The long and extremely complex process of establishing the unity of Russia and the Caucasus is saturated with contradictory trends, sometimes associated with dramatic events, which, unfortunately, often become the subject of political speculation. They are increasingly being used by forces interested in undermining Russia's position in the Caucasus.

In 1992, a very representative congress of Turkologists was organized in Ankara with the direct assistance of Turkish official circles, and specialists from the Russian autonomous regions and former Soviet republics were also invited to participate. At this meeting, among other things, it was suggested that " the vast Turan Turkic community in the Caucasus and Central Asia should unite under the leadership of Turkey." For the sake of credibility, a supposedly "historical justification" was given, in which Turkey was depicted as the traditional intercessor of the highlanders. As an "indisputable" proof, the phenomenon of mahajirism was cited - the resettlement of mountaineers to the Ottoman Empire, which was outlined at the end of the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, and for which they are trying to lay the blame entirely on Russia. This version in the 90-ies of our century was reflected in a number of publications that appeared in the publications of some republics of the former USSR.

However, in modern Russian historiography, a completely new direction has also emerged in the study of the phenomenon of mahajirism, in which a promising, in my opinion, scientific development of the well-known Krasnodar scientists A. Avramenko, O. Matveev, P. Matyushchenko and V. Ratushnyak "Russia and the Caucasus in the latest historical publications (1995)"played a peculiar role. It denies the existence of genocide of mountaineers at the final stage of the Caucasian War and after its end. Emphasis is placed on documents that were not put into scientific circulation until recently. They show that at the final stage of the Caucasian War, the Russian command, with the approval of higher government authorities, considered it necessary to use the most important political measure to prevent further bloodshed on both sides, allowing everyone who wanted to move to co-religionist Turkey.

One of the initiators of this approach, General N. I. Evdokimov, gave the following explanation: "The relocation of recalcitrant mountaineers to Turkey, without a doubt, is an important state measure that can end the war in the shortest possible time without much strain on our part, but in any case I have always looked at this measure as an auxiliary means... which makes it possible not to drive the highlanders to despair and opens a free way out for those of them who prefer death rather than submission to the Russian government." At the same time, the rebellious mountaineers were offered a free choice: to go abroad or settle in new, more fertile lands of the Caucasus with a guaranteed arrangement of their life. The mountaineers could openly discuss the alternative at village gatherings.

Secret proclamations were distributed among the mountaineers through the Muslim clergy with an insistent invitation "to go to Turkey, where the Ottoman government will arrange for them the most generous reception and where they will live incomparably better...". Despite the fact that it was known that the Turks intended to make the immigrants a "striking force" against neighboring Christian peoples, and mainly Against Russia itself, the local authorities initially did not attach serious importance to this agitation and underestimated the danger of a mass exodus. Nevertheless, the position of the Muslim clergy, who were afraid of losing their privileges in an Orthodox country, combined with Turkish propaganda proved to be important in shaping the phenomenon of mahajirism. It also coincided with the mountain people's tendency to migrate.

Many left solely out of a sense of solidarity with their relatives, and not at all because they really considered it unacceptable for themselves to remain under Russian rule.

It is important to note that those who were resettled received assistance. Back in 1857, the chief of Staff of the Caucasian Corps, D. A. Milyutin, in a report to the Minister of War, very clearly stated the ideas of the officer corps in this regard: "... duties to the human race require that we take measures in advance to ensure the existence of even hostile tribes. Other representatives of the high command of the Russian army operating in the Caucasus also insisted on providing assistance to the mountaineers who moved to Turkey. Special commissions were created for its organization. They were charged with the task of "understanding all the needs of the displaced", helping them to "sell more profitable property that they cannot take on steamboats", and making sure that the shipowners did not oppress them. The most needy mountaineers were granted resettlement allowances from the Russian treasury, primarily to "the poorest large families".

Thus, the resettlement of mountaineers to Turkey was largely carried out at the expense of funds allocated by the Russian treasury. The mountaineers who entered submissively under Russian patronage were also provided with material support, for which they were purposefully "allocated funds for social assistance", and provisions were prepared to feed them in the hungry winter time. The state, by the way, did not provide such assistance to Russian immigrants, for example, Doukhobors and other sectarians who went abroad due to their unwillingness to obey the law on universal military service.

Official permission to emigrate to the highlanders, who did not want to accept Russian citizenship and made a voluntary choice in favor of leaving, followed in 1862. Faced with uncontrolled emigration, representatives of the Russian administration in the Caucasus almost immediately began to take measures to suspend the eviction. In the official correspondence of that time, deep regret was repeatedly expressed that the peaceful, hardworking population was leaving the borders of Russia. Views on the situation were dominated by the view that our country will not be able to fill the region with human resources for a very long time, and such an outcome does not meet its state interests. I would like to emphasize that the lack of confidence in the possibility of developing the outskirts also led to the loss of Alaska, which is certainly one of the biggest geopolitical blunders of Russia in the XIX century. Facts of the same order include the mass migration of mountaineers to Turkey, some of whom were later used for hostile purposes for Russia, including in the Balkans.

