МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО (последнее)
Belarus-Poland: Co-operation on the New Line of Strategic Contact
Актуальные публикации по вопросам международного права и международных отношений.
The collapse of the world socialist system and the dissolution of the Soviet Union concluded the Cold War. These events significantly changed the geopolitical configuration of the contemporary world. Through transformation of the Yalta-Potsdam post-war system the emerging world order is likely to provide for a new balance of forces and interests at the beginning of the 21st century.
On the threshold of the new millennium the following questions appear to become natural: How should one evaluate the multipolar world? What is the role of Belarus and its neighbours in the post-communist space in different geopolitical scenarios? Obviously, it is not appropriate to look for universal answers to these questions, since these are of different nature and will be defined by the combination of most diverse, interacting and continuously changing factors- political, economic and military.
However, now we can discuss the increasing importance of the paradigm of regional co-operation and interaction that replaced the logic of confrontation between two blocs. Integration processes at different levels and of different scale will constitute the key consolidating element, bringing together states with common historic traditions, common interests in politics, economy and national security. In other words, multipolarity should result in the establishment of the system of new balance of forces and interests, but this time at subregional, local level, less, if compared with the past, vulnerable to the influence of Great Powers.
Polish Drang nach Westen : Illusions and Reality
In this context special emphasis should be placed upon the consideration of dynamics of regional co-operation in Eastern Europe in general, and between Poland and Belarus in particular. This is conditioned by the important fact that the new line of strategic contact between the West and the East lies along the border between these two countries.
What are most essential factors that bear on the evolution of integration processes and regional co-operation? These factors include:
(i) Poland's strategic course towards integration into the transforming structures of NATO and the European Union in the shortest time possible;
(ii) cautious position of Poland regarding co-operation with Russia, and first of all on European security issues;
(iii) projecting circumspection in the Polish-Russian relations onto the development of the interstate contacts with Belarus because of Belarusian- Russian integration;
(iv) Poland's artificially holding back integration processes on the eastern direction due to the concern about the future of its co-operation with the West;
(v) very intensive integration between Belarus and Russia, providing for an opportunity to pursue a concerted foreign policy;
(vi) the increased influence of third countries trying to block the eastern vector of Poland's foreign policy and prevent re-emergence of any type of political and economic consolidation to the east of the Bug river.
Now, one can say that after the break-up of the "Eastern bloc" Poland has unambiguously chosen a pro-Western orientation. However, Russia, which let it happen, begins to realise that the loss of an allied Poland means the loss of the important element in its geopolitical position in Central Europe. Under such circumstances, conducting a constructive dialogue between the two countries has become a very difficult thing to do, and some sort of mutual distrust is growing. In this situation Belarus has been continuously affected by different perceptions by Russia and Poland on key issues relating to the developments in Europe, and has to take account of this, while formulating its multi-vectored foreign policy. These things cause slow down in the regional integration in Eastern Europe. Precisely this is why one can talk on the possible transformation of this region into a "new border cordon" between the competing West and East.
Are there any scenarios providing for conflict-free accommodation of geopolitical interests of the parties involved in this important region? Obviously, this problem could be largely solved through dramatic expansion of regional co-operation in a broad range of areas. In this regard Poland and Belarus seem to have got key positions: these countries have a real opportunity to establish a zone of constructive co-operation between the West and the East through a substantial increase of bilateral and multilateral contacts.
This positive idea has supporters in Poland, too. Mr Nowakowski believes that "...we should support the development of Polish-Belarusian contacts at an economic and social level. We should strive for an open border and strengthen the links between political organisations and NGOs of both countries."(1)
Regrettably, quite narrow tactical considerations rather than obvious long-term strategic advantages clearly prevail in the current policy of the official Belweder.
Future Role of Poland
How wide is the door to the West open to let Poland in into the European house? The answer to this seemingly simple question is far from being definite.
American political scientists J. M. Goldgaier and M. McFault, proponents of one of the Western geopolitical concepts, drawing a geopolitical picture of the contemporary world, use the terms "core" and "periphery". In their theoretical analysis the "core" comprises advanced industrial countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan, i.e. those with stable political and economic systems, while "periphery" means countries under industrialisation and democracy building. Such a theory presupposes absolute predominance of the "core" over the "periphery." Also, foreign investment and property are supposed to be used as the newest tools of exploitation of the natural and other resources by the "core" in the "periphery."(2) This clearly leading element in the new model of world order, consistently built by the West, was not left unnoticed by a number of researchers. For example, A. Malyuta justly notes, "The most powerful countries block access to themselves, satisfying their demands at the expense of the other weaker [nations]."(3)
In the military area, the advanced industrial countries do not want to interfere in affairs of the "periphery"; they are ready to do this only if their vital economic interests are threatened. This key idea is supported by German political scientists W. von Bredow and Th. Jaeger. They offer a "three-polar" model, according to which the U.S., Japan and Western Europe are entitled to claim world hegemony in the 21st century.(4)
The pattern of the real state policy confirms quite convincingly the above theoretical considerations. For instance, now Western Europe is ready to include Poland into the sphere of its influence in the shortest time possible. This policy is naturally guided by narrow pragmatic considerations rather than by abstract ideas of political philanthropy. On the background of the active involvement of Poland in NATO-something conditioned by absolutely clear strategic reasons-the attitude of Western Europe towards the idea of accelerated admittance of Poland into the European Union is quite half-hearted. Even hard optimists in Warsaw foresee Poland's joining the EU not earlier than in ten years.(5) Also, NATO membership does not suggest that a radical modernisation of the Wojsko Polskie would become a reality in the foreseeable future. According to some think tanks-the British-American Council for Security Information and the Centre for European Security and Disarmament-the West will have to pay $7 billion for NATO eastward enlargement over the next decade. With the deployment of modern military infrastructure this amount would increase tenfold. Poland's involvement in this organisation will cost the Polish government not less than $150 million annually, even without the construction of new military facilities.(6) In this situation the West proves to be unable to subsidise generously programmes of military reconstruction in the new NATO member states.
