long because
multiple procedures involving numerous decision-making entities have been
maintained. Formalities to start up a business, get construction permits and
register properties are excessive, risking corruption to get around them. Ongoing
progress achieved under the implementation of the “Better Regulation” programme, aimed
at improving the regulatory environment for doing business, should be extended. More generally, inefficient government bureaucracy hampers economic activity, and tax and
legal regulations should be made more transparent and predictable.
Modernising infrastructure would boost potential output growth and allocate
resources more efficiently. Insufficient quantity and quality of motorways and
under-investment in the maintenance of existing transport infrastructure have
combined with increasing transportation needs to make the development of
road and rail networks a priority in order to reduce costs and attract foreign
investors. As 40% of the EU funds allocated for 2007-13 will be used to develop
transport, enhancing the capacity to absorb these funds efficiently will be
essential. Progress has been made, and should be continued, to: improve the
legal framework for public procurement and the issuance of building permits;
enhancing co-ordination between all public and private parties involved in
the process; systematically defining project priorities based on cost-benefit
analysis; and facilitating the issuance of temporary permits for foreign workers
to avoid future labour shortages in construction-related activities.
Broadband Internet is insufficiently developed mainly due to the control
maintained by the incumbent operator (TPSA) and the inability of the regulator
(UKE) to ensure effective competition in the market. Discriminatory treatment
of alternative operators limits the use of the incumbent’s infrastructure, and
it is too soon to assess whether the recent agreement reached between the
incumbent and UKE will succeed in ensuring equal access. Despite recent
improvements to the regulatory framework, the power of the regulator should be
strengthened further. Moreover, UKE should proceed with the functional separation
of the incumbent, the effective unbundling of the local loop and the implementation of
a wholesale pricing scheme that is consistent with costs and conducive to long-term
investments.
The gap between the skills needed by firms and those provided by the
education system has grown despite rising educational attainment. Recent
measures encourage training at work; however, a comprehensive and flexible
lifelong strategy should be developed. Students should be encouraged to study science
and technology, and the links between employers and the education system should be
strengthened. The currently discussed reform of the higher education system
could foster FDI absorption and export performance by: systematically assessing
the quality of higher education institutions and putting financing of public and private
institutions on an equal footing; simplifying the student-loan scheme; and allocating
academic positions based on transparent and competitive procedures.
Investment in R&D is low compared with other OECD countries in the region
as a result of insufficient linkages between firms and universities, and the
relatively limited technological content of the industrial specialisation. One
direct way to boost R&D expenditure would be to increase tax credits, especially given
their currently low levels compared to the OECD average, so long as there is adequate
monitoring and evaluation of its efficiency. Also, the quality of public research
institutions is instrumental to increase the return on R&D investment. Current
efforts to concentrate the public funding of research should be intensified in
order to link resources to performance more systematically, thereby helping the
best centres to reach a critical mass. Researchers should be encouraged to move in
and out of businesses, and financial incentives provided to develop scientific partnerships
between firms and universities, and to promote international research collaboration.
Expanding the financial capacity of the foreign investment agency (PAIiIZ)
might boost FDI inflows significantly. PAIiIZ’s resources do not compare
favourably with those of its competitors in neighbouring countries, and
empirical evidence suggests that the size of such agencies’ budgets contributes
heavily to inward FDI, especially when funds are targeted at activities to improve the quality of the investment and business climate. Moreover, PAIiIZ
could be turned into an independent agency so as to participate more efficiently
in the decision-making process, with the power to make binding offers to
foreign investors without resorting to lengthy approvals by ministries or other
relevant authorities.
While the number of export promotion agencies has grown at a fast pace
worldwide over the last two decades, this function remains fragmented in
Poland. The creation of such an agency would bring together these activities in one
place with an exclusive focus on export promotion and branch offices in key
trading-partner countries. Such an agency could encourage SMEs to co-operate
to access foreign markets and offer training support to overcome barriers
related to managerial skills needed for engaging in export activities and to
the acquisition of knowledge of international markets. It could also seek to
raise Polish exporters’ awareness of the prohibition against bribing foreign
public officials in international business transactions under Polish law and
Poland’s commitments to combat such bribery under the OECD’s Anti-Bribery
Convention. Also, the web presence of export promotion activities should be aligned
with international best practice.
Financial development should be encouraged as a way to channel savings towards
the most productive projects. The financial system has already been
modernised significantly, in part due to the increasing role of foreign banks,
but margins remain large, suggesting that competition is insufficient. Banking
infrastructure is underdeveloped in rural areas. Co-operative banks should be
consolidated to reduce fixed costs and facilitate access to credit. Moreover, the legal
framework for collateral suffers from the inefficiency of the commercial court
system, which generates huge uncertainties for creditors in recovering pledged
assets. Recent legislation aimed at simplifying procedures goes in the right
direction, but enforcement should be strengthened and the senior position of the state to
call collateral removed. The planned privatisation of the Warsaw Stock Exchange
is of key importance, as it has the potential to enhance the Polish market’s
integration within the network of European stock exchanges, broaden the listed
companies’ shareholders base, improve liquidity and provide greater finance for
SMEs.
Compared to other OECD countries, including those in Eastern Europe, the
distribution of Polish enterprises is heavily skewed toward small firms,
suggesting that important obstacles prevent them from developing their
businesses. These structural weaknesses might explain why exporters have
trouble reaching distant markets. Previous OECD work focusing on Polish SMEs
has argued that the fragmentation of support policies among various entities should be
reduced and co-ordination among them improved.
This is particularly the case for the government financing schemes that provide
guarantees and facilitate access to finance. The loan and guarantee funds
should be rationalised, and their operation and fees standardised through
consolidation or increased co-operation. SMEs often lack basic skills in business
and financial management, accounting and marketing. Hence, public support
should target these areas for SME training. This applies as well to vocational
training for which participation is heavily skewed against SME employees
compared to other Eastern European countries. ■

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