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Belarus-Russia: the Military Aspect of Integration
Актуальные публикации по вопросам военного дела. Воспоминания очевидцев военных конфликтов. История войн. Современное оружие.
The military aspect of the Belarusian-Russian integration attracts attention of analysts from many countries. This interest is largely conditioned by the fact that the advanced form of such integration could have a significant bearing on the regional balance of forces and entail tangible consequences for Ukraine, the Baltic states and Poland. If the Belarus-Russia military co-operation is deliberately considered in the context of NATO's enlargement, movement of the Alliance's zone of responsibility towards western borders of Belarus, and this co-operation is seen in terms of confrontation-which is often the case-then the dynamics of the Belarusian-Russian military integration can be perceived with concern and seen as one of the possible prerequisites of future confrontation. However, one assumes that military co-operation between Belarus and Russia is a natural process, consistently evolving within the framework of the general integrational paradigm, irrespective of the enlargement of NATO or anticipated "neo-imperialist impulses" from Moscow, then the assessments will be less disturbing.
For understandable reasons, western experts keep in mind the perspective of the Russian armed forces' deployment on the territory of Belarus. Sherman W. Garnett, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, "For the states of the region and the West, the issue is not so much whether Belarus disappears as a sovereign state-for even the most sweeping forms of integration are unlikely to return Belarus to the formal status of province-but rather whether Belarus retains real control over its security policy on key questions of the deployment and control of military forces on its territory."1
This issue is really important. According to one comment, "military subordination" of Belarus "has not yet assumed a definite character, particularly with regard to deployments of Russian forces and equipment."2
Notably, many German experts in East European affairs do not perceive the Belarusian-Russian integration and its military component as something extraordinary. They do not see in it a threat to Germany or Western Europe, although they acknowledge that the union of Belarus and Russia can make Poland "a little nervous". According to Hermann Clement of the East European Institute in Munich, from this Union, Moscow has little to gain in military terms. Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Society, also believes that "not very much has changed" since the signing of the Union of Belarus and Russia.3
Nevertheless, integration of Belarus and Russia in the military sphere is becoming a notable phenomenon, affecting the situation in the region.
New Stage of Military Co-operation
In the context of the formation of the Union of Belarus and Russia under the treaty signed on 2 April 1997 in Moscow, large-scale tasks in the area of security were highlighted. According to Article 11 of the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia, signed on 23 May 1997, these tasks, in particular, include:
Ыco-ordination of the activities of the Union participating states in the area of military building and development of their armed forces, joint use of the military infrastructure;
Ыjoint defence procurement; provision, on its basis, for deliveries and sales of armaments and military equipment, establishment of the joint maintenance system for the armed forces of the Union member states;
Ыimplementation of co-ordinated border policy, the development and realisation of joint programmes on border issues, provision for interoperability of the border troops' command and control bodies of the Union member states to protect borders of the Union.4
On 19 December 1997, the meeting of senior defence officials from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus and that of the Russian Federation took place in Minsk. The official delegation of the Russian defence establishment was headed by defence minister Marshal I. Sergeyev, and the Belarusian delegation-by defence minister Colonel-General A. Chumakov. The questions of implementation of the basic provisions of the Treaty on the Union and the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia in the military area, problems of the European security and NATO enlargement were discussed.
The meeting resulted in the signing of a package of documents. The main among them are the treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on military co-operation, and agreement on the joint provision for regional security in the military sphere.
According to I. Sergeyev, the signing in Minsk of the package of documents on defence issues was not an impromptu, but a logical result from the joint effort of expert groups, which started to work immediately after the Moscow meeting in May 1996. Defence ministers adjusted the provisions of the former treaty on co- ordination of activities in the military area to the present realities of the Belarusian-Russian relations and current international situation. 5
To all appearances, the signed documents will not introduce any fundamental changes in the relations between military structures of the two countries. At the press conference on the results of the visit, I. Sergeyev emphasised that the achieved agreements do not presuppose creation of joint military structures or formations.6 It was also noted that the question of re-deployment of nuclear wea-pons in Belarus-if such weapons are deployed on the territory of the new NATO members-was not raised during the negotiations. The Russian defence minister pointed out that the development of military co-operation between Russia and Belarus will take place under the conditions of downsizing overall strength of their armies, and in no way will destabilise the situation in Central Europe.
