The Risk of Strategic Rivalry and the Role of Belarus

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Опубликовано в библиотеке: 2014-04-29
Источник: "БЕЛАРУСЬ В МИРЕ" No.004 12-01-97



The possible consequences of NATO enlargement against the background of the Russian foreign policy with regard to the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) give grounds to argue that Belarus-due to its geographical and political profile in the modern Europe-could play a visible role in setting the future security climate in Eastern Europe and, to a degree, on the whole European continent. The remaining uncertainty in relations between Russia and NATO makes it possible for the countries that geographically separate these two key actors to increase their own stakes in the shaping of the future European security.



Under the special relationship between Moscow and Minsk, Belarus could become, on the one hand, a "litmus paper" for the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, and, on the other hand, quite a notable "contributor" to European agenda of the Russian foreign policy.



NATO Enlargement: The Case for Argument



The decision to enlarge NATO brings about serious problems not only for Russia, but for the West, too. According to a leading American foreign policy expert, one of the major tasks for the West is that the enlargement should be successful and, at the same time, it should offer rather than compromise further opportunities for NATO-Russia partnership.



The NATO's enlargement goes ahead together with the NATO-Russia dialogue, something which in Washington and other West European capitals is obviously seen as an instrument to "manage in a constructive way the Russian reaction to the enlargement." The Founding Act, signed by NATO and Russia, lays down the basis for further dialogue and co-operation on security issues between the parties. However, this document has not been unambiguously welcomed by a good many from the Russian political establishment. For them, the signing of the Founding Act is a sort of stopgap move by the current Russian leadership, a move made for getting some tactical benefits from the ongoing dialogue between Russia and the West.1



It seems interesting to look at how the dialogue with NATO is seen in Russia. Some Russian analysts say that the Founding Act does not solve fully the problem of Russia's exclusion from the process of decision-making on the issues of European security. This is because Russia, they believe, has had a secondary role in this dialogue. And more, they do not see in the text of the Founding Act any substantial obligations, the fulfilment of which could bring the parties well ahead to the declared goals. According to such a viewpoint, neither the enlargement of NATO nor the beginning of Russia-NATO dialogue solve the main problem of the European security-to create a comprehensive structure providing security for all Europe.



In most countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) those involved in this debate are reluctant to share concerns of Russian politicians. Unlike the latter, they regard the NATO's enlargement mostly as a positive process. According to G. Perepelitsa from the National Institute for Strategic Studies in Ukraine, the NATO's enlargement is not a threat to his country. This process is seen in Ukraine as an important component of the "multidimensional all-European integration process."2 Kyiv views the enlargement as a process that strengthens stability in CEE region. Taking advantage of some CEE countries' willingness to join NATO, Ukraine has managed to settle a number of problems with its neighbours: agreements reached with Poland and Romania allowed Ukraine to fix previously unsettled issues on state borders and some other matters.



Professor A. Kaminski from the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, says that the CEE countries willing to join NATO see in the membership beneficial opportunities: firstly, to scale down, in the long run, their defence expenditures, and, secondly, to better conditions for a full integration of their countries into West European institutions, and to provide favourable conditions that would stimulate and guarantee the irreversibility of the processes of consolidating institutions of the democratic state, open society and effective mechanisms of the market economy. In his opinion, for instance, Poland's membership in NATO will remove military security concerns from the realm of bilateral relations, as these will be dealt with at the multilateral level: within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council or the CFE negotiations as part of the OSCE. 3



The only country in CEE that backs Russia's objections to the Alliance's eastward expansion is Belarus. Besides replicating Russian arguments against the enlargement, this country has quite serious reasons for concern. In case of Russia-NATO confrontation, this country will inevitably fall into an area of engagement, which would mean to be hammered between the conflicting interests of the Russians and Europeans.



For most analysts, the words by a Belarusian high-ranking official-that the NATO's enlargement is, from the point of view of history, unjustifiable-are likely to be perceived as a slight exaggeration, especially in terms of history. For Belarusians, irrespectively of who takes advantage of their country's "beneficial geostrategic position", this is far from being an exaggeration. Rather, this reflects the way they realise that Belarus could again become hostage to grandiouse schemes of the great powers.



