O. A. DOBRINSKAYA, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

international assistance to Afghanistan Keywords:, Japan, Japan-American alliance

The situation in Afghanistan for many years remains a serious problem that affects the interests of many members of the international community. From the very beginning of Washington's declared anti-terrorist operation in this country, many American allies joined it. Japan was not left out of the picture either. Over the past decade, Japanese-American cooperation in Afghanistan has undergone certain changes related to a complex of domestic and foreign policy factors. Despite the specifics of the legislation that restricts the sending of Japanese military personnel abroad, Tokyo managed to find the best, from its point of view, option for participating in the solution of the Afghan issue.

Washington's decision to withdraw foreign troops in 2014 poses serious challenges to the security and stability of not only Afghanistan, but the entire region. Today, the United States and its allies face challenges to ensure the stability and sustainable development of this country both in the so - called transition period until the end of 2014, and in the "decade of transformation (transformation)", covering the decade after 2014 (2015-2024). This was stated at the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2011 U.S. Secretary of State H. Clinton, calling on the international community to participate in his fate ¹.

In such circumstances, the importance of non-military efforts in resolving the Afghan problem is increasingly growing. Claiming the reputation of a "global non-military power" and actively engaged in ensuring international security by non-military means, Japan is ready to play a leading role in solving the humanitarian and socio-economic problems of Afghanistan.

AFGHANISTAN PROMISES NOT TO BE LEFT TO FEND FOR ITSELF

Issues of international assistance, as well as the development of a strategy for the sustainable development of Afghanistan, were on the agenda of the 2nd Tokyo International Conference, which was held on July 8, 2012. It was attended by about 55 States and 25 international organizations.

Back at the Bonn conference in 2011, the main directions of the international community's participation in the fate of Afghanistan during the transition period were formulated by the hosts of this meeting. According to German Foreign Minister G. Westerwelle, it is necessary to make the transition of power irreversible, provide political support for national reconciliation and indicate the long-term involvement of the international community in the affairs of Afghanistan. In this regard, the reconstruction of the country, assistance to the army and police, as well as assistance in the development of the economy are of particular importance.²

Speaking in Bonn, Japanese Representative D. Nakano outlined Japan's commitment to long-term assistance to Afghanistan in stabilizing the situation by facilitating the political process, achieving stable growth in a period of "transformation" and expanding regional cooperation. Tokyo attaches particular importance to the development of the entire region as a factor in creating a strong Afghanistan.³

While the NATO conference in Chicago in May 2012 made major decisions regarding the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) participation in military operations in Afghanistan, the withdrawal of foreign combat units by the end of 2014, and the provision of assistance to the Afghan national security forces, the more representative meeting in Tokyo reached specific agreements on the following issues: financial and economic assistance to Afghanistan before and after 2014

As a result of the conference, the Tokyo Declaration was adopted, according to which the international community will allocate $16 billion in aid to Afghanistan. for the end of the transition period and the initial stage of "transformation", i.e. until the end ^{of 2015.4}

The United States remains the main donor to Afghanistan, promising this time to provide financial assistance to Afghanistan until the end of 2017.

economic development and humanitarian needs at the average annual level of the last 10 ⁵ years, i.e. about $3 billion. in year ⁶.

Japan has been ranked second after the United States in this indicator since 2002. As of October 2011, the Japanese Government had provided about $3.22 billion for Afghanistan.⁷ Now the aid will increase significantly: at the Tokyo conference, Japanese Foreign Minister Koichiro Gemba said that Tokyo will provide another $3 billion. until the end of 2017 It will be used to develop the agricultural sector, infrastructure and human resources. $1 billion. It will also be allocated to neighboring countries (Pakistan and Central Asian States) in order to strengthen regional cooperation that is beneficial for Afghanistan.⁸

At the suggestion of Tokyo, the new strategy for international assistance to Afghanistan is based on the principle of mutual responsibility: the Afghan government is committed to fighting corruption and taking measures to improve the situation in the country, and donors are committed to fulfilling financial promises. Assistance will be provided for specific projects of the Afghan side, and the results of their implementation are subject to review every two years. The first such meeting is scheduled for 2014 in the UK.

SUPPORT FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

The purely economic nature of Tokyo's contribution to the solution of the Afghan problem did not take shape immediately.

