МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЕ ПРАВО (последнее)
Belarus in the Foreign Policy of Russia
Актуальные публикации по вопросам международного права и международных отношений.
This article is abridged from the author's paper that will be published in full as a separate chapter in the forthcoming book by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The book will be based on the papers prepared for the international meeting on 16-17 October, 1997, in Minsk, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Committee on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Development and Security Research Institute.
The relationship between Russia and Belarus is very much unique and its specific nature opens up big opportunities and concurrently causes serious problems.
This relationship is built in accordance with the model different from that applied to relations between other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In many areas Russian-Belarusian relations are more advanced and less dependant upon third countries' positions. At the same time, they are most politicised and subject to changes in the internal political climate. Russia does not put problems of human rights in the foreground in the relations with any CIS country other than Belarus, although Belarus is not an anti democratic exception on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Both in Russia and Belarus the question of bilateral relations, unlike other international issues, is a very significant factor in the internal political discussion. This issue is of great interest for the public in both countries, where general population has little grounds to regard each other as different peoples. The feeling of historical, ethnic and cultural identity is very strong. Furthermore, the important role of economic aspects of the bilateral relations should be noted.
This reflects a high level of the initial economic integrity of Belarus and Russia.
Belarus is the only country in the world ready to maintain allied relations with Russia, as seen in the Agreement on the Union between the two countries signed in April 1997.
However, even with the creation of the Union the relationship did not become large-scale and serene. Though the Agreement provides for a model of integration which goes far beyond the level of the European Union (EU), subsequent internal political events have abruptly hindered the implementation of the Agreement. This provides grounds for many experts to talk about the crisis in the Belarusian- Russian relations and the unpredictability of its future.
International Dimension
From the very beginning of its independence Belarus-as compared to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)-accentuated the European vector in its foreign policy to the smallest degree. Such a low profile in terms of the CEE affiliation was conditioned by the fact that the majority of the population and political elite persisted with nostalgia for the times of the USSR and pro- Russian feelings.
For the first time the sense of community of Belarus and the countries of CEE region was stated in the preamble of the Agreement between Belarus and Poland on the Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, signed on 23 June 1992, which recognised the "ethnic and cultural closeness of the Polish and Belarusian peoples."
In July 1994, Belarus received the status of associate member in the Central European Initiative (CEI), which presupposed involvement in the proceedings of working groups dealing with the issues of transport, energy and ecology. As an observer, Belarus participated in the proceedings of the CEI at the level of prime ministers and the ministers of foreign affairs. In the autumn of 1994, in the course of the visit of Mechislav Grib, the head of the Belarusian Parliament, to Poland the question of Belarus's joining the Visegrad Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was discussed. In November 1994, at the meeting of the CEFTA member states in Poznan, Poland initiated the discussion on the possibility of admittance of the Baltic countries, Romania, Ukraine and Belarus to CEFTA.
After the victory of A. Lukashenko at the presidential elections he announced an initiative to mark more clearly his country's positions in the CEE region and develop the European direction of Belarusian foreign policy. He indicated that Belarus "is going to 'fly on two wings'-one of the East and the other of the West," building relations with either party on the grounds of pragmatism or "first of all, economic interest." At the same time, A. Lukashenko emphasised,
"We are ready for mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries. However, Russia is, of course, the priority. 75-80% of today's sales of our production and resources supplies are "bound" with Russia. It is impossible not to see these realities. There is nowhere to re-orient oneself: the world market has long ago been divided and nobody is waiting for us in its western part."
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus announced its intention to achieve greater equilibrium of the foreign policy along the West-East line, preserving the development of the relationship with Russia as the priority. Another important area was strengthening links with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
More active foreign policy of Belarus in the CEE region appeared to prove Belarus's intentions to expand bilateral relations with other countries. Parallel to the signing of the Customs Union between Belarus and Russia on 6 January 1995, the meeting of Belarusian and Polish prime ministers took place in Brest, where economic agreements were achieved. Later on, A. Lukashenko paid official visits to Latvia and Lithuania. In February 1995, in the course of his visit to Vilnius, the Belarusian party discussed the possibility of Belarus's joining the construction of an oil terminal in Butinge and a pipeline to the Novopolotsk oil refinery. According to A. Lukashenko, these moves could make it possible to open an alternative way for energy supplies and provide Belarus with "the freedom of economic manoeuvre." At the same time, he made it clear that he was against the exclusion of Russia from the projects.
In January 1995, the issue of oil deliveries was effectively solved by the bilateral agreement between Russia and Belarus, under which Belarus began to receive energy resources at prices practically equal to those in Russia, in exchange for free transit of goods to and from Russia through its territory.
In the policies of Western states, Belarus-as compared to the other CEE countries and the former Soviet republics-has been of peripheral importance for a long time. The European structures were aware of the problems in establishing democratic institutions, and put Belarus on the long waiting list for the membership in the Council of Europe (CE). Only Germany was developing any significant economic relations with Belarus.
NATO's eastward enlargement, perceived negatively both in Belarus and in Russia, has increased difficulties in relations between Belarus and its western neighbours.
The treaty on the establishment of a Community of Russia and Belarus, concluded on 2 April 1996, gave rise to no serious concerns. The West viewed this event predominantly as a propagandistic means for the solution of political tasks of the moment by the presidents of the Russian Federation and Belarus. In the first case-as part of B. Yeltsin's election campaign, and in the second-as an effort by A. Lukashenko to outmanoeuvre his opponents in his confrontation with the parliament.