At the same time, the Polish economy has shown quite symptomatic trends. On the one hand, now Poland is delivering surprisingly high rate of economic growth. In fact, in 1996 Poland's GDP increased by 6%, and during the first quarter of 1997-by 7.6%, one of the best figures in Europe. One can understand this achievement as soon as the scale of foreign investment in Poland is considered. In fixed prices, the investments increased by 52.3% in 1997 in comparison with 1990. These have already amounted to $14 billion, with about the half of this figure coming to Poland in 1996.(7) Foreign money was directed primarily for support and development of the ventures with the involvement of foreign capital. Precisely Western currency injections have chiefly conditioned such a rapid economic growth. Mr G. Kolodko, former finance minister of Poland, confirmed this, saying that to maintain the current economic growth rate would be possible "only through export expansion and investment." In addition, foreign investment policy is becoming now an effective tool for stimulating the development of those branches of the Polish economy that are of interest for donor countries.
At the same time, the problem of trade balance is quite acute. For example, the deficit of Poland's foreign trade has increased from $814 million in 1992 to $8.3 billion in 1996, with the latter figure amounting to more than 6% of Poland's GDP. This tendency is a manifestation of Polish economy's competitiveness falling down on the world market. The gap between the growth rates of export and import continues to grow. For instance, import exceeded export by 28.1% in the third quarter of 1996 compared to the third quarter of 1995. Among the main foreign trade partners of Poland in 1996 in export operations were Germany (36.6%) and the Netherlands (6.8%), in imports-Germany (24.9%) and Italy (9.8%).(8) Back in 1990 Polish export exceeded import with the positive balance of $3.8 billion. More than 80% of the total export was directed then to the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.(9)
According to some Polish experts, the difficulties in normalising the trade balance are caused predominantly by the low level of processing of the domestic raw materials, something resulted from insufficient use or lack of modern technologies. However, in its foreign trade operations Poland remains turned to the West, sacrificing Polish economic interests for the sake of current political considerations. In this context it becomes clear that Polish elites are obviously biased with regard to the West, and creditors from over the Oder are strongly interested in preserving invested capitals under the guarantees of complete political loyalty and manageability of the Belweder. Obviously, this is the West European model, adopted by Poland, with, according to Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "interaction of the national interests and mechanisms of equilibrium, adjusted through institutional co-operation and norms of the civic society."(10)
With this in mind, it is quite natural to ask the question: Are Europeans ready to further deepen the integration process with Poland and undertake enormous financial expenses on Poland's economic radical transformation? Among Western politicians and businessmen prevail cool pragmatists, with their mind-sets obviously free from ideas of political altruism. Now, the main spring of the integration process of Poland and Western Europe is located east of the Oder, where reigns quite full approval of everything done in order to get closer to the West. Now, Warsaw's romanticism with regard to everything from the West, its way of life and culture, is strong as never before, and this is true not only for ordinary rank-and-file Poles.
Paradoxically, Europe doesn't seem interested in serious economic reforms in East European countries, and first of all due to strategic considerations. West Europeans are quite happy with "conservation" of the second-rate economies in Eastern Europe, as long as these remain a source of cheap raw materials, semi- finished products and inexpensive work force. To provide for security of the European house on the "eastern flank", new NATO members are being rapidly linked to the Alliance.
Even most general analysis clearly unveils double standards in the policy of the West European "core" towards the East European "periphery". These reminds one of the Orwellian formula of the equals: all are equal, but there are some "more equal than the others." Thus, Poland and other post-communist countries are obviously assigned a modest role of Europe's peripheral province.
Is it worthwhile for Poland to consistently follow one-sided westbound track of selective co-operation? Are there any alternatives providing more flexibility whilst taking into consideration Polish national interests in interaction with interests of the neighbouring countries to the east, those striving for expansion of regional co-operation?
East European Vector
Unfortunately, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been the scene of the growing interstate political polarisation that resulted from the break-up of the previous mechanism of balance between blocs and the search by post-communist countries for a new place in the renewed European landscape. At the same time, the powerful centrifugal force, a reaction to the old practices of co-operation within the socialist system, has been in action. This force has been so dominant that any attempts to pursue re-integration in this region were inevitably met with resistance, being these attempts perceived as nothing else but a recurrence of the past or attempts to deny national sovereignty. In such circumstances long-term strategic interests are often sacrificed for the sake of immediate political benefits, which sometimes run against the common sense and objective historic experience.
Now Eastern Europe has a sufficient number of consolidating interstate entities that bring together different groups of countries. However, in practical terms the effectiveness of these entities turns out to be insignificant. The relations that have been established are primarily formal, and thus ineffective in the solution of most regional problems. This well reflects different approaches towards key European issues, revealing the very difference which might provide for strategic confrontation between the West and the East.
