R. SIKOEV, Candidate of Philological Sciences

At the beginning of 2006, a major international conference on Afghanistan was held in London. Representatives of 70 countries gathered in the capital of the United Kingdom, as part of providing assistance to Afghanistan in solving pressing socio-economic and military-political problems, adopted a program called "Afghanistan Compact". This document contains the country's development plan for the next five years and provides for the allocation of multibillion-dollar financial assistance ($10 billion) to the Government of H. Karzai, as well as targeted funding for four major national projects. First, the fight against corruption; second, the fight against drug trafficking; third, the reduction of poverty; and finally, the disarmament of warlords and the creation of a national army.

The challenges for the Afghan society, which is suffering from unresolved problems, are indeed vital, but the government's chances of coping with them, even with the financial and military support of the United States and Europe, in our opinion, remain very vague. This is especially true for the first two projects. To assess the prospects for their implementation, it would be useful to refer to the history of Afghanistan.

FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Attempts to end this evil, which is deeply rooted in Afghan society, have been made more than once. Let's recall some facts. The reformist King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched a particularly tough fight against bribery and bribery. During his rule, the official Amani Afgan newspaper compared bribery to "pathogenic microbes" that degrade the human body, and called the habit of taking bribes "the most heinous crime." The newspaper reported on the exposure of a number of Finance Ministry officials who were convicted of bribery and sentenced to long prison terms.¹

The issue of combating bribery and bribery of officials was even submitted to a special session of the Parliament. The king himself, speaking in parliament, proposed to create a special "registration book", which would record the financial and property status of an official before entering the civil service and after leaving it.

It was also proposed to conduct periodic audits and, if unearned income is found, confiscate the property of officials, and punish them severely.²

King Nadir Shah, who came to power in 1929 after the overthrow of the rebel Bachai Sakao, who ruled the country for several months under the name of Emir Habibullah Ghazi, declared in his first decree that "the main reason for the revolution that had just ended and the death of the 150-year-old Afghan monarchy was bribery alone." "This filthy vice," the decree continued, "throws both the giver and the taker into a fiery hell." ³

At the same time, the government newspaper Islah reported on the punishment of some officials convicted of bribery. Thus, a certain Abdul Ghaffar was sentenced to two months in prison and "shameful driving in the bazaars of Kabul" ^.4

It seemed that a turning point in the fight against corruption came with the coming to power in 1978 of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan( PDPA), which in its program (March 1982) set the task of eliminating such "remnants of the past as bribery, embezzlement, bureaucracy, nepotism and arbitrariness." However, less than a year later, the leaders of the PDPA were forced to admit that the use of official position for personal gain, expressed in various types of corruption, is still widespread in the state apparatus.⁵

The civil war in Afghanistan has only reinforced this vice. With the victory of the Mujahideen and the fall of the PDPA regime in 1992, the country plunged into anarchy, split into many "appanage principalities", where extortion, violence, looting, robbery and corruption flourished. Under these circumstances, the appearance of the Taliban in the country, who proclaimed the fight against arbitrariness and promised to clean Afghanistan "from filth", was met with enthusiasm by the majority of the population. The Taliban sentenced the most notorious corrupt officials to death, and then inserted banknotes into their mouths as a sign of shame, exposing their bodies to the public.⁶

...The remains of former anti-graft monarchs have long since turned to dust, the power of the Taliban has collapsed, and this vice still lives and flourishes in Afghan society, remaining one of the acute problems of social life. Therefore, in the" Afghan Agreement", funding for the project to eradicate it is in the first place. This issue has been much discussed during both the presidential and parliamentary election campaigns. And all the candidates promised to fight this evil. So, one of the former presidential contenders Yunus Kanuni-now the chairman of the lower house of parliament-in his election program, in particular, said:: "We will make every effort to combat bribery, embezzlement of public funds, theft and other manifestations of unfair relations in the administrative sphere." ⁷

It is no coincidence that President X. Karzai asked donor countries to direct the money allocated to his country directly to the government, which assumed responsibility for its targeted spending. Karzai also demanded that "stop corrupt and unaccountable non-governmental organizations engaged in 'rebuilding the country'. " ⁸

FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING

One of the most serious consequences of the war was that the crops of wheat, cotton, grapes and many other crops began to give way to opium poppy crops. Drug production and smuggling during the war years became the main source of income for all belligerents involved in the inter-Afghan conflict.⁹

It is known that the culture is-

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The opium poppy and cannabis industry in Afghanistan dates back more than a century. Drug addiction has always existed in this country, but it has never been considered a social threat, and the measures declared by the authorities to combat drug addicts (charsi) did not develop into a decisive campaign; drug addicts were found in all strata of society, even in the highest circles.

