On September 23, 2008, the Institute of Current International Problems (IAMP) of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation hosted a round table discussion on the topic:: "Russia - Central Asia and Radical Islam".

The round table was attended by representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Council of Muftis of Russia, St. Philaret Institute, Moscow State University for the Humanities, MGIMO (U), the Carnegie Center and other leading scientific centers, as well as representatives of embassies of Central Asian countries.

The meeting was opened by the director of IAMP A. K. Pushkov. In his speech, he stressed the importance of the chosen topic in the context of the transition from the unipolar world of American hegemony to a multipolar world order. Plenary presentations were made by: S. A. Nikolaev-Deputy Director of the Third CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, A. V. Malashenko - member of the Scientific Council of the Carnegie Center, A. B. Podtserob - Head of the Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, G. A. Rudov - Head of the Center for World Economy and Global Problems of the IAMP.

In his report, Sergey Nikolaev presented an overview of the current state of relations between Russia and the Central Asian states. He stressed that Russia is primarily interested in ensuring that the region is stable and secure, in steadily strengthening relations of strategic partnership and alliance with its member States, and in working together with them to solve regional problems, including the fight against terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking. Among all the areas of cooperation, he particularly highlighted the energy sector, as it is in this sector that the foundations of multilateral cooperation with Central Asian partners are being laid, and promising integration schemes are being tested.

Within the framework of bilateral humanitarian cooperation, Russia pays special attention to protecting the rights and interests of our compatriots, preserving the position of the Russian language, and expanding the Russian educational, cultural and information space in the countries of the region. There is an understanding of the need to use the civil society resource in this area, including the capabilities of the Russian World Foundation.

The report also noted that the Central Asian region is increasingly attracting the attention of influential global players - China, the United States, Japan, and the European Union. In Russia, this is perceived calmly, since the integration of the Central Asian space into broader formats of interaction is an objective reality, which, in turn, implies increased competition there in various areas. Russia does not claim to be a monopolist in Central Asian affairs and is open to cooperation with other states, including on a competitive basis, but proceeds from the fact that it should ensure that Russia's strategic interests in the region are fully taken into account. At the same time, such cooperation should meet the urgent needs of the Central Asian countries themselves. There is every reason to consider the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as key complementary structures capable of countering security challenges and threats in Central Asia.

Today, we have identified an area where competition with the West will be particularly tough. For the United States and its allies, the priority is to strengthen their influence in the energy sector, with a focus on establishing control over oil and gas production and their transportation to foreign markets bypassing Russia. But in this area, our country has significant advantages

The counterarguments are the high level of cooperation with Central Asian countries in the energy sector, which will become even higher if progress is made in the construction of the Caspian gas pipeline and the modernization of the regional gas transmission system.

As the speaker emphasized, despite the fact that the overall situation in Central Asia remains stable, challenges and threats to regional security remain a reality. The dangerous neighborhood with Afghanistan, where the situation is not only not improving, but tends to further degrade, as well as the difficulties of its own internal development, are the main reasons why the region continues to be the focus of attention and activities of extremists, terrorists and drug traffickers, who have turned it into the main transit corridor for the delivery of Afghan drugs to the CIS countries, Russia, and further to Europe.

Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islyamiy (HTI) and the Turkestan Islamic Party (IPT) The former Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has repeatedly attempted to destabilize the situation in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, continues its subversive activities almost throughout the region. The strategic goal of these two organizations is to overthrow secular regimes in Central Asia and create a caliphate-like theocratic state in the Ferghana Valley. Hiding behind the slogans of returning Central Asia to the "bosom of pure Islam", the supporters of KhTI and IPT rely on spreading the most radical ideas in the region, which were not particularly popular there before. This has the most negative impact on the internal political situation in Central Asian countries, which is fraught with dangerous consequences on a regional scale.