For example, the perception of the three Baltic states as a geopolitical unit is far from being realistic. The Baltic Assembly has been failing to deliver the desired unity of views for a long time. Estonia is consistently strengthening its ties with the Scandinavian nations. Lithuania is accelerating its contacts with Poland, establishing with the latter common inter-parliamentary structures, and thus drifting away from the idea of the Baltic Union. The Visegrad group, the Council of the Baltic States, the Central European Initiative remain quite amorphous and cumbersome organisations with no effective mechanisms for implementation of practical measures aimed at real strengthening and development of regional co-operation. Their basic strategic goal is to consistently draw closer to and, ultimately, integrate with the European Union. Hence, all these organisations are temporary, interim entities, designed to achieve outlined strategic goal. Under such circumstances, when the countries of the region are cautious towards Russia and Belarus, and, at the same time, trying hard to join NATO, there appears the concept of "Baltic-Black Sea arch" in the east of the European continent, which, if implemented, could lead to the emergence of the new dividing line between the West and the East.
Bilateral Co-operation: The Current Balance
The comparative analysis of the existing list of Belarusian-Polish accords gives quite a full picture of the bilateral co-operation at the present stage. Here, one has to take account of the following:
(i) the legal basis of relations between Minsk and Warsaw has been built from scratch over the past six years;
(ii) geopolitical situation in Europe and politico-ideological context of relations between Belarus and Poland have dramatically changed;
(iii) the level of the Belarusian-Polish regional co-operation is the most important indicator of the general state of relations between East and West in the area where their strategic interests meet.
Let us dwell upon the most significant elements determining dynamics of building legal basis for bilateral relations and the quality of relevant steps. By now, more than 30 different interstate acts and about 20 inter-agency agreements concluded by the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Poland have become operational. All these regulate economic co-operation, cross-border contacts, transportation, cultural, scientific and educational contacts, as well as other important areas of co-operation.
One should note the significant growth in number of intergovernmental and interstate treaties and agreements signed between the two countries in 1992. Obviously, it is explained by the then emergence of Belarus as an independent entity in international relations. The decline in number of accords signed in 1993-94 and 1996 is quite conspicuous. This decline reflected the slowing down of bilateral co-operation (see Table 1).
Table 1
Data on the Belarusian-Polish agreements signed in 1991-96
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Total
Interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements
2
14
1
2
7/3*
1
27/3*
Inter-agency agreements
-
6
5
2
6
-
19
* This figure relates to those treaties and agreements concluded between the USSR and the Polish People's Republic that remained legally valid for the Republic of Belarus as the successor state of the USSR.
It should be noted that although the number of accords regulating Belarusian-Polish co-operation is quite impressive, the effectiveness of the concluded treaties and agreements turns to be low.
The analysis of the existing legal basis shows clear growth in the number of agreements that regulate various aspects of trade and economic co- operation, cross-border interaction, co-operation in transportation, contacts in the areas of culture, education, science and technology (see Table 2). New areas of co- operation emerged-those on investment and environmental protection.
Table 2
Treaties and agreements regulating relations
between the Republic of Belarus and Poland*
Areas of co-operation
Treaties, agreements/inter-agency agreements
Diplomatic and consular relations
2/1
Trade and economic relations
5/2
Transportation
4/0
Cross-border relations
11/2
Culture, science and technology, education and tourism
6/8
Combating crime
0/1
Defence and military
0/2
Environmental protection
1/1
Health care
0/1
Legal affairs
2/1
* Since some of the Belarusian-Polish agreements cover several areas of bilateral relations, the number of accords indicated in this table may not correspond to the total number of the existing agreements.
Despite the considerable growth of the legal basis regulating Belarusian-Polish relations, the list of bilateral accords is still far from being complete. There is a legal vacuum in many areas of co-operation between Minsk and Warsaw.
Military co-operation between the two parties has been practically frozen. As long as Belarus and Poland participate in the establishment of the new system of European security, both are involved in NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the disarmament negotiations, the existing level of military co-operation seems to be absolutely inadequate.
Agreements regulating bilateral co-operation in combating crime are also clearly inadequate to this formidable task. In 1992 the only agreement on co-operation in combating crime was concluded between the Ministry of Interior of Belarus and the Ministry of Interior and Administration of Poland. The signed accord does not envisage extradition of criminals.
There are no appropriate legal instruments providing for mutual settlement of accounts, and this makes a negative impact on the co-operation in investment policy and on the development of trade and economic relations. Also, the legislative process in Minsk and Warsaw lacks relevant dynamism in contributing to the solution of such a global problem as environmental protection.
Unfortunately, the organisational structure of the relations between Minsk and Warsaw does not correspond to the new conditions of today. This makes a negative impact on the process of improving legal basis and on the nature of bilateral relations between Belarus and Poland. Currently, only two Belarusian-Polish commissions-on trade and economic co-operation, and intergovernmental co-ordination commission on cross-border co-operation-operate as permanent bilateral bodies.
The co-operation between Belarus and Poland remains a prerogative, first of all, of the executive authorities of both countries. Local authorities, like legislative and judicial bodies, are not sufficiently involved in the solution of problems related to bilateral interaction. However, if legislative authorities are not interested in further improvement of the legal basis for the Belarusian-Polish relations, it is not possible to have these improved. In addition, no matter what decisions on the development of partnership between Belarus and Poland are made in the capitals, little results could be achieved without effective co-operation among the local authorities.
Therefore, joint efforts to overcome the gap between declarations and the reality are needed in order to establish a truly constructive atmosphere of co-operation between our countries.