In the first phase of the operation, Japan proved to be an active participant in the global war on terrorism. This was largely facilitated by the Prime Minister Dz, who was in power. Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006), a determined and popular politician, was an advocate of strengthening Japan's military role in the world and strengthening the Japan-US alliance. Already on September 12, 2001, the Japanese leader declared unconditional support for the United States in the fight against Al-Qaeda and indicated his intention to provide them with all possible assistance.

Although initially this assistance did not involve sending armed forces to participate in the anti-terrorist operation, under pressure from Washington, Tokyo was forced to adjust its position within a few days. The Prime Minister's statement of September 19, 2001 outlined specific areas of assistance to the international coalition, which included providing logistical support to US forces (sending self-defense force ships to the Indian Ocean to gather information), transport, medical and supply support for US troops, and economic assistance to States adjacent to the proposed operation zone. ⁹

Tokyo's intention to limit the mission of the self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean to intelligence gathering and surveillance was also perceived with displeasure in Washington. According to the Pentagon, more valuable would be assistance in ensuring the security of American naval communications in the South China Sea, as well as in transporting ammunition from Australia to Diego Garcia Atoll in the Indian Ocean, where a large American military base is located. ¹⁰

There was no consensus in Japanese political circles about Japan joining the anti-terrorist operation. His opponents believed that if Japan provided logistical support to the United States, it would be drawn into the war. The idea of sending self-defense forces to the Indian Ocean was ambiguously received even in the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Its conservative part opposed the participation of warships in the operation, which was dictated by the desire to avoid damage to Japanese oil interests in the Middle East and the Arab world11. The New Komeito Party offered to support the US only if its actions were approved by the UN. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has put forward a demand for prior parliamentary approval for each self-defense force mission. The Social Democrats were opposed to military strikes on Afghanistan, as a retaliatory action would have entailed retaliatory actions by extremists. They believed that Tokyo should mediate between the US and the Taliban regime.

In general, the government's legislative initiatives caused relatively few complaints and were approved in the shortest possible time by Japanese standards.

A package of "anti-terrorist legislation", including the Law on Special Anti-Terrorist Measures, amendments to the Law on Self-Defense Forces and the Law on Maritime Security Management, was adopted as early as October 29, 2001. In addition to supplying, transporting and maintaining the troops of the international coalition (excluding the supply of weapons and ammunition), the self-defense forces received the right to carry out measures to rescue and search for military personnel and even use weapons in order to protect "persons under their care." The validity of the Law on Special Anti-Terrorist Measures was limited to two years, with the possibility of extending it for another two years.

Based on the new legislation from November 2001. Japan began to participate in a naval interception operation. It was conducted within the framework of Operation Enduring Freedom, initiated by the United States in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter as a response to a threat to its security*.

The Americans initially expressed the wish that Japan would send destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat control system to the Indian Ocean, but Tokyo refused

* Operation Enduring Freedom is the official name for all U.S. military actions in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It is divided into sub-operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines and the Horn of Africa, Western Sahara and the Pankisi Gorge (arming and training the Georgian army) (editor's note).

This is done on the grounds that the situation does not require the presence of high-class warships, On the one hand, the presence of such ships provided greater flexibility and security for the Japanese self-defense forces in their area of operation. On the other hand, it increased the risk of being involved in combat operations, which would mean violating constitutional prohibitions. However, the relevant decision was made in December 2002. In the run-up to the operation against Iraq, Tokyo believed that the capabilities of the US Armed Forces to monitor and collect information in the Indian Ocean would be limited. At the same time, Japan considered the possibility of using destroyers to protect its tankers in the Persian Gulf in the event of US military action against Baghdad.

The adoption of "anti-terrorist legislation" was an unprecedented event in the history of post-war Japan. For the first time, the Self-Defense Forces have joined actions that take place far beyond the Japanese Islands and do not fall under the definition of UN peacekeeping operations. They also did not fall under the category of measures to protect Japan from attack or to provide security in "areas adjacent to Japan", which were designated in the Guidelines for Japanese-American Defense Cooperation approved in 1997.

Participation in the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan, like any foreign activity of the self-defense forces, has become a very sensitive issue for Japanese politicians. According to the Constitution, Japan has renounced the right to collective self-defense, the use of force is possible only if the Japanese islands are protected from aggression, which means that it is illegal to fully participate in foreign military operations. For more than half a century, sending self-defense forces abroad has been banned. Only in 1992 was a law passed allowing them to participate in UN peacekeeping operations, but it contains strict restrictions on the parameters of this participation.