After the dismissal of the Belarusian parliament by A. Lukashenko and a toughening of the political regime, the Western assessment of the policy of Minsk and the integration between Belarus and Russia became increasingly negative. In February 1997, after visits of their observers to Minsk, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the CE demanded that the results of the November 1996 referendum be reconsidered. The U.S. State Department recommended that American investors refrain from co-operation with the incumbent regime in Belarus and suggested that they redirect investments into neighbouring countries.
The assessments of the transformation of the Community of Russia and Belarus into the Union in April 1997 varied. The U.S. State Department did not notice anything new in principle: "it does not look like a genuine union, rather it reminds one of a closer co-operation." The Re-solution of the European Parliament, adopted on 10 April 1997, had a clear resentment relating to the establishment of this Union. It called for a postponement of the ratification of the Treaty until democratic institutions are formed in Belarus.
At the same time, it cannot be said that the West completely "closed the door" for official Minsk. Contacts at the level of the European structures continued. Poland and Ukraine often played the part of a middleman between the West and Belarus. According to some Polish experts, leaving Belarus in a complete international isolation would be counter-productive. According to a high-ranking official of the European Commission, "Poland has long been trying to convince the West not to give up efforts aimed at drawing Belarus into the sphere of its influence. In dealings with Minsk, Poland offers the stick and the carrot policy as the only feasible solution."
Within the CIS, the Union of Russia and Belarus was assessed rather neutrally, apart from the painful reaction of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Their position can largely be explained by the fact that the conclusion of the Union of the Russian Federation and Belarus and the plans to introduce common citizenship led to pressure from the large Russian-speaking populations of Kazakhstan and Ukraine in favour of strengthening integration with Russia. Additionally, there are concerns in Kyiv that the integration of Russia and Belarus is capable of weakening the economic positions of Ukraine, first of all because of the possibility of laying oil and gas pipelines from Russia to the West through Belarus, not Ukraine.
Russian experts and politicians-both proponents and opponents of the integration of Russia and Belarus-are quite unanimous in the assessment of positive and negative international consequences of this process for the Russian Federation. The difference is that proponents accentuate advantages and opponents- disadvantages.
To the negative international consequences of the integration, Russian analysts refer the possibility of the transition of some states to the pursuit of individual or co-ordinated policy aimed at the neutralisation of the benefits gained by Russia. The main components of this course may include:
i.accelerated military rather than political enlargement of NATO towards the countries of Central Europe, whilst building the infrastructure for "forward deployment" (at the same time, it should be emphasised that the integration of Russia and Belarus is not regarded by leading Russian politicians and experts in the context of NATO enlargement; in their opinion, Union members have a set of objective national interests that demand their integration irrespective of the future of NATO);
(ii) Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement, as well as further consolidation of the Baltic states which will narrow the space for manoeuvre of Russian foreign policy;
(iii)increasing attention by the West towards Ukraine, something which, in the medium term, may lead to efforts aimed at undermining the partnership model of Russian-Ukrainian relations;
(iv) the growth of contradictions in the relationship between Russia and the West; although Western countries are, in a sense, constrained by their previous official position regarding the acceptability of the Russian-Belarusian integration, providing this process is conducted in a democratic way. They may, nevertheless, try to mobilise their allies towards barring such a union, or, later on, splitting the Union of Russia and Belarus;
(v) indirect economic pressure by the West in the form of a further downsizing of economic aid, and refusal to provide financial and economic assistance in the reform of the Belarusian economy, under the pretext that if Russia finds resources for large-scale foreign policy actions, it should not rely on assistance from abroad.
In general, Moscow assumes that Western countries will not openly confront Russia because of its integration with Belarus. It is perceived as process- although not corresponding to the interests of the West-which is quite natural and predictable, considering the closeness of the Russian and Belarusian peoples, perhaps analogous with the recent reunification of Germany.
Russian-Belarusian Integration
From the moment of gaining independence, Russia and Belarus have never called into question close economic, political and military integration. The interest in economic integration was pre-determined by the strongly interwoven economies. Belarus was one of the most developed republics the former Soviet Union and possessed high-technological-by Soviet standards-industries, skilled personnel and developed infrastructure. Advanced large specialised enterprises mainly produced final products, using components, energy and raw materials which came mostly from Russia. Belarus was the traditional supplier of meat and dairy products, potatoes and flax to the Russian market, depending on the deliveries of fodder grain and concentrated products.
Russia would gain the following clear benefits from integration with Belarus:
(i) expansion of the capacity of the internal market;
(ii) the possibility to make use of the extremely advantageous geo-economic position of Belarus and its developed transport and foreign trade infrastructure for the sake of common economic interests;
(iii) acquisition of a reliable transport corridor for the flow of goods to the West, especially gas and oil;
(iv) maintaining deliveries in support of the Kaliningrad region;
(v) restoration and creation of new technological links between Russian and Belarusian enterprises.
Compatible levels of economic development have been and remain important prerequisite for integration. At the time of the dissolution of the USSR, Belarus was first-among the republics of the CIS-in terms of national income per capita and third-in terms of the total volume of industrial production, food products and light industry. The crisis in the Belarusian economy-largely connected with the breaking of previous economic ties, the downsizing of oil deliveries from Russia (by 1993 they fell by two thirds compared to the 1990 level), the halting of production of outdated equipment and a slump in military production-led to the 36% decrease in Belarus's GDP in 1992-96. In Russia, for the same period, the GDP has dropped by 38% due to similar reasons. Because of the different structural changes in shrinking economies, average incomes in Russia appeared to be almost twice as big as those in Belarus. However, in Belarus cash payments were made without delays, the prices were lower and the gap in incomes-less significant.