While analysing the state of bilateral co-operation, it is necessary to mention positive results. The two agreements between Belarus and Poland- the first one on economic co-operation and trade, signed in 1991, and the second on mutual assistance and protection of investment, signed in 1992,-made it possible to stop the decline in bilateral trade caused by structural transformations in the economies of both countries, and to provide for conditions for its gradual growth. In 1995, bilateral trade increased 2.2 times and amounted to $468.8 million. This trend remained in 1996-bilateral trade increased by 10.9% and Poland's share in Belarus's foreign trade in 1996 came to 12.4%. In terms of foreign trade with countries outside the CIS, Poland appeared to be the second major partner, following Germany. The structure of foreign trade has also changed. In 1996, the import of machines, equipment and means of transport to Belarus grew significantly-from 14% to 30.9% of the total turnover. This benefits the Polish industrial enterprises experiencing serious difficulties in selling machinery products.(11)
Some progress has been made in contacts between private enterprises. So far, about 180 Belarusian-Polish joint ventures with the authorised capital of $68.7 million have been registered in Belarus. Eighty-seven companies with 100% Polish capital operate in this country. Most of them are involved in wholesale and retail trade, agricultural products processing, production of food products and consumer goods.
Cross-border economic relations are gradually intensified. Practical issues of economic co-operation within the Bug and Neman Euroregions have been on the agenda of the intergovernmental co-ordination commission on cross-border co-operation.
Pending Issues
What are the areas where bilateral co-operation should be further developed? What should and can be in the priority list for implementing practical steps? To answer these difficult questions both parties should thoroughly examine all circumstances.
Obviously, it is quite difficult to make a forecast for future bilateral relations: this process remains under the influence of too many competing factors. At the same time, it is possible to propose a number of concrete measures that meet mutual interests of the both countries. Below is the list of measures that can be implemented at the initial phase.
1. To intensify contacts between the lower chambers of the legislative bodies of the Republic of Belarus and Poland; to evaluate the idea concerning the creation of an inter-parliamentary structure which would carry out consultations and co-ordinate positions on issues of mutual interest.
2. To draft, at the governmental level, a joint programme for the development and deepening of Belarusian-Polish economic co-operation. This document can be based upon the provisions of the Programme for the Development of Economic Co- operation with Eastern Countries and the Baltic States, adopted in Poland in 1996.
3. Since strategically important European communication lines go through the territory of Poland and Belarus, agreed measures aimed at the development of border infrastructure are required. First of all, these measures should include practical steps with regard to raising funds from international organisations to be channelled to modernisation of the existing and construction of the new border check points, rehabilitation and construction of roads and bridges in the border area.
4. To fix up mechanisms for payments and settlement of accounts; to develop co-operation in banking, and to establish insurance agencies for investments.
5. To outline steps on co-ordination and development of bilateral co-operation within the framework of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; to work out and implement additional steps concerning the expansion of mutual confidence measures in military area; to set up joint military units similar to the Polish-Ukrainian battalion.
6. To improve the legal basis of the Belarusian-Polish relations; to put forward concrete proposals aimed at the expansion of areas of bilateral co- operation with due regard to the existing imbalance in the legal framework regulating mutual contacts.
7. To make joint efforts aimed at the promotion and implementation of Belarus's initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in CEE as an important element of strengthening the system of security on the European continent.
8. To seek a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of Belarus's access to the Baltic Sea and establishment of the national merchant fleet base.
9. To increase bilateral contacts at unofficial level amongst non- government and public organisations; to promote people-to-people diplomacy actions.
Undoubtedly, this list is far from being complete. It can be added with a number of measures, including those with the involvement of other countries interested in the development of the regional co-operation.
* * *
The burden of problems that had accumulated in previous years will overshadow the relations between Western and Eastern Europe for a long time. This is why we must not cast new, shifted to the east, contours of geopolitical confrontation. Instead, we have to create such mechanisms of regional co-operation that would provide for a conflict-free accommodation of the divergent interests of the parties, precluding thus tough confrontation. The solution of this problem is seen-among other steps-through a considerable expansion of the Belarusian-Polish co-operation.
Being at the strategic cross-roads of the interests of the West and East, Poland and Belarus turned to be in focus of the modern European policy. Poland and Belarus should pull itself together and break negative trends that lately have been significantly influencing their bilateral relations. It seems extremely important to give more positivism and dynamism to mutual contacts and to make these contacts full of practical substance. Through reinforcement of the eastern azimuth of its foreign policy, Poland is sure to be able to change the negative image of the Trojan horse of the West in the eyes of its close neighbours and to bring to a totally new level of economic co-operation with the neighbouring states in the east. Belarus, in its turn, would not be perceived by European and world's public opinion as the Trojan horse of Moscow and would be able to count on a serious support from Poland in launching a constructive and equal dialogue with the West. Close Belarusian-Polish co-operation should become a reliable bridge bringing together and uniting the European continent on the cross-roads of the geopolitical interests of Western and Eastern civilisations.
Notes
(1) Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, "Polish-Belarusian relations within the context of NATO expansion," Belarus v mire , 1997, No. 1, p. 22.
(2) J.M.Goldgaier, M.McFault, " A tale of two worlds: Core and periphery in the post-Cold War era," International Organization, Stanford, 1992, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 467-491.
(3) See in Belaruskaya dumka, Minsk, 1996, No. 12, p. 29.
(4) W. von Bredow, Th. Jager. Konflikte und globale Kooperation am Ende des 20, Jahrhunderts, Bonn, 1994, B. 26/27, S/3-11.
(5) Panorama polskih reform, Vostochny institut, Warsaw , 1996, No. 4 (5), p. 4.
(6) Itar-Tass, Kompas, 1995, No. 84, p. 5.
(7) Delovye lyudi, 1997, No. 76.
(8) Panorama polskih reform, Vostochny institut, Warsaw , 1996, No. 4 (5), pp. 23, 35.
(9) Polsha, Moscow, Politizdat, 1991, p. 54.