A. V. Malashenko's report focused on the problems of the spread of radical Islamism in Central Asian countries. In his opinion, the activity of Islamists reflects people's dissatisfaction with the internal policies of the ruling elites, corruption, low living standards, and the lack of real reforms. In addition, the Islamic form of protest is a consequence of the prohibition or limited opportunities for its expression in a secular form.

Speaking about the religious roots of Islamic radicalism, the author noted the decline of traditional Hanafi Islam in Central Asia during the Soviet era. The radical trend in religion that gained momentum was a reaction to the weakness of traditional Islam, its degradation, the adaptability of the clergy, and the lack of a religious education system.

The report also spoke about external influence. Although the significance of this influence cannot be absolutized (as all Central Asian leaders persistently do), it should not be underestimated in any way. First, the Islamic radicals of the region fit into the global model of Islamism; second, various ties exist and strengthen between them and their foreign co-religionists; third, the basic ideological attitudes common in Central Asia are developed not in the region itself, but outside it. Finally, it is no longer possible to understand the nature of the problems faced by Central Asian countries without taking into account the situation in Afghanistan, which is increasingly seen as part of the region.

Most Islamist organizations in Central Asia are small groups, even circles. The real force is represented by Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamiy, and more recently by the Islamic Party of Uzbekistan. Although the main target of KHTI's activities is the current leadership of Uzbekistan, the party is a supranational organization, and its branches also exist in other countries of the region.

The number of CTI members is unknown. The inability to accurately count "active" Islamists suggests that there is no specific social stratum (or strata) in Central Asia that can be considered as the main support of Islamists.

The party consists of cells, from 3 to 5 people in each. The average age of CTI members is about 30 years. It seems that its structure will not change dramatically, as the current ideologues of Islamist extremism, such as Abu Musab al-Suri, who believes that the key figure of jihad should be a lone terrorist, and calls for temporarily abandoning the idea of creating an Islamic state in one particular country. But the territory of KhTI's activity is gradually expanding. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, the activity of KhTI is observed

already in the northern regions of the republic, where previously its presence was not noted. One of the main (and already solved) tasks of KhTI remains penetration into the state apparatus, including the security services. Although there is no confirmed data on how this happens, most analysts are confident that such a process is taking place.

Alexander Malashenko also pointed out that the ruling elites often use the danger posed by the activities of Islamic radicals as a pretext for suppressing the opposition. This is most typical for Uzbekistan. The threat from religious extremists has become a reason to demand that the population rally around the government and fully support it. A special role in shaping this approach was played by the civil war in Tajikistan, which all Central Asian presidents referred to when they wanted to show what excessive democratization and the entry into politics of supporters of forces acting under Islamic slogans leads to.

The tragic experience of Tajikistan has revealed a number of important circumstances. First, he demonstrated a high probability of Islamists entering politics, which can really destabilize the situation, and secondly, that in relations with them, the authorities cannot be guided only by the desire to crush the opponent by removing him from the field of legal politics.

After September 11, 2001, the leaders of Central Asian states did everything in their power to present their countries as the main bulwark of the struggle against global Islamism and terrorism. The success of al-Qaeda really worried the local regimes, but they were completely confident in their own strength and exaggerated the Islamist danger, based mainly on opportunistic considerations, namely, seeking increased material assistance.

In general, Islam in Central Asia remains quite politicized. However, when evaluating its role, you should be extremely careful, avoiding extremes.

No" green revolution " can be expected, including in Uzbekistan. In the near future, power will remain in the hands of secular authoritarian regimes. But for all that, Islamism as a political and religious phenomenon will remain, and its influence may increase. First of all, this applies to Uzbekistan, as well as to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where the socio-economic situation remains tense.

In Central Asia (except Kazakhstan), the process of archaization of society will continue, which creates prerequisites for strengthening the role of Islam as a regulator of social relations, and this in turn facilitates its further consolidation in politics. Organizations that already have experience in political struggle under religious slogans and have gained popularity by criticizing the ruling regimes from Islamic positions will be able to do this better than others.

