Polish-Belarusian Relations wihhin the Context of NATO Expansion

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Опубликовано в библиотеке: 2014-04-22
Источник: "БЕЛАРУСЬ В МИРЕ" No.001 01-01-97


Entering NATO is the most important short- term goal of Poland's foreign policy and one of its major strategic goals. Since the 1989 breakthrough, when Polish foreign policy recovered full sovereignty, it has been Poland's fundamental aim to reorientate alliances and foreign policy towards the West.

That direction is absolutely in line with Poland's self- consciousness as well as the convictions of the majority of citizens. There was also the significance of decades of communism and unequal rights in Polish-Soviet relations within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. But it has to be stressed that this was an additional and not a dominating factor.

One of the main aims of reorienting Poland westwards was to guarantee security for the state. Analyses made by politicians and political experts resulted in one clear conclusion, that the only effective means of ensuring the Poland's security in a strategic dimension was to work towards achieving membership in NATO.

Obviously, this reorientation had a significant bearing on relations with her neighbours in the East. It is worth stressing at this point that after December 1991 Poland stood in an entirely new geopolitical situation. Instead of a Soviet empire on the eastern border there appeared new states: Lithuania, Belarus, and the Ukraine, with Russia in the north.

These were states with which Poland had contacts of varying intensity and strategic importance. And at the same time certain historical stereotypes existed concerning Poland's eastern neighbours, often creating obstacles on the way to any real partnership. These have significantly affected the Polish- Belarusian relationship. However, despite this these contacts were the least intensive.

The complications took place after the visit by Minister Skubiszewski to Belarus in October 1990, when Belarus became the only state not to sign a joint declaration with Poland on mutual relations, and at the same time by the small activity of Belarus on the international arena.

In the opinion of the Polish public and a good number of politicians, Minsk was looking for its own place on the international arena and Belarus should have been given time to define its own interests. The links between Poland and Lithuania or Ukraine were much stronger and more intensive.

Attempts to strengthen contacts with Minsk were made by the governments of Jan Olszewski and Hanna Suchocka, and both proved unsuccessful. Neither did a breakthrough in mutual relations come after the visit of President Lech Walesa to Minsk, made at a time of crisis in Belarus, i. e. the controversy over the extent of a rapprochement between Belarus and Russia.

This problem has been taken to the heart by the political elites in Poland. It also affects current Polish-Belarusian relations in a fundamental way. In a nutshell, one can say that the independence and sovereignty of Belarus is one of the foremost guarantees of the stabilisation of Poland's independent existence. Support to Belarusian independence is also a feature of Poland's policy towards Minsk. Growing international contacts make it possible to formulate the second of these principles as an expectation that free market economy will develop in Belarus.

Political analysis shows that the implementation of these two principles would not be possible in the long run without strengthening democracy in Belarus. Hence the Polish interest in the development of democratic institutions and of a civil society beyond our eastern border.

Nonetheless, the general context of Polish-Belarusian relations should not be forgotten. They form a part of the overall picture of Polish Eastern policy as well as this country's efforts towards rapid access to western political structures. Moreover, one can say that they emerge from these two elements of Poland's foreign policy.

Poland's road to NATO - despite the interpretation made by Russia's diplomacy - does not mean the intention to create new divisions in Europe or to set up a "cordon sanitaire" of an anti-Russian character. On the contrary, Polish politicians are of one mind in emphasising that Poland is interested in furthering NATO enlargement process beyond its first stage. Warsaw hears with pleasure the declarations of the Baltic States and the Ukraine that in the future they too see their place in an integrated security system supported by NATO. Ex-Solidarity politicians as well as those from the post-communist camp do not exclude the possibility that in the future the Russian Federation too will find its place within the NATO system. Warsaw only stresses that the process of European stabilisation should be a gradual process and have a defined direction: West to East. It seems that such a principle should not harm Polish-Belarusian relations. And yet the declarations voiced by President Lukashenko, bitterly opposed to NATO's eastwards move, undoubtedly cool down bilateral relations. It would seem that the clearly defensive nature of the Alliance should not cause Belarus to feel threatened. The more so that Brussels has declared a policy to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons and large military units on the territory of new members.