In the atmosphere created after September 11, 2001, the Japanese government, under the slogan of fighting terrorism, managed to quickly and painlessly ensure the deployment of military personnel abroad. In fact, a precedent was set for their continued participation in foreign operations conducted by the United States. At the same time, taking into account both the opinion of the opposition and the attitude of the countries of the region to any attempts to expand the geographical scope of the self-defense forces, Tokyo showed maximum caution and limited the law to this situation and for a period of two years.

Tokyo emphasized that this decision is not so much a demonstration of allied loyalty to the United States, but rather has a broader meaning, representing a contribution to international security efforts. Koizumi stressed that the Government considers international terrorism as a challenge to Japan's security and, on its own initiative, intends to join the efforts of the international community to combat it12.

Japanese diplomacy has significantly intensified, which has helped Japan ensure a calm response from Arab and Asia-Pacific countries to the decision to join Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as gain a foothold among the sponsors of the post-war settlement in Afghanistan.

In January 2002, a large-scale international conference on Afghanistan was held in Tokyo, where it was decided to allocate about $4.5 billion. for the needs of this country. Japan itself has pledged $500 million to help refugees, mine clearance, health and medicine, education, and women's rights. ¹³

Japan's assistance to Afghanistan has taken on new dimensions with the proclamation of the concept of "consolidating peace", which was voiced by Foreign Minister Yi. Kawaguchi on the eve of his visit to Kabul in May 2002. This concept was intended to provide Japanese assistance in three areas: politics, security, and humanitarian assistance. Tokyo assisted in drafting the Constitution of Afghanistan, as well as in holding presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004-2005. In the field of security, Japan, together with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, has undertaken a campaign to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the Taliban. Assistance to the population of Afghanistan was provided on the basis of the Ogata Initiative, which provided for a smooth transition from humanitarian assistance to assistance in the reconstruction of ^the country14.

One of the most important aspects of Japan's involvement in Afghanistan was the coordination of socio-economic issues. To this end, the country has begun to actively use its traditional and main foreign policy tool-financial assistance. This approach was intended to demonstrate its commitment to the concept of integrated security and the principles of human security that underpin Japan's quest to achieve global civil power status. ¹⁵

Under the slogan of fighting international terrorism, Tokyo also supported US actions in Iraq and sent self-defense forces personnel to participate in its reconstruction.

However, due to the strengthening of the Taliban, the White House tried to attract the Japanese self-defense forces to cooperate with the international coalition in Afghanistan itself. In Japan, supporters of strengthening the country's military capabilities also supported the idea of its greater involvement in foreign operations and global cooperation with Washington's European allies. One of these supporters was the successor of the Dz.Koizumi S. Abe, who clearly indicated his intention to increase Japan's military role in the world. He actively advocated for strengthening Japan's cooperation with NATO, including in Afghanistan, in the

areas such as the disarmament of illegal armed groups, humanitarian projects in cooperation with the PKV (Provincial Reconstruction Teams), the fight against drugs and the strengthening of border controls. Later, in December 2007, a representative of the Japanese Embassy in Afghanistan was appointed Liaison Officer at the office of the senior civilian Representative of NATO in Kabul, which helped to improve cooperation between Japan and the alliance in the implementation of projects to promote human security. At the same time, Abe was cautious about expanding Japan's mission in Afghanistan, fearing a negative public reaction. Although in May 2007, Defense Minister F. Kuma talked about the possibility of providing air self-defense forces to transport supplies necessary for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, two months later, his successor Yu Koike rejected any options for sending self-defense forces to this country16.

By that time, the internal political situation in Japan had changed dramatically: in July 2007, the opposition won a majority in the upper house of parliament, and the extension of the anti-terrorist law was under threat. In addition, public opinion polls showed that more than half of the population favored ending the Indian Ocean mission. ¹⁷ Corruption scandals and the failure to ensure the continued presence of the self-Defense Forces in the Indian Ocean cost Abe the post of Prime Minister.