At the same time, Russia remained the main trade partner of Belarus with 52% of its total foreign trade turnover. All oil and gas deliveries come from Russia. In 1994-96, Belarus took from Russia about 70% of its imports of ferrous metallurgy products, over 50% of cement, about 80% of mineral fertilisers, about 100% of timber, 100% of lorries, 70% of tractors, and 100% of combine harvesters. For Russia, Belarus is a significant but not vital foreign trade partner-it takes about 4% of the total Russian foreign trade.
The creation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995 and cancellation of customs duties became an important incentive for the development of trade relations. Exports from Russia to the other countries of the Customs Union increased by 40% in the course of two years (this figure does not reflect real exports income, since Russia has not received payments for part of its exports). However, many provisions of the Customs Union Agreement have not been put into action so far. The system of foreign economic regulation of Belarus has not been adjusted to match that of Russia, as was stipulated in the Agreement. Significant differences remain in the preferential tariffs in Russia and Belarus with regard to the list of countries, goods inventory and the level of exemptions.
While establishing the common customs area, lack of co-ordination of the legal framework provided conditions for the illegal export of alcohol, tobacco and other excisable goods.
Russian businessmen regard conditions for investment in Belarus as not bad, since there is no serious competition in the Belarusian capital market. The most common form of Russian investment is that into the development of joint projects and financial-industrial groups. However, for the growth of investment and full-term economic integration there remains a number of restrictions associated with the specific character of the economic system in Belarus, which is becoming increasingly different from that of Russia because of the heavily state-controlled nature of the former.
The economic integration Russia and Belarus presupposed that they would undertake measures aimed at both co-ordination of the legislation and economic policy of the two nations. Article 4 of the Treaty, signed on 2 April 1996, reflects this requirement, according to which Russia and Belarus "starting from late 1997 shall synchronise the phases, timetable and depth of the conducted economic reforms, and shall establish a single legal framework to remove any type of interstate barriers and restrictions."
Despite the fact that Belarus started to bring many of its laws in financial, budgetary, trade spheres, etc. in compliance with the Russian laws and regulations back in 1993, significant differences in the legal environment have remained.
President B. Yeltsin repeatedly stressed the importance of the countries' conducting "reforms not at different pace," otherwise there will be no integration. According to the official Belarusian press, Moscow thought up the thesis of "synchronisation of reforms" in order to derail real steps towards integration. Nevertheless, on 2 April 1997, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Russia and Belarus adopted the programme of the synchronisation of economic reforms.
However, little has been accomplished to provide for its implementation. The management of the national economy of Belarus continues to be conducted on the basis of the programmes developed by the government. The pace of privatisation envisages denationalisation of 70% of enterprises only by the year 2000. Now, little more than 20% of enterprises have been privatised, mainly in the sphere of small business. The government continues to regulate prices for a long list of commodities.
There is a difference between the budgetary policy and the structure of revenue and expenditures on public account. Whereas in Russia the revenue of the consolidated budget is roughly 20% of the GDP, in Belarus it exceeds 50% of the GDP. The main tax rates-VAT, income tax-do not differ significantly. However, the number of Belarusian taxes, excise goods, as well as tax incentives and tax exemptions excessively prevail over that of Russia. More funding is designated in the Belarus's structure of budgetary expenditures for the social sphere, as well as support to the sectors of the national economy. The policy in the area of covering the budget deficit differs in principle. Russia uses predominantly external and internal borrowings to come out of the red, whereas in Belarus the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) provides direct crediting of the state budget deficit.
Compared to Russia, the currency regime is more rigid in Belarus, due to the existence of a number of restrictions for buying currency, which, however, do not solve the problem of the stability of the Belarusian rouble. Experts link the recent aggravation of the currency market crisis in Belarus to the administrative measures designed to support overvalued exchange rate of the national currency.
The measures outlined by the Belarusian government to get the economy out of crisis seem to be more close to statism practices. They include expansionist monetary policy, current assets indexation, crediting of the budget deficit, direct financing of the economy (in particular, construction of housing and vital sectors of economy), mutual settlement of accounts and debts restructuring to solve the non-payment problem and so on.
The differences in the economic mechanisms bring to naught the attempts to unify the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus. These attempts have been undertaken since 1994, when a respective agreement was signed. After the signing of this agreement, the issue of the integration of the monetary systems became a subject of keen political discussion. On the whole, many Belarusian manufacturers and bankers welcomed the establishment of a single rouble zone. They were attracted by common prices for energy and raw materials within a single rouble space, removal of many barriers on the way of Belarusian exports, and opportunities to raise additional currency funds to conduct structural transformations in the economy. The Belarusian opposition clearly viewed the unification of the monetary systems as the move that would lead to Belarus's renunciation of independence.
The liberal-monetarist wing of Russian economists and politicians came out with sharp criticism of the concept of the monetary union. They believed that through the mechanism of rouble zone, including through concealed price subsidisation, considerable part of the Russian GDP would be transferred into Belarus, thus making the realisation of the agreement a heavy burden on the Russian budget and causing another turn of inflation. At the end of February 1995, the government of Russia announced that this would be a question for the future.
In 1996 the government of Belarus officially called on the Russian government and the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to start talks on the tying the Belarusian rouble to the Russian one and on mutual conversion of currencies on the internal markets.
For these purposes, in the beginning of March 1997, the NBB and the CBR signed an agreement on the co-ordination of currency policy that implied consistent introduction of market mechanisms for exchange control in Belarus and further adjustment of this mechanism to that of Russia. In the agreement, the prospects for the possibility of carrying out operations on internal exchange market of the partner country were stipulated for, including access to currency market auctions. By the end of this year, it was planned to provide commercial banks of both countries with the right to freely convert their resources, in Belarusian and Russian roubles, kept on the corresponding accounts in the banks of the partner country into a third country's currency, including hard currency. The central banks of both countries were planning to carry out common national currencies rate management. However, in August 1997, the CBR suspended talks with the NBB for an indefinite period of time, because the Belarusian side had not fulfilled a single provision of the March agreement.