(10) Itar-Tass, Kompas, 1997, No. 9, p. 26.
(11) Sovietskaya Belorussia , June 6, 1997.
On the threshold of the new millennium the following questions appear to become natural: How should one evaluate the multipolar world? What is the role of Belarus and its neighbours in the post-communist space in different geopolitical scenarios? Obviously, it is not appropriate to look for universal answers to these questions, since these are of different nature and will be defined by the combination of most diverse, interacting and continuously changing factors- political, economic and military.
However, now we can discuss the increasing importance of the paradigm of regional co-operation and interaction that replaced the logic of confrontation between two blocs. Integration processes at different levels and of different scale will constitute the key consolidating element, bringing together states with common historic traditions, common interests in politics, economy and national security. In other words, multipolarity should result in the establishment of the system of new balance of forces and interests, but this time at subregional, local level, less, if compared with the past, vulnerable to the influence of Great Powers.
Polish Drang nach Westen : Illusions and Reality
In this context special emphasis should be placed upon the consideration of dynamics of regional co-operation in Eastern Europe in general, and between Poland and Belarus in particular. This is conditioned by the important fact that the new line of strategic contact between the West and the East lies along the border between these two countries.
What are most essential factors that bear on the evolution of integration processes and regional co-operation? These factors include:
(i) Poland's strategic course towards integration into the transforming structures of NATO and the European Union in the shortest time possible;
(ii) cautious position of Poland regarding co-operation with Russia, and first of all on European security issues;
(iii) projecting circumspection in the Polish-Russian relations onto the development of the interstate contacts with Belarus because of Belarusian- Russian integration;
(iv) Poland's artificially holding back integration processes on the eastern direction due to the concern about the future of its co-operation with the West;
(v) very intensive integration between Belarus and Russia, providing for an opportunity to pursue a concerted foreign policy;
(vi) the increased influence of third countries trying to block the eastern vector of Poland's foreign policy and prevent re-emergence of any type of political and economic consolidation to the east of the Bug river.
Now, one can say that after the break-up of the "Eastern bloc" Poland has unambiguously chosen a pro-Western orientation. However, Russia, which let it happen, begins to realise that the loss of an allied Poland means the loss of the important element in its geopolitical position in Central Europe. Under such circumstances, conducting a constructive dialogue between the two countries has become a very difficult thing to do, and some sort of mutual distrust is growing. In this situation Belarus has been continuously affected by different perceptions by Russia and Poland on key issues relating to the developments in Europe, and has to take account of this, while formulating its multi-vectored foreign policy. These things cause slow down in the regional integration in Eastern Europe. Precisely this is why one can talk on the possible transformation of this region into a "new border cordon" between the competing West and East.
Are there any scenarios providing for conflict-free accommodation of geopolitical interests of the parties involved in this important region? Obviously, this problem could be largely solved through dramatic expansion of regional co-operation in a broad range of areas. In this regard Poland and Belarus seem to have got key positions: these countries have a real opportunity to establish a zone of constructive co-operation between the West and the East through a substantial increase of bilateral and multilateral contacts.
This positive idea has supporters in Poland, too. Mr Nowakowski believes that "...we should support the development of Polish-Belarusian contacts at an economic and social level. We should strive for an open border and strengthen the links between political organisations and NGOs of both countries."(1)
Regrettably, quite narrow tactical considerations rather than obvious long-term strategic advantages clearly prevail in the current policy of the official Belweder.
Future Role of Poland
How wide is the door to the West open to let Poland in into the European house? The answer to this seemingly simple question is far from being definite.
American political scientists J. M. Goldgaier and M. McFault, proponents of one of the Western geopolitical concepts, drawing a geopolitical picture of the contemporary world, use the terms "core" and "periphery". In their theoretical analysis the "core" comprises advanced industrial countries of Western Europe, North America and Japan, i.e. those with stable political and economic systems, while "periphery" means countries under industrialisation and democracy building. Such a theory presupposes absolute predominance of the "core" over the "periphery." Also, foreign investment and property are supposed to be used as the newest tools of exploitation of the natural and other resources by the "core" in the "periphery."(2) This clearly leading element in the new model of world order, consistently built by the West, was not left unnoticed by a number of researchers. For example, A. Malyuta justly notes, "The most powerful countries block access to themselves, satisfying their demands at the expense of the other weaker [nations]."(3)
In the military area, the advanced industrial countries do not want to interfere in affairs of the "periphery"; they are ready to do this only if their vital economic interests are threatened. This key idea is supported by German political scientists W. von Bredow and Th. Jaeger. They offer a "three-polar" model, according to which the U.S., Japan and Western Europe are entitled to claim world hegemony in the 21st century.(4)
The pattern of the real state policy confirms quite convincingly the above theoretical considerations. For instance, now Western Europe is ready to include Poland into the sphere of its influence in the shortest time possible. This policy is naturally guided by narrow pragmatic considerations rather than by abstract ideas of political philanthropy. On the background of the active involvement of Poland in NATO-something conditioned by absolutely clear strategic reasons-the attitude of Western Europe towards the idea of accelerated admittance of Poland into the European Union is quite half-hearted. Even hard optimists in Warsaw foresee Poland's joining the EU not earlier than in ten years.(5) Also, NATO membership does not suggest that a radical modernisation of the Wojsko Polskie would become a reality in the foreseeable future. According to some think tanks-the British-American Council for Security Information and the Centre for European Security and Disarmament-the West will have to pay $7 billion for NATO eastward enlargement over the next decade. With the deployment of modern military infrastructure this amount would increase tenfold. Poland's involvement in this organisation will cost the Polish government not less than $150 million annually, even without the construction of new military facilities.(6) In this situation the West proves to be unable to subsidise generously programmes of military reconstruction in the new NATO member states.