Prospects for Military Integration
Belarusian-Russian military integration is one of the most significant areas of co-operation between the two countries. The military-strategic aspect of the relationship with Belarus is of special importance for Russia, and the Russian side deliberately accentuates it. Nevertheless, relations in the area of military co-operation cannot be developed separate from the other components of the Belarusian-Russian union.
Additionally, the area of Belarusian-Russian military co-operation itself is far from being free from problems. Some issues were raised by the Belarusian side, but sa-tisfactory solution to these have not been found yet. For instance, according to Major-General Yuri Portnov,7 it is expedient, first of all in the strategic interests of the Russian Federation, to jointly maintain and use certain facilities of the military infrastructure in Belarus-command and control centres, communication centres, airfields, transport routes and so on-under the conditions of consolidated allocation of required resources.
Interestingly, in connection with the prospective enlargement of NATO and the need to adjust the CFE Treaty in the light of the developing military- strategic environment, Russian experts have lately raised the question: To what degree the conclusion of the military union with Belarus and deep integration with it in the military sphere meet security interests of Russia. On the one hand, this can considerably enhance position of Russia, for example, in terms of air defences, and provide an opportunity to use airfields, communications and other components of the infrastructure. On the other hand, a long line of close contact of Russia's and NATO's forces will emerge.
According to Yuri Fyodorov, Professor of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, "maintaining Belarus's guaranteed neutrality can become a more meaningful contribution to Russian security than a military union with Belarus."8 In his view, the Russian armed forces will then be separated from NATO's troops by a vast neutral zone, save the Kaliningrad enclave. This may contribute to non-deployment of fo-reign forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Poland. In addition, if the question of equalling NATO's and Russia's military potentials in the southern part of the Baltic region is raised, then Belarus's neutrality can be advantageous for Russia, since the balance in this case will be established between Russia and NATO rather than between Russian-Belarusian coalition and NATO. Accordingly, Russia would be in position to retain more troops in this region than in case of a military union with Belarus.
It seems that there is a good deal of truthfulness in the assumption that the neutrality of Belarus under the deve-loping military-political situation could be more attractive for Russia than a military union with Belarus. As a matter of fact, Belarus, being a reliable strategic ally of the Russian Federation, but politically remaining independent and, at the same time, loyal toward Russia's foreign policy and its military-political interests in the western direction, could play a more weighty-and even stabilising-role than in case of a close military association with Russia, something that would strengthen inclination of the Baltic states and Ukraine to NATO.
Additionally, there is an impression that the general course of integration has somewhat slowed down lately. The Russian leadership appears to be reluctant to undertake burdensome large-scale integration endeavours at the time when Russia has to concentrate limited resour-ces for the solution of domestic problems of the economic development.
On the whole, the Belarusian-Russian military co-operation does not seem to have achieved a level when it could be perceived as provocative in Central Europe and in the West. There are no grounds to consider this co-operation as confrontational by nature, dictated by the intent to build up a threatening "military fist".
In the foreseeable future, the Belarus-Russia military integration is unlikely to be shaped so that it could require deployment of an advance grouping of Russian forces on the Belarusian territory-even in case of the establishment of the regional grouping of troops. Neither Belarus, nor Russia are interested in the restoration of military confrontation with the West, and they will likely avoid any steps compromising their position. Hence, judgements that have been appearing lately, for instance, in the analysis of some foreign researchers-that some sort of Belarusian-Russian military bloc jeopardising neighbouring states has already been formed-do not reflect the reality. It is revealing that Russian senior defence officials do not long to speed up the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusian military structures or formations. Obviously, there has been growing understanding in the Russian defence establishment that incautious developments in the military integration with Belarus are not expedient, as these could provide for additional arguments to those who, counting on closer ties with NATO, are prompt to speculate on "Russian expansionism".
1 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 106.
2 Ibid., p. 109.
3 "Belarus-Russia Union No Threat-German Experts," Reuters , April 2, 1997.
4 "Ustav Soyuza Belarusi i Rossii," Sovietskaya Belorussia , May 27, 1997.
5 Vo Slavu Rodiny, Dec. 23, 1997.
6 "V Minske pobyval ministr oborony Rossii," Beloruskaya Delovaya Gazeta , Dec. 22, 1997.