Military Co-operation
Both Russia and Belarus show visible interest in military and military-technical integration. Belarus committed itself to providing collective security of the CIS countries under the Tashkent Agreement and signed a series of bilateral agreements on military co-operation with Russia.
Withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus became an important area of the co-operation. In April 1992, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons was completed. In May 1992, Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol that stipulated, in particular, the destruction of 81 SS-25 ICBMs. Later, in February 1993, Belarus ratified the START-1 and joined the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The withdrawal of the Russian nuclear forces from Belarus was completed by the end of 1996.
Military-technical co-operation was carried out in accordance with the special agreement signed in October 1993. The agreement was based on the mutual interest in co-operation in the area of development, production, supplies and repair of armaments and military equipment.
Belarus does not actually manufacture final military products. The Belarusian defence production is carried on in co-operation with the Russian defence complex. At present, Russian defence enterprises maintain contacts with enterprises of the Belarusian military-industrial complex. Many Belarusian factories remain monopolists in the CIS.
The defence interests of Russia were taken account of in the bilateral government agreements of 1995 on the completion of the construction, use and maintenance of the Baranovichi centre, missile attack early warning system, as well as the use and maintenance of the signal centre Vileika that is included in the system of the monitoring of the Russian Navy submarines. These facilities, located on the territory of Belarus, will be used by Russia for 25 years.
In the treaty on the Union of the two countries, the parties committed themselves to undertake joint measures, if necessary, to prevent a threat to the sovereignty or independence of each of the state, co-ordinate their activities in the area of defence, jointly use military infrastructure, and implement joint programmes on border issues.
Minsk is ready for close military co-operation. This, however, is impeded by the lack of readiness from the Russian side, caused by internal problems arising in the course of military reform and drastic reduction in military expenditures.
Integration of the Political Infrastructure
The level of political integration reached by Russia and Belarus remains a mystery. The main provisions and aims of the Union of the two countries are formulated in a rather abstract form, not supported by the mechanisms for their realisation, and poorly implemented. Interstate bodies, established by the 1996 Treaty on Community and moved on to the Charter of the Union as of May 1997, create a ramified political infrastructure. These bodies work ineffectively or remain inoperational at all.
The Union is based on the principles of the "sovereign quality of the member states" and in prospect is directed "at the consistent movement to the voluntary unification of the member states of the Union on the basis of free will of their peoples." A greater unity is expected to be achieved by the introduction of the Union citizenship. However, the Charter rather presupposes common quasi-citizenship, since, for instance, a citizen of one country cannot participate in the elections in another on a level higher than municipal.
Such important goals and objectives as co-ordination of the positions and actions when resolving common political problems, adjusting national legislative systems, formation of the legislative system of the Union have not yet been put into practice.
Russia does not have effective means to "facilitate the development of democracy in the Union, observance and protection of human rights and basic freedoms of an individual and citizen" as it is set out in the Charter. This is constantly creating collisions in the relations between Moscow and Minsk.
The Supreme Council of the Union, whose members are the presidents, prime ministers and speakers of the parliament chambers of both countries, has not been convoked for the last months. The Union budget that is to be adopted by the Supreme Council does not exist.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union, where 36 deputies from the legislative bodies of each country are delegated, according to the Charter, carries out its sessions twice a year and is entitled to adopt legislative acts that only have the status of "legislative recommendation." The first session of the Parliamentary Assembly showed the domination of the left and communists there and proved the absence of any constructiveness. Its work hardly moved B. Yeltsin closer to the thought on the acceleration of the "creation of the conditions for the transition of the Parliamentary Assembly into a representative and legislative body elected directly by the citizens," as it is envisioned by the Charter.
The future of the Russian-Belarusian integration mainly depends upon how fast the countries and their leaders manage to find the way out of the crisis in their relations, which started to deepen after the signing of the Union Treaty. So far, the differences have been growing like a snow ball.
Occasional attacks of the Belarusian president on the "opponents of integration in the Russian government," who are allegedly hinder the realisation of the agreements achieved by him and B. Yeltsin, do not increase mutual understanding, too. The signing of agreements on direct co-operation with Yakutia and Krasnodar region caused painful reaction from B. Yeltsin, who, in fact, forbade A. Lukashenko to act in Russia without authorisation of the Kremlin. Moscow was negative on the failure of the OSCE human rights mission to suggest changes in the Belarusian constitution that would provide for implementation of the power-sharing principle and human rights and freedoms.
The longer the crisis lasts in the relations between Russia and Belarus, the harder it is for the presidents of both countries to take face-saving steps. The proponents of the Union in the Russian government undertake measures to unlock the situation and promote practical co-operation. Last September, V. Chernomyrdin had a meeting with the Belarusian Prime Minister S. Ling; E. Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, and V. Serov, the Russian deputy prime minister, visited Minsk.
Also, talks between the heads of the ministries of interior of both countries were held.
This diplomatic activity made it possible to reduce the main irritating factor in the bilateral relations: P. Sheremet, head of the Belarusian bureau of the ORT, Russian TV channel, was released from jail. Still, it is too early to talk about the both sides coming back to constructive dialogue. The worst scenario would be to ruin the already signed treaty. This would mean a serious blow to the prestige of Russia and its leadership, that would be seen thus as unable to carry out the most important foreign policy action, an impulse towards the disintegration of the CIS, possible re-orientation of the Belarusian leadership towards other centres of power and difficulties for Russia in getting access to Western markets.