The resumption of the anti - terrorist mission has become one of the most important tasks facing the next head of State, Y. Fukuda. With great difficulty, the Supply Law was passed through Parliament in ^January 200818. To pass it, for the first time in ⁵⁷ years, the Prime Minister had to use article 59 of the Constitution and override the veto of the upper house of Parliament19. The new law limited the functions of the self-defense forces to fuel and water supplies, while the previous law allowed them to participate in search and rescue operations, and the term of the new law was one year with the possibility of extension. However, the Liberal Democrats managed to defend some fundamentally important provisions of the law. First, it did not provide for parliamentary approval for every case of sending self-defense units to the Indian Ocean. Secondly, there was no mechanism to prevent misuse of fuel, despite the fact that this issue caused a lot of complaints from the opposition.²⁰

Washington's attempts in 2008 to switch Japanese transport planes and helicopters to Afghanistan, which completed the mission of transporting cargo and personnel of coalition forces from Kuwait to Iraq, were unsuccessful. It was not possible to connect the self-defense forces to the provincial reconstruction teams, which consist of military and civilian personnel who work in the Afghan provinces and provide security for relief projects, as well as provide humanitarian assistance or reconstruction work themselves.²¹

In general, in late 2006 - 2008, Washington repeatedly tried to involve Japan more in the Afghan operation, and the Japanese leadership had to reckon with the growing opposition in the country.

FOLLOWING IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF WASHINGTON, BUT WITH AN ECONOMIC TWIST

The arrival of Barack Obama to power in the White House in 2009 brought a certain dynamic to Japanese-American cooperation on the Afghan issue. In February 2009, Secretary of State H. During her visit to Japan, Clinton invited her Japanese colleagues to take part in shaping the new US policy towards Afghanistan. Government of T. The Aso has also sought to establish good relations with the new US administration, especially as concerns that in Asia, Washington will prefer Japan to develop relations with China.

So, following the new Washington administration, Tokyo united Afghanistan and Pakistan into one strategic space.

T. Aso focused on relations with Pakistan as an integral element of ensuring success in Afghanistan. Like Washington, Tokyo has appointed its own representative for Afghanistan: M. Yoshikawa, a high-ranking diplomat who has long been responsible for economic assistance issues together with S. Ogata, who headed the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Together with the US President's Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, R. Holbrooke, he began to explore new opportunities for providing assistance to these countries.

In April 2009, Japan hosted a conference on assistance to Pakistan, at which donor States decided to provide $5 billion. to support the economic stabilization of this country, of which $1 billion each. Japan and the United States were the main contributors. Thus, Tokyo has re-established itself as a coordinator of socio-economic sector assistance, drawing on the experience of organizing a similar conference on Afghanistan. This was in the interests of the United States, which chose the tactic of massive economic assistance in relation to Pakistan in order to intensify its efforts to fight the Taliban.

The coming to power of the Democratic Party in Japan in September 2009 led to a change in the parameters of Tokyo's participation in the anti-terrorist operation. Even during the election campaign, the Democrats promised to reconsider relations with the United States in the direction of greater equality. New Prime Minister Yu. Hatoyama announced the imminent end of the mission in the Indian Ocean, explaining his decision with the desire to find an option that would allow us to promote the fight against terrorism "in the Japanese way", that is, with a focus on non-military assistance.²²

New Government's decision-

wa was quite calmly received in the White House, but in Washington they made it clear that they expect the ally to take further steps to solve the Afghan problem. "We hope that Japan's contribution will be consistent with its status as a great power," said US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.²³

After announcing its decision to withdraw from the Indian Ocean, Tokyo began to look for new forms of involvement in solving the problems of Afghanistan. In early October, the Foreign Minister went to Kabul and Islamabad. Okada to prepare Japanese proposals on Afghanistan for the Japan-US summit in November 2009. In the process of forming them, a proposal was made to join the coalition forces, but it was not developed.

Tokyo has made a fundamental decision to reorient itself to purely non-military assistance in three areas. First, it is improving the ability of Afghanistan itself to provide security, in particular, strengthening the national police, secondly, weakening the social base of the Taliban by helping former militants in social rehabilitation and employment, and, thirdly, developing the country's economic life. It was decided to allocate about $5 billion for this purpose. for five years. At the same time, Japan confirmed its intention to continue financial assistance to Pakistan.

Tokyo pays great attention to strengthening the law enforcement agencies in Afghanistan. So, in 2010 The entire Afghan police force received a salary for six months from funds provided by Japan. Police and border centers have been built, and Afghan policemen are undergoing training in Japan. With its participation, mine clearance and counter-narcotics projects are being implemented.