7 Yu. Portnov, "Voyennoje sotrudnichestvo Belarus-Rossiya," Belarus v Mire , No. 2, 1996, p. 23.
8 Yu. Fyodorov, "Rasshireniye NATO i modernizatsiya Dogovora OVSE," Yaderny Control , No. 28, 1997, p. 8.
For understandable reasons, western experts keep in mind the perspective of the Russian armed forces' deployment on the territory of Belarus. Sherman W. Garnett, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted, "For the states of the region and the West, the issue is not so much whether Belarus disappears as a sovereign state-for even the most sweeping forms of integration are unlikely to return Belarus to the formal status of province-but rather whether Belarus retains real control over its security policy on key questions of the deployment and control of military forces on its territory."1
This issue is really important. According to one comment, "military subordination" of Belarus "has not yet assumed a definite character, particularly with regard to deployments of Russian forces and equipment."2
Notably, many German experts in East European affairs do not perceive the Belarusian-Russian integration and its military component as something extraordinary. They do not see in it a threat to Germany or Western Europe, although they acknowledge that the union of Belarus and Russia can make Poland "a little nervous". According to Hermann Clement of the East European Institute in Munich, from this Union, Moscow has little to gain in military terms. Alexander Rahr of the German Foreign Policy Society, also believes that "not very much has changed" since the signing of the Union of Belarus and Russia.3
Nevertheless, integration of Belarus and Russia in the military sphere is becoming a notable phenomenon, affecting the situation in the region.
New Stage of Military Co-operation
In the context of the formation of the Union of Belarus and Russia under the treaty signed on 2 April 1997 in Moscow, large-scale tasks in the area of security were highlighted. According to Article 11 of the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia, signed on 23 May 1997, these tasks, in particular, include:
Ыco-ordination of the activities of the Union participating states in the area of military building and development of their armed forces, joint use of the military infrastructure;
Ыjoint defence procurement; provision, on its basis, for deliveries and sales of armaments and military equipment, establishment of the joint maintenance system for the armed forces of the Union member states;
Ыimplementation of co-ordinated border policy, the development and realisation of joint programmes on border issues, provision for interoperability of the border troops' command and control bodies of the Union member states to protect borders of the Union.4
On 19 December 1997, the meeting of senior defence officials from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Belarus and that of the Russian Federation took place in Minsk. The official delegation of the Russian defence establishment was headed by defence minister Marshal I. Sergeyev, and the Belarusian delegation-by defence minister Colonel-General A. Chumakov. The questions of implementation of the basic provisions of the Treaty on the Union and the Charter of the Union of Belarus and Russia in the military area, problems of the European security and NATO enlargement were discussed.
The meeting resulted in the signing of a package of documents. The main among them are the treaty between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on military co-operation, and agreement on the joint provision for regional security in the military sphere.
According to I. Sergeyev, the signing in Minsk of the package of documents on defence issues was not an impromptu, but a logical result from the joint effort of expert groups, which started to work immediately after the Moscow meeting in May 1996. Defence ministers adjusted the provisions of the former treaty on co- ordination of activities in the military area to the present realities of the Belarusian-Russian relations and current international situation. 5
To all appearances, the signed documents will not introduce any fundamental changes in the relations between military structures of the two countries. At the press conference on the results of the visit, I. Sergeyev emphasised that the achieved agreements do not presuppose creation of joint military structures or formations.6 It was also noted that the question of re-deployment of nuclear wea-pons in Belarus-if such weapons are deployed on the territory of the new NATO members-was not raised during the negotiations. The Russian defence minister pointed out that the development of military co-operation between Russia and Belarus will take place under the conditions of downsizing overall strength of their armies, and in no way will destabilise the situation in Central Europe.
Prospects for Military Integration
Belarusian-Russian military integration is one of the most significant areas of co-operation between the two countries. The military-strategic aspect of the relationship with Belarus is of special importance for Russia, and the Russian side deliberately accentuates it. Nevertheless, relations in the area of military co-operation cannot be developed separate from the other components of the Belarusian-Russian union.