The relationship between Russia and Belarus is very much unique and its specific nature opens up big opportunities and concurrently causes serious problems.
This relationship is built in accordance with the model different from that applied to relations between other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In many areas Russian-Belarusian relations are more advanced and less dependant upon third countries' positions. At the same time, they are most politicised and subject to changes in the internal political climate. Russia does not put problems of human rights in the foreground in the relations with any CIS country other than Belarus, although Belarus is not an anti democratic exception on the territory of the former Soviet Union.
Both in Russia and Belarus the question of bilateral relations, unlike other international issues, is a very significant factor in the internal political discussion. This issue is of great interest for the public in both countries, where general population has little grounds to regard each other as different peoples. The feeling of historical, ethnic and cultural identity is very strong. Furthermore, the important role of economic aspects of the bilateral relations should be noted.
This reflects a high level of the initial economic integrity of Belarus and Russia.
Belarus is the only country in the world ready to maintain allied relations with Russia, as seen in the Agreement on the Union between the two countries signed in April 1997.
However, even with the creation of the Union the relationship did not become large-scale and serene. Though the Agreement provides for a model of integration which goes far beyond the level of the European Union (EU), subsequent internal political events have abruptly hindered the implementation of the Agreement. This provides grounds for many experts to talk about the crisis in the Belarusian- Russian relations and the unpredictability of its future.
International Dimension
From the very beginning of its independence Belarus-as compared to the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)-accentuated the European vector in its foreign policy to the smallest degree. Such a low profile in terms of the CEE affiliation was conditioned by the fact that the majority of the population and political elite persisted with nostalgia for the times of the USSR and pro- Russian feelings.
For the first time the sense of community of Belarus and the countries of CEE region was stated in the preamble of the Agreement between Belarus and Poland on the Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, signed on 23 June 1992, which recognised the "ethnic and cultural closeness of the Polish and Belarusian peoples."
In July 1994, Belarus received the status of associate member in the Central European Initiative (CEI), which presupposed involvement in the proceedings of working groups dealing with the issues of transport, energy and ecology. As an observer, Belarus participated in the proceedings of the CEI at the level of prime ministers and the ministers of foreign affairs. In the autumn of 1994, in the course of the visit of Mechislav Grib, the head of the Belarusian Parliament, to Poland the question of Belarus's joining the Visegrad Group and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) was discussed. In November 1994, at the meeting of the CEFTA member states in Poznan, Poland initiated the discussion on the possibility of admittance of the Baltic countries, Romania, Ukraine and Belarus to CEFTA.
After the victory of A. Lukashenko at the presidential elections he announced an initiative to mark more clearly his country's positions in the CEE region and develop the European direction of Belarusian foreign policy. He indicated that Belarus "is going to 'fly on two wings'-one of the East and the other of the West," building relations with either party on the grounds of pragmatism or "first of all, economic interest." At the same time, A. Lukashenko emphasised,
"We are ready for mutually beneficial co-operation with all countries. However, Russia is, of course, the priority. 75-80% of today's sales of our production and resources supplies are "bound" with Russia. It is impossible not to see these realities. There is nowhere to re-orient oneself: the world market has long ago been divided and nobody is waiting for us in its western part."
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus announced its intention to achieve greater equilibrium of the foreign policy along the West-East line, preserving the development of the relationship with Russia as the priority. Another important area was strengthening links with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia.
More active foreign policy of Belarus in the CEE region appeared to prove Belarus's intentions to expand bilateral relations with other countries. Parallel to the signing of the Customs Union between Belarus and Russia on 6 January 1995, the meeting of Belarusian and Polish prime ministers took place in Brest, where economic agreements were achieved. Later on, A. Lukashenko paid official visits to Latvia and Lithuania. In February 1995, in the course of his visit to Vilnius, the Belarusian party discussed the possibility of Belarus's joining the construction of an oil terminal in Butinge and a pipeline to the Novopolotsk oil refinery. According to A. Lukashenko, these moves could make it possible to open an alternative way for energy supplies and provide Belarus with "the freedom of economic manoeuvre." At the same time, he made it clear that he was against the exclusion of Russia from the projects.
In January 1995, the issue of oil deliveries was effectively solved by the bilateral agreement between Russia and Belarus, under which Belarus began to receive energy resources at prices practically equal to those in Russia, in exchange for free transit of goods to and from Russia through its territory.
In the policies of Western states, Belarus-as compared to the other CEE countries and the former Soviet republics-has been of peripheral importance for a long time. The European structures were aware of the problems in establishing democratic institutions, and put Belarus on the long waiting list for the membership in the Council of Europe (CE). Only Germany was developing any significant economic relations with Belarus.
NATO's eastward enlargement, perceived negatively both in Belarus and in Russia, has increased difficulties in relations between Belarus and its western neighbours.
The treaty on the establishment of a Community of Russia and Belarus, concluded on 2 April 1996, gave rise to no serious concerns. The West viewed this event predominantly as a propagandistic means for the solution of political tasks of the moment by the presidents of the Russian Federation and Belarus. In the first case-as part of B. Yeltsin's election campaign, and in the second-as an effort by A. Lukashenko to outmanoeuvre his opponents in his confrontation with the parliament.
After the dismissal of the Belarusian parliament by A. Lukashenko and a toughening of the political regime, the Western assessment of the policy of Minsk and the integration between Belarus and Russia became increasingly negative. In February 1997, after visits of their observers to Minsk, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the CE demanded that the results of the November 1996 referendum be reconsidered. The U.S. State Department recommended that American investors refrain from co-operation with the incumbent regime in Belarus and suggested that they redirect investments into neighbouring countries.