A. B. Podtserob focused his attention on contacts of Russian Muslims with foreign religious non-governmental organizations (RNPO) of Islamic countries. The assistance provided by foreign NGOs to Russian Muslims is carried out in several main areas. One of them is cooperation in the field of training clergymen. Thus, in the second half of the 1990s, about 800 Russian Muslims studied at religious universities and institutes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. In Russia itself, by the beginning of this decade, Saudi, Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, Algerian, and Tunisian teachers were working in Muslim educational institutions. The results of religious education received by Russian citizens abroad were mixed, in particular, in Dagestan, the issue of their involvement in extremist organizations had to be considered by the State Council and the Security Council of the Republic in 2002.

A number of foreign NGOs, including the World Islamic Charity Organization (WIEBO), the League of Islamic Peace (LIM), etc., allocated funds for the construction, restoration or operation of mosques, Muslim cultural centers, religious institutions, madrasas, etc., although the scale of their financial assistance was not so great. Extensive charitable activities were also carried out (publishing religious literature, organizing various forums, providing assistance to the poor, refugees, people affected by armed conflicts or natural disasters, supplying medicines and food for this purpose, building hospitals, etc.).

It is important to note that organizations such as LIM, the World League of Islamic Youth (VLIM), Al-Igasa, and Taiba sought to circumvent Russian official religious structures in distributing financial aid, distributing the Koran, building mosques, teaching Russian Muslims abroad, and setting up children's training camps in Chechnya. Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Dagestan, and Bashkortostan. Moreover, an audit conducted by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation in 1995 revealed violations of Russian laws by Al-Igasa, Taiba and a number of other organizations. In the late 1990s, the situation changed for the better: under pressure from Egyptians, Algerians, and Tunisians, the Saudis reshuffled the leadership of the Russian branches of the League of Islamic Peace, Al-Igasi, and VLIM, whose main partners have since become official Muslim institutions in Russia.

Foreign non-profit organizations were also engaged in preaching activities in Russia and other CIS countries. Missionaries of some organizations promoted the ideas of religious revivalism, financed circles in which young people sympathized with Islamists were involved.

Significant financial assistance was provided by RNPO, co-

founded in 1990 in Russia by the Islamic Renaissance Party. So, in 1992, the Saudis provided its Dagestan branch with $ 17 million. It was not without external assistance that cells of such an international fundamentalist organization as the Islamic Liberation Party (IRP) also emerged in Russia at the beginning of this decade, which has become the largest Islamist group in the Russian Federation outside the North Caucasus region. Its cells were discovered in the republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, in Tyumen, Tobolsk, Nizhnevartovsk.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a situation similar to the Russian one also emerged in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, where Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Arab countries began to show interest. Especially assertive were the Turks, who emphasized in their propaganda not only their cultural and linguistic affinity, but also their common membership in the tolerant, reform-friendly Hanafi madhhab. The Iranians were most active in Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The opportunities of international Islamic organizations were also used. Soon, however, it turned out that the hopes of Russian Muslims for large-scale assistance from their co-religionists were not justified. Moreover, the leadership of foreign non-profit organizations became disillusioned with the secularist orientation of local political elites.

Both Russia and other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States have faced the problem of radicalization of young people studying abroad. At the same time, local branches of the PIO emerged in the Central Asian republics, which became the largest Islamist groups there, as in Russia.

A. B. Podtserob paid special attention to the assistance provided by international Islamic organizations to Chechen separatists. At the same time, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban (DT) played the most prominent roles. Maskhadov's representatives signed a protocol with bin Laden and the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on their assistance to Ichkeria with volunteers, weapons and ammunition. In turn, representatives of the "Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chechen Republic" who visited Kandahar in 1999 agreed with bin Laden to grant him - if necessary-asylum in Chechnya. Chechen fighters received military training at Al-Qaeda and DT bases in Afghanistan, and bin Laden allocated $ 10 million for their training directly in Chechnya.