Much has been done to restore infrastructure both in Afghanistan and in its neighboring countries. With the assistance of Japan, the reconstruction of roads that allow humanitarian and other transportation, as well as trade and economic activities in the region, is underway. In particular, the Mazar-I - Sharif - Kabul - Kandahar - Herat-Mazar-I-Sharif ring road, roads on the borders of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Uzbekistan, infrastructure facilities in Tajikistan, and a bridge connecting Tajikistan with Afghanistan have been upgraded. Much attention is paid to the development of cities, primarily in Kabul and the capital region.

The Japanese focus is on promoting the development of the agricultural sector, which is the main source of income for the Afghan population. A rice-growing program is being implemented, experimental agricultural stations are operating, and irrigation has been established in certain regions of the country. Tokyo makes a significant contribution to ensuring human security. In collaboration with 16 provincial Recovery Teams (PCBs) NATO Japan carries out more than 120 projects in the field of education, medicine and healthcare and other areas. In the summer of 2009, Japanese Foreign Ministry officials joined the PKV in the Chagcharan area of Ghor Province, where almost half of the Afghan projects involving Japan are implemented.

Cooperation with the PKV allows Japan to more effectively implement projects in rural areas, where there is the greatest need for assistance to the population. In total, Japan participates in more than two thousand projects to help the people of Afghanistan and does this not only by providing financial resources, but also by sending experts from the Japan International Cooperation Agency and non-governmental organizations. Tokyo has repeatedly stressed that in the field of assistance to Afghanistan, the country adheres to the principle of "all Japan", which means combining the forces of the state and public organizations to help Afghanistan. The involvement of various humanitarian organizations demonstrates Japan's desire to focus on solving non-military security problems in this country.

No less important is Tokyo's diplomatic activity within the framework of a regional approach to attract Afghanistan's neighbors - not only Pakistan, but also the countries of Central Asia and Iran-to cooperation. For example, at the conference on assistance to Pakistan, Japan organized a meeting between representatives of Iran and the United States. At the same time, Tokyo agreed to cooperate with Tehran on Afghanistan in such areas as border strengthening, humanitarian assistance, and agricultural assistance.²⁴

The Afghan theme has long been present in the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue. Back in 2006, Afghanistan was involved in the dialogue as an observer, and Pakistan's involvement in this multilateral process is not excluded.

Afghanistan has become more firmly on the agenda of Tokyo and Ankara.Japan highly appreciated Turkey's initiative to organize talks on Afghanistan and welcomed the start of the Istanbul process25.

In November 2009, with the assistance of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, a round table on reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan was held in Tokyo, attended by representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran. ²⁶ Japan's image in Afghanistan and neighboring countries is not negatively politicized, it is not associated with soldiers waging war with the Afghans, and it is not associated with the United States. This opens up additional opportunities for Tokyo to help rebuild the country.

WITH HOPE FOR THE FUTURE

A conference on Afghanistan in Tokyo in July 2012 once again confirmed that the role of non-military assistance provided by Japan will increase with the withdrawal of troops from this country.

Tokyo emphasizes that the fight against international terrorism combines both military and military methods.-

It is also important to take measures to address its root, deep causes, such as poverty, unemployment, and socio-economic problems. Therefore, cooperation between Japan and the United States in the reconstruction of Afghanistan can effectively help both a combination of military operations and non-military assistance.

Cooperation between Japan and the United States in resolving the Afghan problem can be described as a compromise between pressure from Washington to involve Japan in its military actions and the desire of the Japanese elite to maintain a balance in order, on the one hand, to meet the requirements of an ally, and on the other, to take into account domestic political realities. The experience of participating in the Afghan operation also indicates a gradual expansion of the scope of activities of its armed forces, which has already been reflected in the documents defining the main directions of development of the country's defense policy. At the same time, the ban on collective self-defense remains a deterrent that allows Tokyo to limit its involvement in American operations abroad and at the same time ensure the country's national interests.

Tokyo's efforts to resolve the Afghan problem are not limited to Washington's assistance. On the contrary, the Afghan direction has become a completely independent direction of Japanese diplomacy and has great potential for development, especially in the light of the imminent withdrawal of foreign troops and the concentration of efforts on post-war construction.

Japan strives to position itself as a global leader in addressing humanitarian and socio-economic issues. Its active involvement in helping to rebuild Afghanistan not only allows Tokyo to gain new experience in solving global problems, but also becomes another step towards raising its international profile.