The assessments of the transformation of the Community of Russia and Belarus into the Union in April 1997 varied. The U.S. State Department did not notice anything new in principle: "it does not look like a genuine union, rather it reminds one of a closer co-operation." The Re-solution of the European Parliament, adopted on 10 April 1997, had a clear resentment relating to the establishment of this Union. It called for a postponement of the ratification of the Treaty until democratic institutions are formed in Belarus.
At the same time, it cannot be said that the West completely "closed the door" for official Minsk. Contacts at the level of the European structures continued. Poland and Ukraine often played the part of a middleman between the West and Belarus. According to some Polish experts, leaving Belarus in a complete international isolation would be counter-productive. According to a high-ranking official of the European Commission, "Poland has long been trying to convince the West not to give up efforts aimed at drawing Belarus into the sphere of its influence. In dealings with Minsk, Poland offers the stick and the carrot policy as the only feasible solution."
Within the CIS, the Union of Russia and Belarus was assessed rather neutrally, apart from the painful reaction of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Their position can largely be explained by the fact that the conclusion of the Union of the Russian Federation and Belarus and the plans to introduce common citizenship led to pressure from the large Russian-speaking populations of Kazakhstan and Ukraine in favour of strengthening integration with Russia. Additionally, there are concerns in Kyiv that the integration of Russia and Belarus is capable of weakening the economic positions of Ukraine, first of all because of the possibility of laying oil and gas pipelines from Russia to the West through Belarus, not Ukraine.
Russian experts and politicians-both proponents and opponents of the integration of Russia and Belarus-are quite unanimous in the assessment of positive and negative international consequences of this process for the Russian Federation. The difference is that proponents accentuate advantages and opponents- disadvantages.
To the negative international consequences of the integration, Russian analysts refer the possibility of the transition of some states to the pursuit of individual or co-ordinated policy aimed at the neutralisation of the benefits gained by Russia. The main components of this course may include:
i.accelerated military rather than political enlargement of NATO towards the countries of Central Europe, whilst building the infrastructure for "forward deployment" (at the same time, it should be emphasised that the integration of Russia and Belarus is not regarded by leading Russian politicians and experts in the context of NATO enlargement; in their opinion, Union members have a set of objective national interests that demand their integration irrespective of the future of NATO);
(ii) Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement, as well as further consolidation of the Baltic states which will narrow the space for manoeuvre of Russian foreign policy;
(iii)increasing attention by the West towards Ukraine, something which, in the medium term, may lead to efforts aimed at undermining the partnership model of Russian-Ukrainian relations;
(iv) the growth of contradictions in the relationship between Russia and the West; although Western countries are, in a sense, constrained by their previous official position regarding the acceptability of the Russian-Belarusian integration, providing this process is conducted in a democratic way. They may, nevertheless, try to mobilise their allies towards barring such a union, or, later on, splitting the Union of Russia and Belarus;
(v) indirect economic pressure by the West in the form of a further downsizing of economic aid, and refusal to provide financial and economic assistance in the reform of the Belarusian economy, under the pretext that if Russia finds resources for large-scale foreign policy actions, it should not rely on assistance from abroad.
In general, Moscow assumes that Western countries will not openly confront Russia because of its integration with Belarus. It is perceived as process- although not corresponding to the interests of the West-which is quite natural and predictable, considering the closeness of the Russian and Belarusian peoples, perhaps analogous with the recent reunification of Germany.
Russian-Belarusian Integration
From the moment of gaining independence, Russia and Belarus have never called into question close economic, political and military integration. The interest in economic integration was pre-determined by the strongly interwoven economies. Belarus was one of the most developed republics the former Soviet Union and possessed high-technological-by Soviet standards-industries, skilled personnel and developed infrastructure. Advanced large specialised enterprises mainly produced final products, using components, energy and raw materials which came mostly from Russia. Belarus was the traditional supplier of meat and dairy products, potatoes and flax to the Russian market, depending on the deliveries of fodder grain and concentrated products.
Russia would gain the following clear benefits from integration with Belarus:
(i) expansion of the capacity of the internal market;
(ii) the possibility to make use of the extremely advantageous geo-economic position of Belarus and its developed transport and foreign trade infrastructure for the sake of common economic interests;
(iii) acquisition of a reliable transport corridor for the flow of goods to the West, especially gas and oil;
(iv) maintaining deliveries in support of the Kaliningrad region;
(v) restoration and creation of new technological links between Russian and Belarusian enterprises.
Compatible levels of economic development have been and remain important prerequisite for integration. At the time of the dissolution of the USSR, Belarus was first-among the republics of the CIS-in terms of national income per capita and third-in terms of the total volume of industrial production, food products and light industry. The crisis in the Belarusian economy-largely connected with the breaking of previous economic ties, the downsizing of oil deliveries from Russia (by 1993 they fell by two thirds compared to the 1990 level), the halting of production of outdated equipment and a slump in military production-led to the 36% decrease in Belarus's GDP in 1992-96. In Russia, for the same period, the GDP has dropped by 38% due to similar reasons. Because of the different structural changes in shrinking economies, average incomes in Russia appeared to be almost twice as big as those in Belarus. However, in Belarus cash payments were made without delays, the prices were lower and the gap in incomes-less significant.
At the same time, Russia remained the main trade partner of Belarus with 52% of its total foreign trade turnover. All oil and gas deliveries come from Russia. In 1994-96, Belarus took from Russia about 70% of its imports of ferrous metallurgy products, over 50% of cement, about 80% of mineral fertilisers, about 100% of timber, 100% of lorries, 70% of tractors, and 100% of combine harvesters. For Russia, Belarus is a significant but not vital foreign trade partner-it takes about 4% of the total Russian foreign trade.