In some cases, the governments of Muslim countries have been unable to stop aid to Chechen separatists, or have chosen to turn a blind eye to it, so as not to aggravate relations with their own Islamists. At the same time, during the second Chechen campaign, the capitals of Muslim states began to realize that it was not in their interests to contribute to the division of Russia and the transformation of the North Caucasus into a hotbed of terrorism and religious fundamentalism. This insight led to the fact that certain measures were taken to prevent the uncontrolled provision of assistance by foreign non-profit organizations.

In conclusion, the speaker expressed the opinion that in order to successfully fight any ideology, it is necessary to oppose it with another, more attractive ideology. The role of such an "anti-fundamentalist" ideological concept, in his opinion, could be played by Islam of a reformist or secularist orientation. The widespread adoption of such views is hindered by the lack of competent, well-trained teachers of religious subjects in Russia. The solution to this problem could be facilitated by sending Russian Muslim students to such religious educational institutions abroad, where future clerics are trained in the spirit of moderate Islam.

G. A. Rudov's speech was devoted to the analysis of such a phenomenon as political Islam, or Islamism. The speaker emphasized that in modern Islamic societies, two different but mutually pervasive processes are taking place against the background of globalization. The first is a manifestation of the global Islamic political system, the second is a negative reaction of Islam to the westernization of national culture and manifestations of consumerism. This reaction is accompanied by a rapid revival of Islam and a return to its traditional foundations, and this process is taking place not only in Central Asia, but throughout the Islamic world. It has found its expression in the return to the fundamental foundations of religion, "pure" Islam and the search for an answer to the challenges of today in the knowledge already achieved earlier and in the reform of Muslim society and the search for solutions to the problems generated by modernity. These two directions basically do not contradict each other and proceed from one important principle - the inviolability and immutability of the Holy Qur'an and the foundations of religion. There are only different ways to achieve the main goal-to preserve and strengthen the position of the Muslim community both in the region and in the world.

One of the important results of the revival of Islam was its politicization. As the speaker pointed out, the problem of religious extremism in the transitional societies of Central Asia is divided into at least two components: objective processes of religious revival that are natural in transition conditions and the use of the religious factor by internal and external forces in order to promote their interests.

The problem is to skillfully use the positive potential of the first, natural component, and try to reduce both existing and possible negative risks, as well as unnecessary consequences of the second component.

The speaker paid special attention to the problem of terrorism and the fight against it in the Central Asian region. World experience shows that the main negative consequence of international terrorism is a slowdown in the pace of economic and political development in some regions of the world.-

in different regions of the world. The concepts of "terrorism" and "modernization" are mutually exclusive.

As G. A. Rudov noted, the governments of a number of countries in the region tend to use the "Islamic threat" as an excuse for excessively large security forces, slow implementation of democratic governance principles and restrictions on freedom of speech.

During the general discussion, one of the leading Russian Islamic scholars, R. G. Landa (Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences), emphasized that fundamentalism, which spread widely throughout the Islamic world after the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979, and even more widely after the war of 1979 - 1989 in Afghanistan, did not turn into violence and terrorism everywhere. Most fundamentalist Muslims are "moderate" Islamists who are willing to defend their ideas through peaceful means. Together with those who are generally opposed to fundamentalism, they certainly make up the majority of followers of Islam.

Today, the politicization of Islam is facilitated by the growing socio-economic contradictions in the Muslim world and the difficulties associated with unsuccessful attempts at modernization, which also often come into conflict with the postulates of Islam. To this must be added demographic pressures, as well as technological backwardness, which deepens the inherited gulf between the West and the East.