At the same time, the Polish economy has shown quite symptomatic trends. On the one hand, now Poland is delivering surprisingly high rate of economic growth. In fact, in 1996 Poland's GDP increased by 6%, and during the first quarter of 1997-by 7.6%, one of the best figures in Europe. One can understand this achievement as soon as the scale of foreign investment in Poland is considered. In fixed prices, the investments increased by 52.3% in 1997 in comparison with 1990. These have already amounted to $14 billion, with about the half of this figure coming to Poland in 1996.(7) Foreign money was directed primarily for support and development of the ventures with the involvement of foreign capital. Precisely Western currency injections have chiefly conditioned such a rapid economic growth. Mr G. Kolodko, former finance minister of Poland, confirmed this, saying that to maintain the current economic growth rate would be possible "only through export expansion and investment." In addition, foreign investment policy is becoming now an effective tool for stimulating the development of those branches of the Polish economy that are of interest for donor countries.
At the same time, the problem of trade balance is quite acute. For example, the deficit of Poland's foreign trade has increased from $814 million in 1992 to $8.3 billion in 1996, with the latter figure amounting to more than 6% of Poland's GDP. This tendency is a manifestation of Polish economy's competitiveness falling down on the world market. The gap between the growth rates of export and import continues to grow. For instance, import exceeded export by 28.1% in the third quarter of 1996 compared to the third quarter of 1995. Among the main foreign trade partners of Poland in 1996 in export operations were Germany (36.6%) and the Netherlands (6.8%), in imports-Germany (24.9%) and Italy (9.8%).(8) Back in 1990 Polish export exceeded import with the positive balance of $3.8 billion. More than 80% of the total export was directed then to the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.(9)
According to some Polish experts, the difficulties in normalising the trade balance are caused predominantly by the low level of processing of the domestic raw materials, something resulted from insufficient use or lack of modern technologies. However, in its foreign trade operations Poland remains turned to the West, sacrificing Polish economic interests for the sake of current political considerations. In this context it becomes clear that Polish elites are obviously biased with regard to the West, and creditors from over the Oder are strongly interested in preserving invested capitals under the guarantees of complete political loyalty and manageability of the Belweder. Obviously, this is the West European model, adopted by Poland, with, according to Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "interaction of the national interests and mechanisms of equilibrium, adjusted through institutional co-operation and norms of the civic society."(10)
With this in mind, it is quite natural to ask the question: Are Europeans ready to further deepen the integration process with Poland and undertake enormous financial expenses on Poland's economic radical transformation? Among Western politicians and businessmen prevail cool pragmatists, with their mind-sets obviously free from ideas of political altruism. Now, the main spring of the integration process of Poland and Western Europe is located east of the Oder, where reigns quite full approval of everything done in order to get closer to the West. Now, Warsaw's romanticism with regard to everything from the West, its way of life and culture, is strong as never before, and this is true not only for ordinary rank-and-file Poles.
Paradoxically, Europe doesn't seem interested in serious economic reforms in East European countries, and first of all due to strategic considerations. West Europeans are quite happy with "conservation" of the second-rate economies in Eastern Europe, as long as these remain a source of cheap raw materials, semi- finished products and inexpensive work force. To provide for security of the European house on the "eastern flank", new NATO members are being rapidly linked to the Alliance.
Even most general analysis clearly unveils double standards in the policy of the West European "core" towards the East European "periphery". These reminds one of the Orwellian formula of the equals: all are equal, but there are some "more equal than the others." Thus, Poland and other post-communist countries are obviously assigned a modest role of Europe's peripheral province.
Is it worthwhile for Poland to consistently follow one-sided westbound track of selective co-operation? Are there any alternatives providing more flexibility whilst taking into consideration Polish national interests in interaction with interests of the neighbouring countries to the east, those striving for expansion of regional co-operation?
East European Vector
Unfortunately, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been the scene of the growing interstate political polarisation that resulted from the break-up of the previous mechanism of balance between blocs and the search by post-communist countries for a new place in the renewed European landscape. At the same time, the powerful centrifugal force, a reaction to the old practices of co-operation within the socialist system, has been in action. This force has been so dominant that any attempts to pursue re-integration in this region were inevitably met with resistance, being these attempts perceived as nothing else but a recurrence of the past or attempts to deny national sovereignty. In such circumstances long-term strategic interests are often sacrificed for the sake of immediate political benefits, which sometimes run against the common sense and objective historic experience.
Now Eastern Europe has a sufficient number of consolidating interstate entities that bring together different groups of countries. However, in practical terms the effectiveness of these entities turns out to be insignificant. The relations that have been established are primarily formal, and thus ineffective in the solution of most regional problems. This well reflects different approaches towards key European issues, revealing the very difference which might provide for strategic confrontation between the West and the East.
For example, the perception of the three Baltic states as a geopolitical unit is far from being realistic. The Baltic Assembly has been failing to deliver the desired unity of views for a long time. Estonia is consistently strengthening its ties with the Scandinavian nations. Lithuania is accelerating its contacts with Poland, establishing with the latter common inter-parliamentary structures, and thus drifting away from the idea of the Baltic Union. The Visegrad group, the Council of the Baltic States, the Central European Initiative remain quite amorphous and cumbersome organisations with no effective mechanisms for implementation of practical measures aimed at real strengthening and development of regional co-operation. Their basic strategic goal is to consistently draw closer to and, ultimately, integrate with the European Union. Hence, all these organisations are temporary, interim entities, designed to achieve outlined strategic goal. Under such circumstances, when the countries of the region are cautious towards Russia and Belarus, and, at the same time, trying hard to join NATO, there appears the concept of "Baltic-Black Sea arch" in the east of the European continent, which, if implemented, could lead to the emergence of the new dividing line between the West and the East.