For Belarus, what could be an exaggeration is its official policy- if it attempts to pursue two obviously excluding ends: to contribute to an "adequate answer" to the enlargement of the Alliance, and, at the same time, to build up a "potential for a useful co-operation with NATO". Advice to the Alliance how to transform, and support for today's declarations by leaders of Russia and NATO's countries that they would be friends rather than rivals,-all these are unlikely to give Belarus something substantial in terms of security. It seems logical to suggest that the less attention is paid to Belarus's "beneficial geostrategic position" in the agendas of great powers and in the planning documents of military alliances, the less da mage this country would suffer under the worst case scenario.



Any attempts to devise and implement an "adequate" response to the NATO enlargement, seen as an enlargement of its military component, would by no means strengthen stability and security in Europe. On the contrary, such attempts would undermine stability and security there. The debates over the NATO's enlargement clearly showed differences between those involved in the enlargement and those who believe their interests are affected by the process. Their different views are signalling about lack of mutual understanding or lack of will to re-cognise goals and interests of the other party. If these differences persist, there remain quite a decent pretext for renewing-at the convenience of the most interested side-rivalry between the West and Russia.4



The Risk of Rivalry



After Russia's failure to establish a genuine partnership with the West in the first post-communist years and to enter the Western club of the advanced industrialised countries, the growing influence of the so-called "pro-imperial" line in the Russian foreign policy became more apparent. It was reflected in the relinquishment of the pre-1993 Russian foreign policy course: with the adoption of a new foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation in autumn 1993, new priorities for Russia's foreign ministry were assigned. Among the first in the priority list were "integration within the CIS" and search for "other partners" in the international arena. The 1994 NATO's declaration on plans to expand eastwards have strehgthened the ranks of those in Moscow who supported the "pro-imperial" course.



Taking the enlargement as an anti-Russian move, these supporters saw in it a good argument to confirm their theory on West's designs on Russia: from their point of view, the economic "expansion" of the Western countries on the post- Soviet space is allegedly backed by the eastward expansion of the West's military- political alliance. No doubt, the logical conclusion from this assessment would be an attempt to formulate a policy of countering "Western expansion" and to find allies for implementing such a policy. Such attempts could be a sort of invitation to renew the strategic rivalry between the West and Russia in the former Soviet Union.



For most observers outside Russia, it is clear that the Western countries have no policy or even intention to start a confrontation with Russia on the post-Soviet space. However, the risk of such confrontation has not faded away. Conflicts in the Caucasus region, in the south-east Europe, and possible failures in democratic and economic reforms in the post-Soviet states could fuel further instability, bearing negative effects on security. According to R. Legvold, professor of the Columbia University, if one assumes that security is indivisible, one would agree that security in Western Europe is linked with the security on the post-Soviet space. Therefore, the decline of security on the post-Soviet space would be harmful for the security of Western Europe.5 In this context the enlargement of NATO is rather part of or just a palliative decision of the problem of security of Europeans.



To assess the risk of strategic rivalry on the post-Soviet space it is important to follow actions and changes in those influential groups in Russia and in the West that could be interested in such rivalry. The confrontation is not inevitable-as soon as both Europeans and Russians have common interest in transforming the continent into a zone of stable and solid peace. Accordingly, to find a solution that would fully secure this common interest is not least-or, perhaps, even most-important task for the West, than that of "managing in a constructive way" the Russian reaction to the Alliance's enlargement. For Russia, too, it is important to look for not just "adequate response" to the enlargement, but for opportunities to get what seems to be in common interest with Europeans. If Russia, America and European countries fail to fully use the existing opportunities for co-operation and partnership, one would not probably exclude the emergence of new divisive lines, now most probably on the periphery of the post-Soviet space.