Analyzing the situation in Central Asia, the speaker concludes that the new political elite needs to get rid of its communist past and its corresponding image. Rapprochement with Islam would be one of the steps in this direction. However, if in 1991-1992 the political leaders of the Muslim republics of the CIS were still forced to reckon with Islamists, by the end of 1992 they, following the example of Tajikistan, almost everywhere started suppressing the Islamist movement. Stability was achieved by systematically contrasting radical Islam with moderate Islam, fundamentalism with nationalism, and nationalism (if used by the opposition) with regionalism, "enlightened authoritarianism" and the charisma of a national leader.

A. I. Fursov (Center for Russian Studies, Moscow University for the Humanities) suggested in his speech that Islamic radicalism should not be considered as a revolt of tradition against modernity. According to a number of historians, fundamentalism is fundamentally different from traditionalism, primarily in that it is essentially a overcoming of traditions, offering to return to the origins of the period when no traditions were built yet. Being somewhat archaic in form, Islamic fundamentalism denies not only tradition, but also modernity.

Rejecting or overcoming traditions, Islamic fundamentalism (radical Islamism) enters into a complex relationship with globalization. In its form, fundamentalism acts as a denial of globalization, as a fighter against it. In fact, it is its base: without and without the phenomenon of globalization, it is difficult to imagine the current Islamic radicalism.

G. G. Kadymova (Diplomatic Academy) raised in her speech the problem of new self-identification of the population in Central Asian countries. Some members of the society accept new, mostly Western, liberal patterns and values, others seek support in the spiritual values spread by regional cultural centers, and still others - in local traditions. According to him, the following main identifications are formed in Central Asia: cultural and civilizational (Islamic), national and ethnic (state) and clan-territorial (local).

With the disappearance of Soviet values, people intuitively turn to traditions. Religion becomes a" lifeline " through which they try to find a new identity. They are encouraged to join the faith by local and foreign preachers who spread Sharia slogans that are so similar to the recently rejected Communist postulates of social justice and equality, but wrapped in an Islamic wrapper.

Forced to accept Islamic and clan values and local interests, the national elites of Central Asian countries are simultaneously trying to create a legitimate, controlled alternative to the ideology and political practices introduced by radicals. This creates the ground for an identification conflict, the essence of which is that the authorities forcibly impose the identification of the titular ethnic group, which ignores both the broader cultural and civilizational identification and the identity of national and other minorities. As for radical Islam, it tries to present itself as a carrier of a broader cultural and civilizational identification.

A. I. Vavilov (Russian Foreign Ministry) suggested that the main reason for the spread of Islamic radicalism is the deterioration or at best stagnation of the socio-economic situation in most Central Asian countries. The second, no less important reason, he sees in the weakening, and in the near future, the gradual loss of the population of these republics of the ties they had developed in the past with the global culture and civilization, the main channel of which was the Russian language. Finally, the third reason is the authoritarian nature of the regimes in the Central Asian republics.

In general, the Muslim world remained in the position of a global village, supplying the capitalist city with raw materials and cheap (often illegal) labor. In this difficult situation in the Muslim world, the mood of hopelessness and social despair is growing, and internal instability is growing. The lack of freedom of expression, the suppression of any manifestation of secular activity that deviates from the official line, untie the hands of Islamists, reinforcing their slogans about non-discrimination.-

the necessity of renouncing foreign influence, returning to the past, building a religious state and reviving the caliphate. The rise of the Islamist movement expresses the search of the third world states for new guidelines and ideals, their own path and place in a qualitatively different situation that has developed in the international arena after the collapse of the"socialist camp".

R. S. Bobokhonov (Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences) spoke about radical Islam in Tajikistan. In particular, he noted the role of so-called "men's clubs" in spreading the ideas of Islamism. During the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997), many men's clubs became centers for spreading the ideas of Wahhabism, calling for the overthrow of the existing state power and the construction of an Islamic state on the territory of the republic. In recent years, many men's clubs have not promoted the religious ideology of fundamentalists. The vast majority of members of such clubs no longer share the radical views of Wahhabis. The bitter lessons of the civil war taught us to live differently. Many clubs are gradually returning to their former social life. Today, the religious situation in the republic is completely under the control of the authorities.