Additionally, the area of Belarusian-Russian military co-operation itself is far from being free from problems. Some issues were raised by the Belarusian side, but sa-tisfactory solution to these have not been found yet. For instance, according to Major-General Yuri Portnov,7 it is expedient, first of all in the strategic interests of the Russian Federation, to jointly maintain and use certain facilities of the military infrastructure in Belarus-command and control centres, communication centres, airfields, transport routes and so on-under the conditions of consolidated allocation of required resources.
Interestingly, in connection with the prospective enlargement of NATO and the need to adjust the CFE Treaty in the light of the developing military- strategic environment, Russian experts have lately raised the question: To what degree the conclusion of the military union with Belarus and deep integration with it in the military sphere meet security interests of Russia. On the one hand, this can considerably enhance position of Russia, for example, in terms of air defences, and provide an opportunity to use airfields, communications and other components of the infrastructure. On the other hand, a long line of close contact of Russia's and NATO's forces will emerge.
According to Yuri Fyodorov, Professor of the Moscow State Institute for International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, "maintaining Belarus's guaranteed neutrality can become a more meaningful contribution to Russian security than a military union with Belarus."8 In his view, the Russian armed forces will then be separated from NATO's troops by a vast neutral zone, save the Kaliningrad enclave. This may contribute to non-deployment of fo-reign forces and tactical nuclear weapons in Poland. In addition, if the question of equalling NATO's and Russia's military potentials in the southern part of the Baltic region is raised, then Belarus's neutrality can be advantageous for Russia, since the balance in this case will be established between Russia and NATO rather than between Russian-Belarusian coalition and NATO. Accordingly, Russia would be in position to retain more troops in this region than in case of a military union with Belarus.
It seems that there is a good deal of truthfulness in the assumption that the neutrality of Belarus under the deve-loping military-political situation could be more attractive for Russia than a military union with Belarus. As a matter of fact, Belarus, being a reliable strategic ally of the Russian Federation, but politically remaining independent and, at the same time, loyal toward Russia's foreign policy and its military-political interests in the western direction, could play a more weighty-and even stabilising-role than in case of a close military association with Russia, something that would strengthen inclination of the Baltic states and Ukraine to NATO.
Additionally, there is an impression that the general course of integration has somewhat slowed down lately. The Russian leadership appears to be reluctant to undertake burdensome large-scale integration endeavours at the time when Russia has to concentrate limited resour-ces for the solution of domestic problems of the economic development.
On the whole, the Belarusian-Russian military co-operation does not seem to have achieved a level when it could be perceived as provocative in Central Europe and in the West. There are no grounds to consider this co-operation as confrontational by nature, dictated by the intent to build up a threatening "military fist".
In the foreseeable future, the Belarus-Russia military integration is unlikely to be shaped so that it could require deployment of an advance grouping of Russian forces on the Belarusian territory-even in case of the establishment of the regional grouping of troops. Neither Belarus, nor Russia are interested in the restoration of military confrontation with the West, and they will likely avoid any steps compromising their position. Hence, judgements that have been appearing lately, for instance, in the analysis of some foreign researchers-that some sort of Belarusian-Russian military bloc jeopardising neighbouring states has already been formed-do not reflect the reality. It is revealing that Russian senior defence officials do not long to speed up the establishment of joint Russian-Belarusian military structures or formations. Obviously, there has been growing understanding in the Russian defence establishment that incautious developments in the military integration with Belarus are not expedient, as these could provide for additional arguments to those who, counting on closer ties with NATO, are prompt to speculate on "Russian expansionism".
1 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 106.
2 Ibid., p. 109.
3 "Belarus-Russia Union No Threat-German Experts," Reuters , April 2, 1997.
4 "Ustav Soyuza Belarusi i Rossii," Sovietskaya Belorussia , May 27, 1997.
5 Vo Slavu Rodiny, Dec. 23, 1997.
6 "V Minske pobyval ministr oborony Rossii," Beloruskaya Delovaya Gazeta , Dec. 22, 1997.
7 Yu. Portnov, "Voyennoje sotrudnichestvo Belarus-Rossiya," Belarus v Mire , No. 2, 1996, p. 23.
8 Yu. Fyodorov, "Rasshireniye NATO i modernizatsiya Dogovora OVSE," Yaderny Control , No. 28, 1997, p. 8.
Опубликовано 29 апреля 2014 года
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