Russia: Unsettling Choice



Now the Russia's foreign policy seems to be a result from interaction of the two divergent trends: "pro-liberal" with the objective to bring Russia to a respected club of the advanced industrialised countries, and "pro- imperial", which objective is, in the wording of its supporters, to "defend zone of Russia's vital interests", to expand its "zone of influence", and, finally, to restore Russia's status of superpower. The CIS region is the very place where the interests of the advocates of these trends are usually different, if not conflicting.



It is worth noting that in the first case, in efforts to join the ranks of the advanced nations, Russian politicians are seemingly ready to comply with those conditions and rules of conduct that are accepted in the Western community, while in the second-some part of Russian political class insist on Russia's right to regard countries of the "near abroad" as those falling in a "zone of their vital interests". In the latter case, argue some critics of the Russian foreign policy, claims to such a right clearly imply the right of veto by Russia on those actions and decisions on the part of former Soviet republics and other states, which are seen in Moscow as a threat to Russia's national interests.



Some analysts argue that Russia is trying to ensure its dominating role in the post-Soviet space through the policy of "integration" in the CIS, maintaining its military presence in the countries of the "near abroad", and using instruments of economic pressure in relations with those countries which are attempting to implement a policy that is independent from Moscow.6 In Russia's economic policy toward the CIS countries, its critics see attempts at "tying" the economies of those countries to that of Russia, while trying its best to deny this region from any foreign presence. In fact, the remaining instability and dormant sources of conflicts, unreformed economies in the post-Soviet states are effectively turning this region into an area closed for foreign capital and investments.



Realising that Russia itself is restructuring economy, and, to this end, is seeking credits, investments and technology in the West, many in the CIS countries, and first of all in Ukraine, do not agree to accept the role of Russia's "junior partner"-they do not see any benefits in staking their countries' future on co-operation with Russia or recognising the priority of Moscow's interests there. At the same time, Russia, with no resources enough to lead effectively the process of economic integration of the post-Soviet states, is now able, using a number of instruments, to limit the freedom of foreign policy options for most of the CIS countries, keeping them "circling" around Russia as satellites on the "orbit" of its influence. Some critics of the Russia's foreign policy argue that Moscow is already translating this ability into actions.



After unsuccessful attempts to convince Ukraine's leaders to change their mind on the issues of integration within the CIS, those in Russia who made a stake on preserving and strengthening the CIS resorted to the formula of "multi-speed integration". Such a formula gave plausible grounds for maintaining apparently impotent overall structure of the CIS, and, at the same time, allowed for simultaneous "integration" with those states where political leaders agreed to go ahead with integration on a bilateral basis. In 1995, in particular, Russia took up an "accelerated integration" with Belarus.



In the beginning of 1996, with the Russian presidential elections ahead, integration became an important issue for Moscow's politicians. As this issue has become an indispensable item in the Russian home policy agenda, it was obviously clear for B. Yeltsin's team that his personal involvement in integrationist initiatives is both possible and necessary. It is precisely then B. Yeltsin started to personally participate in some "pro-imperial" initiatives, like "accelerated integration" with Belarus. B. Yeltsin's involvement in such initiatives-irrespectively of intentions-is a clear signal about the shift in guidelines and interests of the Russian foreign policy.



The participation of the Russian president in the initiatives of both "pro-liberal" and "pro-imperial" wings of the foreign policy establishment seems to be practical for keeping the existing balance on the Moscow's political scene. And more, the ambiguous Russian foreign policy fits quite well B. Yeltsin's strategy of governing his country. Such a foreign policy can be, in a sense, a by-product of his strategy-if one agree with some analysts that the incumbent Russian president welcomes competitive rather than co-operative involvement of the different interest groups in the government. Under these circumstances success in any initiative of these groups may be put on B. Yeltsin's credit.



On the other hand, divergent and controversial Russian foreign policy is a reflection of the conflicting interests of different groups in the Russian political class and interest groups in the Russian bureaucracy. This seems inevitable as soon as such different groups with conflicting interests did exist in the Soviet Union, exist now and will continue in the modern Russia. Obviously, what changes is the mechanism and procedure of accommodation of their interests.