A.V. Sadur (St. Philaret Institute) suggested in his speech that radical Islam emerged as a reaction of the Muslim religious society to those trends that have gone far from the ideal, the standard of which most Muslims consider the community of Muhammad. This is primarily due to the Sufis and cults that have developed within the Sufi tariqas. Some branches of Sufism developed practices that came into direct conflict with Muslim Orthodoxy: this includes excessive veneration of saints (awliya) and their burial sites, and defiantly immoral behavior of some members of Muslim society. All these phenomena, as well as the growing influence of the West and the secularization of the Islamic world, have generated a powerful wave of reaction called salafia.

Radical Islam has become a tool in the hands of political forces trying to make the regions of the former CIS their sphere of influence. It should be noted that first of all, it penetrated into traditionally Sufi regions: Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Tajikistan. And this is not accidental. Initially, Islamic radicalism was directed specifically against certain forms of Sufism.

According to the speaker, in order to solve the problems associated with the spread of radical Islamism, it is advisable to support such forms of traditional or regional Islam that have already proved their ability to successfully resist the onslaught of Islamic radicalism.

A. K. Nanayeva's speech (MGIMO) was devoted to the analysis of the activities of the Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamiy party (HTI), the most popular radical Islamic organization in Central Asia. The experience of the KhTI's activities in different countries of the world highlights the ambivalence of its character: on the one hand, it draws strength from a centralized ideological base, which also supports the party, including organizationally, on the other, success largely comes from the fact that its leaders are able to take into account the specifics of local conditions in this region.

Most of the members of the KhTI are Uzbek, although the organization also includes ethnic Kyrgyz and Tajiks. In Central Asia, the party operates mainly in Uzbekistan, and its main goal is to overthrow President Karimov. However, the organization has recently stepped up its activities in Kyrgyzstan as well.

Many members of KhTI are unemployed young people. Young people are drawn to HTI because of dissatisfaction with their lives, or even just out of boredom. Recruits are particularly attracted by the promises of Islamic radicals to restore public order, ensure social equality, and help the poor and all those in need. As a rule, members of Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islamiyyah come from poorly educated families, and they are most actively recruited in rural areas, where the most acute problems are poverty, unemployment and lack of educational opportunities.

However, recently there has been a steady trend not only of quantitative growth, but also of qualitative improvement in the membership of KHTI. Currently, the emphasis is on attracting educated young people to the party's ranks, first of all. Recruitment work is actively carried out among civil servants, law enforcement officers, as well as among military personnel and prisoners in correctional labor colonies.

V. V. Cherny (Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) noted in his speech that globalization destroys centuries-old cultural and everyday traditions in the countries of Islam and in fact forms a new type of modern neo-colonialism, contributing to the polarization of society in these countries in terms of income and lifestyle. This causes sharp criticism of the traditionally conservative societies of Islamic countries, and pushes its members to create protest organizations whose activities are directed, among other things, against the American ideas of global democratization.

The growing trends towards social stratification and marginalization are a breeding ground for ideologists of radical Islam. Despite repeated defeats of both military and political nature, extremism in the region is constantly reviving, as the population is threatened with unemployment and starvation. To overcome the danger of social explosions, it is necessary, first of all, to overcome glaring social inequality and raise the educational level of the population of the countries. Simultaneously with the implementation of the poverty eradication program, measures to improve the

Public health and housing issues should also be addressed by punishing those responsible for war crimes, which is a constant demand of the Central Asian public.

A.V. Mitrofanova (Diplomatic Academy) focused her speech on the problem of drawing the line between Islam as a religion and Islamism as a religious ideology. In Islam, religion and politics are almost inseparable. Sharia is both religious and civil law; the Ummah (community of Muslims) is understood as a religious and political community. It would seem absurd to think that there can be any trends of political quietism in Islam. However, politicized Islamists not only see, but constantly emphasize the difference between them and the supporters of "just Islam" (quietists).