Assistance to Afghanistan is also important for Japan in terms of strengthening its position in Central Asia, as well as ensuring energy security. Both Tokyo and Washington are interested in building pipelines in the region that will allow transportation of hydrocarbon resources. Japan is also attracted to other natural resources of the region, such as rare earth metals.

Of course, the implementation of the plans of Washington, Tokyo and the entire international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan will depend on how the difficult situation in the country develops after the withdrawal of foreign troops. But the current efforts, including those of a non-military nature, allow us to at least hope for the best.

¹ Remarks at Afghanistan Conference first working session. 5.12.2011. U.S. Department of State - http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178306.htm

² Speech by foreign minister Westerwelle at the Afghanistan conference in Bonn. 5.12.2011. German missions in the United States -http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/__pr/P__Wash/2011/12/05 AFG__Bonn__Westerwelle__sp.html

³ Nakano seimukan sutetumento. Gaimuse (Speech by Parliamentary Deputy Minister Nakano. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan) - http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/23/12/pdfs/1206_05_01.pdf

⁴ Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan. The Tokyo Declaration. Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan. From Transition to Transformation. July 8, 2012 - http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_d eclaration_en 1.html

⁵ Remarks. Hillary Rodham Clinton Secretary of State. Prince Park Tower Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, July 8, 2012 - http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194672.htm

^{Tamoff Curt.} 6 Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance. August 12, 2010 // Congressional Research Service - http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40699.pdf

⁷ Japan's assistance in Afghanistan // Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan. 20.02.2012 - http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/pdfs/assist0901.pdf

⁸ Remarks by H.E. Mr. Koichiro Gemba, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan. Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan. July 8, 2012, Tokyo -http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/fm_spe ech_enl.html

⁹ Koizumi naikaku sori daijin kisyakaiken roku (Press conference of the Prime Minister of Japan.Koizumi 19.09.2001. Office of the Prime Minister) - http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2001/0919sourikaiken.html

^{Latyshev I.} 10 Japanese destroyers entered the Indian Ocean / / Asia and Africa Today, 2002, N 2, p. 14.

^{Nosov M.} 11 Junichiro Koizumi and the external world / / Japan of the Koizumi Era. Estimates and Prospects, Moscow, 2007, p. 295.

¹² Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. October 29, 2001 -http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2001/1029danwa_e.html

¹³ Opening statement by Prime minister Junichiro Koizumi at the international conference on reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. January 21, 2002. Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan -http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/pm012.html

¹⁴ Japan's regional comprehensive development assistance to Afghanistan // Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/regional.html

^{Hughes Ch.} 15 Japan's security policy, the US-Japan alliance, and the 'war on terror': incrementalism confirmed or radical leap? // Australian Journal of International Affairs 2004, vol. 58 (N 4), p. 427 - 445.

^{Milford P.} 16 Rethinking Japanese public opinion and security: from pacifism to realism? Stanford university press. 2011, p. 152.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁸ Official name-Law on Special Measures for Providing Supply support to Maritime Activities aimed at Suppressing Terrorism.

¹⁹ A bill passed by the House of Representatives on which the House of Councillors has approved a decision other than that of the House of Representatives becomes law after its second approval by at least two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives present. The Constitution of Japan. Modern Japan, Moscow, 1973, p. 765.

²⁰ The Japan Times, 14.01.2008.

^{Fergusson J.} 21 US and Japan build a new Silk Road //Asia Times online, 13.02.2009 - www.atimes.com

²² Nichibei shuno kedo kisyakaiken. 13.11.2009. Shusho kantei (Joint press conference of the Heads of State and Government of Japan and the United States. 13.11.2009. Office of the Prime Minister of Japan)- http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200911/13usa_kaike. html

²³ American forces press service. 21.10.2009 - www.defense.gov

²⁴ Joint Press Release (Japan / the Islam Republic of Iran) on Cooperation in Afghanistan (May 2, 2009). Ministry of foreign affairs of Japan - http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/joint0905.html

²⁵ Nakano seimukan sutetumento (Statement by Parliamentary Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan D. Nakano. 5.12.2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan - www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release23/12/pdfs/1206_05_01.pdf (01.03.2012)

²⁶ Religions for peace. E-bulletin, 4th quarter of 2009 -www.religionsforpeace.org/file/e-bulletin-fourth-quarter.pdf