For now, one can assume that in the Yeltsin's second term the result of rivalry of those groups is likely to indicate better performance of the "pro-liberal" wing: there has been some progress in Russia's efforts to transform G7 into G8; Russia has also become a member of the Council of Europe; it has managed to get long-awaited status of a creditor in the Paris Club and so on. Against these achievements, the stark crisis in the CIS, a cooling lull in the relations between the Kremlin and Minsk, and bubbling prospects of the "union of the four", a project in a series of the Moscow's integration exercises to bring some CIS countries around Russia,-all these cast serious doubts on the effectiveness of the integration policy prescribed by advocates of the "multi-speed" integration in the CIS. However, assessing these results, one should have in mind that these are not final yet.



It seems reasonable to suggest that the "pro-imperial" and "pro- liberal" trends will continue competing, leaving the issue of Russia's strategic choice unresolved. On the one hand, this seems natural for today's Moscow political lot, where none of the power groups has a domination over the others, and Yeltsin's tactics is seemingly fuelling their rivalries. On the other hand, this is natural for a big country moving, although slowly and unsteadily, toward democracy: in a democratic state there always exist competing political groups with conflicting interests.



In-the-imperial-spirit moves could be well used by the Russian diplomacy to extort occasional concessions from their close and distant partners. At the same time, the "pro-imperial" feelings appear to be strong among pragmatic Russian politicians with high chances to be supported by a good many rank-and-file voters. There are many people in Russia who believe in easy solutions to the present complex problems of their long-unsettled country, and that these are comfortably very similar to those deemed effective for Russia, or its Soviet version, well until the end of the 1980s. These circumstances do give grounds to argue that the renewal of the strategic rivalry in the former Soviet Union is quite possible.



The Role of Belarus



The unsettling Russia's strategic choice makes the future of the European security uncertain, and, therefore, hard for anyone to work on the long- term estimate and planning of relations between Russia and the West. What adds to this uncertainty is a potentially positive or negative contribution of the post- Soviet states.



The future of the so-called "East European geopolitical divide" is not fatally dependent on Moscow's policies. Russia's tactics and what Moscow will be reaping in the result of its actions in the CIS depend, to a certain extent, on the policies chosen and the way these are implemented by Belarus, Ukraine, and the other CIS countries. In a sense, their policies could stimulate or hold back "pro-imperial" and "pro-liberal" trends in the Russian foreign policy. Arguably, the key to stability and security in Eastern Europe is in Moscow. But, at the same time, individual doors that are made in Kyiv, Minsk and other Central and East European capitals could fit to the key of a Russian "pro-liberal" policy, or, otherwise, invite the use of the already tested instruments of "imperial expansion". The ambivalent Russia's foreign policy allows for East European countries to have a bigger "window of opportunities" to choose their policies, and, therefore, to have a greater influence on Moscow's policies with regard to Eastern Europe and the CIS, as well as on security and stability in this region.



The unique position of Belarus makes this country's role quite visible in the developments in the area of European security. For an outside observer, the Belarus-Russia relationship could serve a kind of "litmus paper" for probing Russia's foreign policy: what trend-"pro-liberal" or "pro-imperial"-is taking the lead.



To assess the capacity of Belarus, for instance, in influencing Russia's strategy on the post-Soviet space, one can assert that this country's behaviour has, although limited, influence on the Russian policies in the CIS. Taking an active posture in every CIS-related event, Belarus is able either to play in the hands of the current Russian leaders, helping to canalise integration on the post- Soviet territory in the direction chosen by Moscow, or to question the ability and determination of the Russia's leaders to implement a sound policy toward its CIS partners. The latter is possible through bringing forward some unrealistic initiatives and fuelling criticisms on the Kremlin's inability to meet the objective interests and demands for fostering relations with the other CIS countries. Seemingly, this also means Belarus's ability, although limited, to put its small weight to the wobbling balance of power on the Moscow's political scene. Such an ability has already been tested in the 1996 Russian presidential elections, that time, however, to the benefit of the Kremlin rather than Minsk.