Bilateral Co-operation: The Current Balance
The comparative analysis of the existing list of Belarusian-Polish accords gives quite a full picture of the bilateral co-operation at the present stage. Here, one has to take account of the following:
(i) the legal basis of relations between Minsk and Warsaw has been built from scratch over the past six years;
(ii) geopolitical situation in Europe and politico-ideological context of relations between Belarus and Poland have dramatically changed;
(iii) the level of the Belarusian-Polish regional co-operation is the most important indicator of the general state of relations between East and West in the area where their strategic interests meet.
Let us dwell upon the most significant elements determining dynamics of building legal basis for bilateral relations and the quality of relevant steps. By now, more than 30 different interstate acts and about 20 inter-agency agreements concluded by the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Poland have become operational. All these regulate economic co-operation, cross-border contacts, transportation, cultural, scientific and educational contacts, as well as other important areas of co-operation.
One should note the significant growth in number of intergovernmental and interstate treaties and agreements signed between the two countries in 1992. Obviously, it is explained by the then emergence of Belarus as an independent entity in international relations. The decline in number of accords signed in 1993-94 and 1996 is quite conspicuous. This decline reflected the slowing down of bilateral co-operation (see Table 1).
Table 1
Data on the Belarusian-Polish agreements signed in 1991-96
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Total
Interstate and intergovernmental treaties and agreements
2
14
1
2
7/3*
1
27/3*
Inter-agency agreements
-
6
5
2
6
-
19
* This figure relates to those treaties and agreements concluded between the USSR and the Polish People's Republic that remained legally valid for the Republic of Belarus as the successor state of the USSR.
It should be noted that although the number of accords regulating Belarusian-Polish co-operation is quite impressive, the effectiveness of the concluded treaties and agreements turns to be low.
The analysis of the existing legal basis shows clear growth in the number of agreements that regulate various aspects of trade and economic co- operation, cross-border interaction, co-operation in transportation, contacts in the areas of culture, education, science and technology (see Table 2). New areas of co- operation emerged-those on investment and environmental protection.
Table 2
Treaties and agreements regulating relations
between the Republic of Belarus and Poland*
Areas of co-operation
Treaties, agreements/inter-agency agreements
Diplomatic and consular relations
2/1
Trade and economic relations
5/2
Transportation
4/0
Cross-border relations
11/2
Culture, science and technology, education and tourism
6/8
Combating crime
0/1
Defence and military
0/2
Environmental protection
1/1
Health care
0/1
Legal affairs
2/1
* Since some of the Belarusian-Polish agreements cover several areas of bilateral relations, the number of accords indicated in this table may not correspond to the total number of the existing agreements.
Despite the considerable growth of the legal basis regulating Belarusian-Polish relations, the list of bilateral accords is still far from being complete. There is a legal vacuum in many areas of co-operation between Minsk and Warsaw.
Military co-operation between the two parties has been practically frozen. As long as Belarus and Poland participate in the establishment of the new system of European security, both are involved in NATO's Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and in the disarmament negotiations, the existing level of military co-operation seems to be absolutely inadequate.
Agreements regulating bilateral co-operation in combating crime are also clearly inadequate to this formidable task. In 1992 the only agreement on co-operation in combating crime was concluded between the Ministry of Interior of Belarus and the Ministry of Interior and Administration of Poland. The signed accord does not envisage extradition of criminals.
There are no appropriate legal instruments providing for mutual settlement of accounts, and this makes a negative impact on the co-operation in investment policy and on the development of trade and economic relations. Also, the legislative process in Minsk and Warsaw lacks relevant dynamism in contributing to the solution of such a global problem as environmental protection.
Unfortunately, the organisational structure of the relations between Minsk and Warsaw does not correspond to the new conditions of today. This makes a negative impact on the process of improving legal basis and on the nature of bilateral relations between Belarus and Poland. Currently, only two Belarusian-Polish commissions-on trade and economic co-operation, and intergovernmental co-ordination commission on cross-border co-operation-operate as permanent bilateral bodies.
The co-operation between Belarus and Poland remains a prerogative, first of all, of the executive authorities of both countries. Local authorities, like legislative and judicial bodies, are not sufficiently involved in the solution of problems related to bilateral interaction. However, if legislative authorities are not interested in further improvement of the legal basis for the Belarusian-Polish relations, it is not possible to have these improved. In addition, no matter what decisions on the development of partnership between Belarus and Poland are made in the capitals, little results could be achieved without effective co-operation among the local authorities.
Therefore, joint efforts to overcome the gap between declarations and the reality are needed in order to establish a truly constructive atmosphere of co-operation between our countries.
While analysing the state of bilateral co-operation, it is necessary to mention positive results. The two agreements between Belarus and Poland- the first one on economic co-operation and trade, signed in 1991, and the second on mutual assistance and protection of investment, signed in 1992,-made it possible to stop the decline in bilateral trade caused by structural transformations in the economies of both countries, and to provide for conditions for its gradual growth. In 1995, bilateral trade increased 2.2 times and amounted to $468.8 million. This trend remained in 1996-bilateral trade increased by 10.9% and Poland's share in Belarus's foreign trade in 1996 came to 12.4%. In terms of foreign trade with countries outside the CIS, Poland appeared to be the second major partner, following Germany. The structure of foreign trade has also changed. In 1996, the import of machines, equipment and means of transport to Belarus grew significantly-from 14% to 30.9% of the total turnover. This benefits the Polish industrial enterprises experiencing serious difficulties in selling machinery products.(11)
Some progress has been made in contacts between private enterprises. So far, about 180 Belarusian-Polish joint ventures with the authorised capital of $68.7 million have been registered in Belarus. Eighty-seven companies with 100% Polish capital operate in this country. Most of them are involved in wholesale and retail trade, agricultural products processing, production of food products and consumer goods.