The Iranian secular scholar Ali Shariati (1933-1977), who is considered one of Khomeini's predecessors, created a real hybrid form of religion, interpreting in the spirit of Shiism the activities of guerrilla movements in Latin America and in general the world practice of revolutionary struggle. A significant part of the Iranian clergy's rejection of the ideas of Sharia shows that those who support the traditional understanding of religion as a way of personal salvation cannot accept religious ideologies.

One of the most revolutionary transformations of Islam carried out by Khomeini was the filling of traditional dogmas with modern political content, which sometimes led to a radical transformation of these dogmas. Thus, Khomeini completely rethought the concept of shehadat, which in traditional Shiism was applied exclusively to saints of former days. Khomeini was one of the first to call people from the street, participants in political battles who died for their beliefs, martyrs.

Islamism is characterized by a broad interpretation of who is a Muslim. One of the slogans of the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a kind of identification of "Muslims" and "oppressed": the oppressed of the whole world were considered something like honorary Muslims. The phrase "Muslim peoples and the oppressed of the world" is constantly found in Khomeini's "Testament".

V. N. Matyash's speech (Diplomatic Academy) was devoted to the influence of the United States in the region. From the Black Sea to the Pamirs, the speaker pointed out, a zone of Russian-American rivalry is being formed before our eyes. Russian analysts do not rule out the possibility of creating a "security belt" of pro-Western countries around Russia. China also has more and more reasons to fear the US policy of limiting Chinese influence not only in the world as a whole, but also in the Central Asian region. The United States ' military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are provoking a negative reaction from Muslim circles in Central Asian countries. The effectiveness of the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan remains low, and the inability to defeat the underground network of Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islyamiy gives it the opportunity to get closer to the radicals of the Islamist movement in Uzbekistan. American analysts understand that further radicalization and militarization of Islamist movements in the region will only exacerbate Washington's problems.

Russia's position stems from two provisions laid down in the Russian foreign policy strategy. The first of them is the idea that the former Soviet republics of Central Asia are a natural zone of Russian influence, since Russia rightfully belongs to the place of a regional leader in a space connected with it by common historical and cultural roots. The second is that the main goal of Russia's security policy is to fight terrorism in general and, above all, in the Central Asian region.

Oleg G. Peresypkin (Diplomatic Academy) continued the topic suggested by the previous speaker, emphasizing that several years ago the United States and its allies launched an active campaign to introduce into the public consciousness the idea that the Islamic world is a threat to other civilizations. Such ideas and manipulations are invented by the neoconservatives of the United States, who are trying to find a new enemy in the face of the Islamic world after the collapse of the USSR and the socialist system. An analysis of US actions in the Middle East shows that it is the Americans who unwittingly and sometimes knowingly encourage extremist elements in Islam. The Taliban movement in Afghanistan was created by the United States in opposition to the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul, and bin Laden was and remains the most talented and expensive CIA agent.

The results of the discussion were summed up by G. A. Rudov. He suggested that the spread of radical Islamism in the Central Asian region is associated with the following factors::

- problems of socio-economic development resulting from unsuccessful modernization projects;

- the decline of traditional Islam during the Soviet era, which created a vacuum that was immediately filled with radical concepts;

- the predominance of authoritarian regimes in the region, which make it impossible for the secular opposition to function;

- the influence of extra-regional forces of both states and international Islamic movements.

The participants agreed that, although radical Islamism poses a serious threat to the security of the region, it should not be overestimated, since today total Islamization of the region looks like a small-scale prospect.

The round table review was prepared by Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences A.V. MITROFANOVA

* Quietism is a religious and ethical teaching that preaches humility, submission, contemplative, passive attitude to reality, and complete submission to the divine will. (Editor's note)