Additionally, Belarus is able to make Russian foreign ministry officials do some more homework on certain issues of Russia's foreign policy agenda, in particular, on the European ones. To a certain extent, this has already been the case. On recognising Belarus as its ally, Russia's diplomats have to organise a "solo defence" against the attempts of several European institutions to "impose" on Belarus standards of the western democracies, and, allegedly, to interfere through this with the Belarus's home policy. To be a "trustee" is seemingly an honoured and pleasant function; now Russian diplomats are no doubt able to protect the interests of such an ally as Belarus at any European forum. At the same time, this function has its limitations.



On the one hand, as long as this sort of "alliance" is not weakening-from the Moscow's point of view-Russia's position in these forums, or, in other words, as soon as the price Russia would have to pay for keeping such a unique ally is not prohibitive, first of all in terms of damages Russia could suffer from "opponents" of the current Belarusian government in the West, the double standards of democracy will be effectively in place along with the Helsinki Act obligations and the other relevant documents, signed by all OSCE states. On the other hand, this function is limited by the ability and readiness of the Russian government to support the current Belarusian government with resources the latter desperately needs. The ways and means for channelling economic support are numerous: already free-of-barriers border and the future joint budget of the Union of Russia and Belarus are of substantial utility for one partner to make use of the resources of the other.



The renewal of confrontation in Europe-at least a downsized version of the Cold War-is therefore possible. Under such a scenario, a unique role of Belarus-provided that what now seems unthinkable comes to reality-as an instrument for threatening stability and security in Europe is also possible. The role of Belarus as the one instrumental to strengthening stability and security in Europe will not be unique, but quite desirable. As soon as the interests of the all neighbours and partners of this country, not only those of a privileged ally, are taken into account here, and if there are more people in Russia realising that threats to their interests are coming not from "settled" and reluctant to risk its comfortable position Europe, but from Russia's own unsettled issues, the probability of the Belarus's involvement into the process of strengthening stability and security in Europe increases. In the latter case the role of Belarus would be quite typical for a European state with alike resources. However, this would not be less important: as long as there is a European state that "misses the step", a lasting stability and security in Europe will remain a hypothetical assumption.





1 Quite remarkable is the reference to the Founding Act made by A. Arbatov, deputy head of the Duma's commission on defence, in a broadcast by Radio Liberty on November 16, 1997. Speaking on NATO-Russia relations, he said, "... on the issue of NATO enlargement a temporary compromise has been reached, and this was reflected ... in the [F]ounding document [Act], signed in Paris."

2 G. Perepelitsa, "Belorussko-rossiyskaya voennaya integratsia i yeyo vlianie na besopasnost' Ukrainy," p. 26. The paper is to be published as a chapter in a book on Belarus by the Carnegie Endowment. The book will include materials based on the 16-17 October 1997 International Meeting in Minsk sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, American Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Development and Security Research Institute, Minsk.

3 Comments from Prof. A. Kaminski at the 16-17 October 1997 International Meeting in Minsk sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, American Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Development and Security Research Institute, Minsk.

4 In the same interview to the Radio Liberty , A. Arbatov, deputy head of the Russian Duma's commission on defence, made it clear under what circumstances the renewal of confrontation between Russia and the West would be quite possible: "... in future, if this document [the Founding Act] remains just a paper, and it brings about nothing practical, it will be quite possible that rivalry and confrontation [between NATO and Russia] will re-emerge and dominate over co- operation.

And, I do not even exclude a direct confrontation-if the United States, as [the U.S. State Secretary] Ms Albright has already said, would have as their goal the enlargement of NATO to include the Baltic states and Ukraine, then, certainly, a frontal military confrontation could begin between Russia, on the one side, and the U.S. and their allies, on the other side."

5 R. Legvold, "Belarus in U.S. Foreign Policy," Belarus v Mire , No. 3, 1997, p. 57.

6 See G. Perepelitsa, Op. cit., pp. 15-17.

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