Those who believed that the relocation of the highlanders, they say, should not be regretted, as a rule, were removed from their posts and lowered in rank. In 1867, the emigration of mountaineers to Turkey was prohibited in Russia and allowed only " privately, in some exceptional cases." However, due to the propaganda of Turkish agents and the distrust of local residents, it was not possible to completely stop the resettlement, it continued as early as the 90s of the XIX century.

One of the most common pretexts used by the population was a statement about the desire to make a pilgrimage (Hajj) to Mecca to worship the tomb of the Prophet Mohammed for a period of one year. Those who received a permit did not always return to Russia. Respecting the Muslim tradition, the Russian authorities found themselves in a difficult position. At least the fact that some pilgrims were allocated from the treasury assistance for these needs indicates what attitude they had to the phenomenon of Hajj in Russia. There were specially equipped steamers "for the convenience of Messrs. Hadji".

According to the available approximate data, the total number of displaced persons can be estimated at 400-500 thousand people. Migration to Turkey, by the way, also came from the inner provinces of Russia, but it never took on such a massive character.

Over the course of several centuries, the following distribution of influence in the Caucasus has been established: Iran - in the eastern part, along the coast of the Caspian Sea, Russia - in the north-eastern and central parts, Turkey-in the western part, along the coast of the Black and Azov Seas.

To a large extent, the eviction took place from the zone of traditional Turkish influence, which, in comparison with the above facts, shows who is really the main culprit of the tragedy. Pursuing its goals in the Caucasus, Turkey was also fully supported by some Western powers, and above all by England, which, using its colonial experience, played on the religious feelings of the highlanders in order to " restore them against Russia."

In this regard, the personal ideas of Shamil's son Jemal-Eddin about the background of this tragedy are also indicative, who angrily stated, watching its expansion:"...I'll write to Sultan Abdul Majid to tell him to stop fooling the mountaineers... The Turkish Government's policy toward the highlanders was exactly the same as that of the Europeans toward the Negroes. The Turkish government did not even have the generosity to give shelter to the mountaineers-immigrants to Turkey, who went there with trepidation, as if to holy places, thinking to find a new homeland for themselves in co-religionist Turkey. The cynicism of the Turkish government reached such a point that the Turks, in the beginning almost encouraging immigrants with appeals, thought to use the fugitives, apparently, for their own military purposes... but when faced with an avalanche of refugees, they were afraid and shamefully condemned to extinction people who were dying and were ready to die for one sign-for the greatness of Turkey."

N. Buachidze, the first chairman of the Terek Council of People's Commissars, made the same observations (only with a certain ideological touch of his era) about the true role of Turkey in the fate of the mountain peoples. Recalling his stay in this country for two and a half years at the turn of the 20th century, he singled out, as particularly memorable, meetings with emigrated mountaineers, over whom the Turkish beks " mocked and looked at them as stepsons, as Giauros, they did not have land, did not even have a voice on the courts." And while bitterly admitting their mistake, all the mountain emigrants he met said that "their situation under tsarism in Russia was much better than in Turkey." The bitter realization that " in Christian Russia... it would be better in all respects than in Mohammedan Turkey, " came to those who left their homeland repeatedly.

In the Ottoman Empire and other countries of the Middle East, they were soon completely disappointed, and a huge mass of mountaineers was filled with a desire to return to Russia. Its diplomatic missions abroad, the Embassy in Istanbul and various consulates were literally inundated with numerous requests from mountaineers for their return.

The main Directorate of the governor in the Caucasus has repeatedly informed the heads of regions, provinces and separate parts of the region that " many immigrants of previous years, according to reliable information, are dissatisfied with their current situation ... and have a general desire to return."

This was primarily opposed by the Turkish government itself, which settled low-habitable regions with mountaineers and used them for the most difficult and grueling work. Russia did not refuse the mountaineers in this situation either. However, taking into account the costs incurred by the Russian treasury for resettlement, restrictions were placed on re-emigration to exclude its spontaneous and unpredictable consequences. Suffice it to say that applications for permission to return to Russia usually covered large groups of families (up to 8,5 thousand or more), and their simultaneous reception and arrangement was difficult and very problematic. It is in this context that we should consider, in my opinion, the resolution of the Russian Emperor Alexander II on one of the mass petitions: "There can be no question of returning", which is still used as a decisive argument in the version of "Russia's historical responsibility" for the tragedy. Although from the perspective of what we have now experienced, this resolution can, of course, be considered erroneous. Moreover, a single decision did not determine the nature of the process as a whole.

Emigration by smaller groups was not prohibited, and it did occur. Thus, out of the total number of people who moved to Turkey in 1861, more than 70 percent returned from the Kuban and Terek regions. Unfortunately, due to the noted incompleteness of statistical data, such calculations cannot be made for other years, and even more so for decades. Families of mountaineers returning to their homeland, with permission or illegally settled by the Russian authorities "in their former places out of humanity and leniency for their plight."

Many mountaineers who passed through Turkish emigration have dramatically changed their attitude towards Russia.