The creation of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 1995 and cancellation of customs duties became an important incentive for the development of trade relations. Exports from Russia to the other countries of the Customs Union increased by 40% in the course of two years (this figure does not reflect real exports income, since Russia has not received payments for part of its exports). However, many provisions of the Customs Union Agreement have not been put into action so far. The system of foreign economic regulation of Belarus has not been adjusted to match that of Russia, as was stipulated in the Agreement. Significant differences remain in the preferential tariffs in Russia and Belarus with regard to the list of countries, goods inventory and the level of exemptions.
While establishing the common customs area, lack of co-ordination of the legal framework provided conditions for the illegal export of alcohol, tobacco and other excisable goods.
Russian businessmen regard conditions for investment in Belarus as not bad, since there is no serious competition in the Belarusian capital market. The most common form of Russian investment is that into the development of joint projects and financial-industrial groups. However, for the growth of investment and full-term economic integration there remains a number of restrictions associated with the specific character of the economic system in Belarus, which is becoming increasingly different from that of Russia because of the heavily state-controlled nature of the former.
The economic integration Russia and Belarus presupposed that they would undertake measures aimed at both co-ordination of the legislation and economic policy of the two nations. Article 4 of the Treaty, signed on 2 April 1996, reflects this requirement, according to which Russia and Belarus "starting from late 1997 shall synchronise the phases, timetable and depth of the conducted economic reforms, and shall establish a single legal framework to remove any type of interstate barriers and restrictions."
Despite the fact that Belarus started to bring many of its laws in financial, budgetary, trade spheres, etc. in compliance with the Russian laws and regulations back in 1993, significant differences in the legal environment have remained.
President B. Yeltsin repeatedly stressed the importance of the countries' conducting "reforms not at different pace," otherwise there will be no integration. According to the official Belarusian press, Moscow thought up the thesis of "synchronisation of reforms" in order to derail real steps towards integration. Nevertheless, on 2 April 1997, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Russia and Belarus adopted the programme of the synchronisation of economic reforms.
However, little has been accomplished to provide for its implementation. The management of the national economy of Belarus continues to be conducted on the basis of the programmes developed by the government. The pace of privatisation envisages denationalisation of 70% of enterprises only by the year 2000. Now, little more than 20% of enterprises have been privatised, mainly in the sphere of small business. The government continues to regulate prices for a long list of commodities.
There is a difference between the budgetary policy and the structure of revenue and expenditures on public account. Whereas in Russia the revenue of the consolidated budget is roughly 20% of the GDP, in Belarus it exceeds 50% of the GDP. The main tax rates-VAT, income tax-do not differ significantly. However, the number of Belarusian taxes, excise goods, as well as tax incentives and tax exemptions excessively prevail over that of Russia. More funding is designated in the Belarus's structure of budgetary expenditures for the social sphere, as well as support to the sectors of the national economy. The policy in the area of covering the budget deficit differs in principle. Russia uses predominantly external and internal borrowings to come out of the red, whereas in Belarus the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) provides direct crediting of the state budget deficit.
Compared to Russia, the currency regime is more rigid in Belarus, due to the existence of a number of restrictions for buying currency, which, however, do not solve the problem of the stability of the Belarusian rouble. Experts link the recent aggravation of the currency market crisis in Belarus to the administrative measures designed to support overvalued exchange rate of the national currency.
The measures outlined by the Belarusian government to get the economy out of crisis seem to be more close to statism practices. They include expansionist monetary policy, current assets indexation, crediting of the budget deficit, direct financing of the economy (in particular, construction of housing and vital sectors of economy), mutual settlement of accounts and debts restructuring to solve the non-payment problem and so on.
The differences in the economic mechanisms bring to naught the attempts to unify the monetary systems of Russia and Belarus. These attempts have been undertaken since 1994, when a respective agreement was signed. After the signing of this agreement, the issue of the integration of the monetary systems became a subject of keen political discussion. On the whole, many Belarusian manufacturers and bankers welcomed the establishment of a single rouble zone. They were attracted by common prices for energy and raw materials within a single rouble space, removal of many barriers on the way of Belarusian exports, and opportunities to raise additional currency funds to conduct structural transformations in the economy. The Belarusian opposition clearly viewed the unification of the monetary systems as the move that would lead to Belarus's renunciation of independence.
The liberal-monetarist wing of Russian economists and politicians came out with sharp criticism of the concept of the monetary union. They believed that through the mechanism of rouble zone, including through concealed price subsidisation, considerable part of the Russian GDP would be transferred into Belarus, thus making the realisation of the agreement a heavy burden on the Russian budget and causing another turn of inflation. At the end of February 1995, the government of Russia announced that this would be a question for the future.
In 1996 the government of Belarus officially called on the Russian government and the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to start talks on the tying the Belarusian rouble to the Russian one and on mutual conversion of currencies on the internal markets.
For these purposes, in the beginning of March 1997, the NBB and the CBR signed an agreement on the co-ordination of currency policy that implied consistent introduction of market mechanisms for exchange control in Belarus and further adjustment of this mechanism to that of Russia. In the agreement, the prospects for the possibility of carrying out operations on internal exchange market of the partner country were stipulated for, including access to currency market auctions. By the end of this year, it was planned to provide commercial banks of both countries with the right to freely convert their resources, in Belarusian and Russian roubles, kept on the corresponding accounts in the banks of the partner country into a third country's currency, including hard currency. The central banks of both countries were planning to carry out common national currencies rate management. However, in August 1997, the CBR suspended talks with the NBB for an indefinite period of time, because the Belarusian side had not fulfilled a single provision of the March agreement.