The problem of expansion also bears on Poland's global policy towards the East. While with Kiev we have ma-naged to settle all doubts and we have gained the approval of Vilnius, this area is still a main source of misunderstanding with Russia. Moscow categorically - one could even say, ideologically - opposes NATO expansion. However, it should be stressed that the motivations for this "no" have, in my view, nothing in common with reality.

Russia's basic argument is against "new division of Europe". In fact, NATO enlargement liquidates one of the dividing lines, removing part of the buffer zone, the zone of restricted security between the territory of Russia and NATO countries. For several years now the integrated air control systems ceased to operate in this zone, and it has become less and less saturated with armed forces, when compared to the surrounding area. A lack of unequivocal security guarantees has meant that the zone stretching from Finland to Bulgaria could become a place where conflict could ignite or provoke nuclear powers to establish spheres of influence.

It seems that traditional geopolitical thinking, based upon the category of spheres of influence, is at the very source of Russia's "no" to NATO expansion. The tendency demonstrated by Moscow, sometimes called neo-imperial, is nothing else but an attempt to reconstruct Moscow's sphere of influence beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, this policy could lead all former states of the communist bloc, and especially former Soviet republics, to unite in opposition.

Russia has her place in Europe (or better said: on the Euro-Asian continent) and nobody is negating her principal role in European politics. At the same time it should be in the joint interest of medium-sized and small states to oppose Russia's preferred idea of creating a new "continent of powers", slicing up spheres of influence and imposing their decisions on smaller countries. The democratic provisions of the Washington treaty which is the buttress of NATO, also protect them from such domination.

That is why Poland sees an opening for herself, as well as for her eastern neighbours in stabilising the NATO security structure and its growth eastwards.

Paradoxically, it seems that the decision to invite Poland to NATO may help to improve Polish-Belarusian relations, which are now not particularly good. Similarly to Polish-German relations, Poland's presence in NATO will have a bearing on a full predictability and stabilisation of foreign policy. It will surely become less nervous and less sensitive to many activities of its eastern neighbours. Poland also intends to take on the role of advocate of the interests of her neighbours within NATO (again a parallel with Polish-German relations is seen).

This comparison can be taken further. In many Polish circles, Germany's unification was a cause for much concern. Later it proved that relations with united Germany became much better than could have been expected just a few years ago. It was found possible to leave behind the burdens of history.

It seems that a similar process may take place between Poland and Belarus. At the present stage any discussion on fundamental issues, connected to Poland's membership in the Alliance, will be generally fruitless. In order to lay decent foundations for the future, i.e. the day after enlargement it seems that we should support the development of Polish-Belarusian contacts at an econo-mic and social level. We should strive for an open border and strengthen the links between political organisations and NGOs of both countries.

It cannot be hidden that a major difficulty is caused by the present political situation in Belarus. The implementation of a constitution which is disavowed by the international community and the dissolution of a legitimate parliament have closed many of the ordinary doors to international contacts, and also driven a chasm between Belarus and Europe. This, seen from Poland, is not good.

Concluding, one might say that Belarus and Poland do not have conflicting interests in any of the fundamental political issues concerning contemporary Europe. The expansion of NATO in the long run should lead to an improvement of relations between Minsk and Warsaw. A great deal will depend on Russia's policy. However, one should count on Russia giving up neo-imperial visions for the future which would not be to her advantage for economic reasons and would bring isolation from the international community.

Because of her geographic position, and for historical and civilizational reasons, Belarus is a hub for all of Central and Eastern Europe. It can use this position to provide advantages which would compensate generously for its small mineral wealth. That, however, depends primarily on the political stability of the region, and that can only be guaranteed by an extended NATO.

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