Hasan Hadzarat, who was in Turkey in 1919 on behalf of the organizers of the Mountain Republic, who set a course for creating an independent state in the North Caucasus, was surprised to report from Istanbul in a letter dated February 23 to P. T. Kotsu, who held the post of chairman in the government: "Dear Przemaho,.. Now something about the Turkish Circassians... Strange as it may seem, they do not view Russia negatively, believing that we should never quarrel with it."

When assessing Russia's geopolitical mission in the Caucasus, it is necessary to take into account the contradictory tendencies that influenced its implementation. One of them was singled out by Leo Tolstoy in his handwritten reflections on the plots of the story "Raid". Hot on the heels of the events, the great Russian writer noticed what Russian science approached only at the end of the XX century under the influence of the developments of prominent modern researchers of the region: in the Caucasian War, justice was also on the side of Russia. "Who will doubt," L. N. Tolstoy put the question to eyewitnesses and descendants , " that in the war of the Russians with the Highlanders, justice, which follows from a sense of self-preservation, is on our side? If there wasn't this war, what would ensure all this?.. Russian possessions from... raids?"

According to the historian B. V. Vinogradov, who specializes in the problem, robberies involving the abduction of people, property, and cattle were not uncommon at the turn of the XVIII - XIX centuries, although the mountain peoples were by no means subject to the imposition of Russian orders. Recalling the first years of his service in the Caucasus, General A. P. Ermolov highlights the presence of a constant threat to the Russian borders there as the most significant among other state concerns: "Raids, murders, robberies were no less frequent."

The existence of a permanent threat to the Russian borders in the XVIII - first half of the XIX century was recognized in international treaties. Thus, even after the Peace of Iasi (1791), Turkey, despite the victory of Russia in the war, received recognition of its rights over the western Circassian tribes, while at the same time committing itself to " use all power and methods to curb and abstain the peoples on the left bank of the Kuban River, living near its borders, so that they would be able to the borders of the All-Russian Empire were not raided, no insults, predation and ruin were committed to Russian-imperial subjects and their families, homes and lands, either secretly or openly, and under no guise were people captured in captivity."

Justice at the same time, following the reflectionsof Leo Tolstoy, was also on the side of the Highlanders. And now we have to regret that unity between Russia and the Caucasus was established not only as a result of peaceful solidarity. After all, for many centuries, Russia has developed into a multinational power under the pressure of specific conditions, the defining core of which was the long-term coincidence of the interests of peoples in the vast expanses of a significant part of Europe and Asia, which contributed to their mostly voluntary unification. This trend was also clearly visible in the Caucasus. Thus, the outstanding Armenian educator X. Abovyan wrote in his novel" The Wounds of Armenia " (1840):: "Blessed be the hour when the Russians... they have entered our holy land... "- and called on his fellow tribesmen to "glorify God" for having heard the prayer and brought the long-suffering people "under the powerful sovereign hand of the Russian tsar". The importance of studying this trend was pointed out by the famous Russian humanist and philosopher N. K. from far away abroad as early as 1935. Roerich, with the hope that " a fair, well-founded story will be written about how much Russia has helped different peoples at different times, and this help was not self-serving, on the contrary, Russia itself was very often suffering."

In most cases, its conquests were dictated by the urgent need to protect the security of the population and the State as a whole. At the same time, they were, as it were, an integral part, but by no means predominant, of the general stabilization process that took place over many centuries within Eurasia. Many other nations took part in this stabilization in solidarity with Russia. The war with Shamil, for example, was waged not only by Russian troops, but also by the highlanders themselves. Their actions have repeatedly received high praise from the command. So, after a series of fierce battles in 1841, General P. H. Grabbe, in an order dated May 24, regarding the Mountain volunteer militia that particularly distinguished itself in them, stated the following:" ... the Kabardian, Dzhar and Kumyk militia competed in bravery with the Cossacks." In 1851, peaceful Chechens bravely fought with the detachments of two naibs of the Imam, and during it they suffered very significant losses.

The need to take into account the role of the peoples of the Caucasus themselves in the annexation of the region to Russia was first pointed out by Prince Meshchersky in a travel diary published in 1876, shortly after the end of the Caucasian War: "The Caucasus was conquered both by the weapons of the Russians... and by the weapons of the natives of the Caucasus. Throughout the sixty years ' war in the Caucasus, we see that in these wars the natives there were always different... They gave the Russian troops a whole galaxy of heroes worthy of the highest ranks and insignia." S. Yu. Witte, a prominent statesman of Russia at the turn of the XIX-XX centuries, also believed that it was impossible to ignore "the importance that the natives had in the conquest of the Caucasus...".

Well, what happened in understanding this problem later? To justify the right to power, first under the Provisional Government, and then under the Bolsheviks, since 1917, Russia's geopolitical interests in Eurasia, and in particular in the Caucasus, were reduced under the guise of discrediting tsarism to the idea of its constant aggressive aspirations to expand the borders of the empire. Today, in the struggle for power, the newly-minted adherents of separatism are also clinging to this version. The price of their misrepresentations is now measured by instability in the region, interethnic conflicts, and bloodshed. "Misconceptions" about events more than a century ago continue to sow hatred. The solution can only be found in restoring the full truth about the past and the victory of common sense in the present day.