Cross-border economic relations are gradually intensified. Practical issues of economic co-operation within the Bug and Neman Euroregions have been on the agenda of the intergovernmental co-ordination commission on cross-border co-operation.
Pending Issues
What are the areas where bilateral co-operation should be further developed? What should and can be in the priority list for implementing practical steps? To answer these difficult questions both parties should thoroughly examine all circumstances.
Obviously, it is quite difficult to make a forecast for future bilateral relations: this process remains under the influence of too many competing factors. At the same time, it is possible to propose a number of concrete measures that meet mutual interests of the both countries. Below is the list of measures that can be implemented at the initial phase.
1. To intensify contacts between the lower chambers of the legislative bodies of the Republic of Belarus and Poland; to evaluate the idea concerning the creation of an inter-parliamentary structure which would carry out consultations and co-ordinate positions on issues of mutual interest.
2. To draft, at the governmental level, a joint programme for the development and deepening of Belarusian-Polish economic co-operation. This document can be based upon the provisions of the Programme for the Development of Economic Co- operation with Eastern Countries and the Baltic States, adopted in Poland in 1996.
3. Since strategically important European communication lines go through the territory of Poland and Belarus, agreed measures aimed at the development of border infrastructure are required. First of all, these measures should include practical steps with regard to raising funds from international organisations to be channelled to modernisation of the existing and construction of the new border check points, rehabilitation and construction of roads and bridges in the border area.
4. To fix up mechanisms for payments and settlement of accounts; to develop co-operation in banking, and to establish insurance agencies for investments.
5. To outline steps on co-ordination and development of bilateral co-operation within the framework of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; to work out and implement additional steps concerning the expansion of mutual confidence measures in military area; to set up joint military units similar to the Polish-Ukrainian battalion.
6. To improve the legal basis of the Belarusian-Polish relations; to put forward concrete proposals aimed at the expansion of areas of bilateral co- operation with due regard to the existing imbalance in the legal framework regulating mutual contacts.
7. To make joint efforts aimed at the promotion and implementation of Belarus's initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in CEE as an important element of strengthening the system of security on the European continent.
8. To seek a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of Belarus's access to the Baltic Sea and establishment of the national merchant fleet base.
9. To increase bilateral contacts at unofficial level amongst non- government and public organisations; to promote people-to-people diplomacy actions.
Undoubtedly, this list is far from being complete. It can be added with a number of measures, including those with the involvement of other countries interested in the development of the regional co-operation.
* * *
The burden of problems that had accumulated in previous years will overshadow the relations between Western and Eastern Europe for a long time. This is why we must not cast new, shifted to the east, contours of geopolitical confrontation. Instead, we have to create such mechanisms of regional co-operation that would provide for a conflict-free accommodation of the divergent interests of the parties, precluding thus tough confrontation. The solution of this problem is seen-among other steps-through a considerable expansion of the Belarusian-Polish co-operation.
Being at the strategic cross-roads of the interests of the West and East, Poland and Belarus turned to be in focus of the modern European policy. Poland and Belarus should pull itself together and break negative trends that lately have been significantly influencing their bilateral relations. It seems extremely important to give more positivism and dynamism to mutual contacts and to make these contacts full of practical substance. Through reinforcement of the eastern azimuth of its foreign policy, Poland is sure to be able to change the negative image of the Trojan horse of the West in the eyes of its close neighbours and to bring to a totally new level of economic co-operation with the neighbouring states in the east. Belarus, in its turn, would not be perceived by European and world's public opinion as the Trojan horse of Moscow and would be able to count on a serious support from Poland in launching a constructive and equal dialogue with the West. Close Belarusian-Polish co-operation should become a reliable bridge bringing together and uniting the European continent on the cross-roads of the geopolitical interests of Western and Eastern civilisations.
Notes
(1) Jerzy Marek Nowakowski, "Polish-Belarusian relations within the context of NATO expansion," Belarus v mire , 1997, No. 1, p. 22.
(2) J.M.Goldgaier, M.McFault, " A tale of two worlds: Core and periphery in the post-Cold War era," International Organization, Stanford, 1992, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 467-491.
(3) See in Belaruskaya dumka, Minsk, 1996, No. 12, p. 29.
(4) W. von Bredow, Th. Jager. Konflikte und globale Kooperation am Ende des 20, Jahrhunderts, Bonn, 1994, B. 26/27, S/3-11.
(5) Panorama polskih reform, Vostochny institut, Warsaw , 1996, No. 4 (5), p. 4.
(6) Itar-Tass, Kompas, 1995, No. 84, p. 5.
(7) Delovye lyudi, 1997, No. 76.
(8) Panorama polskih reform, Vostochny institut, Warsaw , 1996, No. 4 (5), pp. 23, 35.
(9) Polsha, Moscow, Politizdat, 1991, p. 54.
(10) Itar-Tass, Kompas, 1997, No. 9, p. 26.
(11) Sovietskaya Belorussia , June 6, 1997.
Опубликовано 29 апреля 2014 года
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