Military Co-operation
Both Russia and Belarus show visible interest in military and military-technical integration. Belarus committed itself to providing collective security of the CIS countries under the Tashkent Agreement and signed a series of bilateral agreements on military co-operation with Russia.
Withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus became an important area of the co-operation. In April 1992, the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons was completed. In May 1992, Belarus signed the Lisbon Protocol that stipulated, in particular, the destruction of 81 SS-25 ICBMs. Later, in February 1993, Belarus ratified the START-1 and joined the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The withdrawal of the Russian nuclear forces from Belarus was completed by the end of 1996.
Military-technical co-operation was carried out in accordance with the special agreement signed in October 1993. The agreement was based on the mutual interest in co-operation in the area of development, production, supplies and repair of armaments and military equipment.
Belarus does not actually manufacture final military products. The Belarusian defence production is carried on in co-operation with the Russian defence complex. At present, Russian defence enterprises maintain contacts with enterprises of the Belarusian military-industrial complex. Many Belarusian factories remain monopolists in the CIS.
The defence interests of Russia were taken account of in the bilateral government agreements of 1995 on the completion of the construction, use and maintenance of the Baranovichi centre, missile attack early warning system, as well as the use and maintenance of the signal centre Vileika that is included in the system of the monitoring of the Russian Navy submarines. These facilities, located on the territory of Belarus, will be used by Russia for 25 years.
In the treaty on the Union of the two countries, the parties committed themselves to undertake joint measures, if necessary, to prevent a threat to the sovereignty or independence of each of the state, co-ordinate their activities in the area of defence, jointly use military infrastructure, and implement joint programmes on border issues.
Minsk is ready for close military co-operation. This, however, is impeded by the lack of readiness from the Russian side, caused by internal problems arising in the course of military reform and drastic reduction in military expenditures.
Integration of the Political Infrastructure
The level of political integration reached by Russia and Belarus remains a mystery. The main provisions and aims of the Union of the two countries are formulated in a rather abstract form, not supported by the mechanisms for their realisation, and poorly implemented. Interstate bodies, established by the 1996 Treaty on Community and moved on to the Charter of the Union as of May 1997, create a ramified political infrastructure. These bodies work ineffectively or remain inoperational at all.
The Union is based on the principles of the "sovereign quality of the member states" and in prospect is directed "at the consistent movement to the voluntary unification of the member states of the Union on the basis of free will of their peoples." A greater unity is expected to be achieved by the introduction of the Union citizenship. However, the Charter rather presupposes common quasi-citizenship, since, for instance, a citizen of one country cannot participate in the elections in another on a level higher than municipal.
Such important goals and objectives as co-ordination of the positions and actions when resolving common political problems, adjusting national legislative systems, formation of the legislative system of the Union have not yet been put into practice.
Russia does not have effective means to "facilitate the development of democracy in the Union, observance and protection of human rights and basic freedoms of an individual and citizen" as it is set out in the Charter. This is constantly creating collisions in the relations between Moscow and Minsk.
The Supreme Council of the Union, whose members are the presidents, prime ministers and speakers of the parliament chambers of both countries, has not been convoked for the last months. The Union budget that is to be adopted by the Supreme Council does not exist.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Union, where 36 deputies from the legislative bodies of each country are delegated, according to the Charter, carries out its sessions twice a year and is entitled to adopt legislative acts that only have the status of "legislative recommendation." The first session of the Parliamentary Assembly showed the domination of the left and communists there and proved the absence of any constructiveness. Its work hardly moved B. Yeltsin closer to the thought on the acceleration of the "creation of the conditions for the transition of the Parliamentary Assembly into a representative and legislative body elected directly by the citizens," as it is envisioned by the Charter.
The future of the Russian-Belarusian integration mainly depends upon how fast the countries and their leaders manage to find the way out of the crisis in their relations, which started to deepen after the signing of the Union Treaty. So far, the differences have been growing like a snow ball.
Occasional attacks of the Belarusian president on the "opponents of integration in the Russian government," who are allegedly hinder the realisation of the agreements achieved by him and B. Yeltsin, do not increase mutual understanding, too. The signing of agreements on direct co-operation with Yakutia and Krasnodar region caused painful reaction from B. Yeltsin, who, in fact, forbade A. Lukashenko to act in Russia without authorisation of the Kremlin. Moscow was negative on the failure of the OSCE human rights mission to suggest changes in the Belarusian constitution that would provide for implementation of the power-sharing principle and human rights and freedoms.
The longer the crisis lasts in the relations between Russia and Belarus, the harder it is for the presidents of both countries to take face-saving steps. The proponents of the Union in the Russian government undertake measures to unlock the situation and promote practical co-operation. Last September, V. Chernomyrdin had a meeting with the Belarusian Prime Minister S. Ling; E. Primakov, the Russian foreign minister, and V. Serov, the Russian deputy prime minister, visited Minsk.
Also, talks between the heads of the ministries of interior of both countries were held.
This diplomatic activity made it possible to reduce the main irritating factor in the bilateral relations: P. Sheremet, head of the Belarusian bureau of the ORT, Russian TV channel, was released from jail. Still, it is too early to talk about the both sides coming back to constructive dialogue. The worst scenario would be to ruin the already signed treaty. This would mean a serious blow to the prestige of Russia and its leadership, that would be seen thus as unable to carry out the most important foreign policy action, an impulse towards the disintegration of the CIS, possible re-orientation of the Belarusian leadership towards other centres of power and difficulties for Russia in getting access to Western markets.
Опубликовано 29 апреля 2014 года
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