Larisa Reisner, who visited Afghanistan in the late 20s of the last century, described the nature of this country and referred to the "endless fields of opium poppies" as a matter of course. The following example shows the tolerant, if not more, attitude of those in power to drug addiction. Emir Habibullah Ghazi in one of his first speeches to the nation announced: "You are dismissed! You can play cards, smoke chare, but watch out! Don't drink wine. If you drink wine, the mullahs will punish you. " ¹⁰

The real drug boom began during the civil war, when Mujahideen leaders, including the head of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan (IPA), G. Hekmatyar, put drug production on an industrial basis, and Hekmatyar himself had his own factory for the production of heroin. Saeed Abdullah Kazem, author of the book "Afghanistan under the spell of the devil's Circle of misfortunes", describing the emergence of drug production and its smuggling, notes that in the remote and inaccessible areas of the border zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan, heroin production was established by the end of 1979. "In 1979," Kazem writes, " foreigners, first of all, were involved in the development of drug production and smuggling. Americans and Germans rushed madly into the area, bringing with them devices for purifying opium... At that time, "he continues," there was only one opium purification laboratory in the Landi Kotal area ... However, a year later, this situation changed, and the number of laboratories reached 22, and by 1987 - 60 were operating, later their number jumped to 100. By 1991, up to 70 tons of heroin were being transported to Pakistan, which was distributed around the world."¹¹

The Taliban leadership has repeatedly expressed its determination to end the drug business. We must give them their due: they have indeed taken some measures to limit the production of drug crops. The Taliban even set up a High commission to fight drugs. In February 1997, the then Foreign Minister, Maulawi Muhammad Gauss, in an interview published by the expatriate newspaper Amu, tried to prove that the Taliban wanted to fight opium poppy cultivation in the territory under their control, but without international assistance and financial compensation for farmers, it was almost impossible to do so. In June 1998, the High Commission for Drug Control issued a statement that the Government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) had taken a number of practical measures to reduce opium poppy cultivation and replace it with other crops in Shinwar counties of Nangarhar Province, Khakriz, Gur, and Maiwand counties of Kandahar Province. The statement went on to say that back in June 1997, the Taliban burned 2 tons of opium in the presence of foreign diplomats, journalists and UN staff.

However, all these palliative measures did not lead to a drastic solution to the problem. It should be noted that each time, in response to criticism from the international community, the Taliban leadership justified its passivity in the fight against opium poppy producers by "caring" for farmers who allegedly grow this plant for medical purposes. Moreover, the Taliban continued to levy a tax ("ushr" - tithe) on opium poppy crops in the provinces of Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar. According to the expatriate magazine Azad Afghanistan, in Laghman province alone, the Taliban received 1,000 kg of opium as tithe in 1999.12

By the way, the flow of drugs from Afghanistan never stopped, and, apparently, both warring parties were engaged in smuggling. The Dushanbe-based newspaper Khambastegi, which supports the Northern Alliance, acknowledged that "the drug distribution zone now covers the entire territory controlled by the Taliban and small areas controlled by the Islamic State of Afghanistan" - that is, the Mujahideen.¹³

The current government of X. Karzai's Government announced an increased crackdown on drug production and distribution, passing a special law in January 2002 and requiring local authorities to take steps to explain to the peasantry the harmful effects of opium poppy production. According to the Kabul press, which refers to UN data, opium poppy cultivation in the country decreased by 21% in 2005, and the former areas after the destruction of poppy crops are distributed to refugees returning to their homeland.¹⁴

It is difficult to predict how this struggle will end. All past regimes, justifying the cultivation of drug crops, referred to the fact that in conditions of war and economic devastation, high unemployment and the lack of other legal sources of income, their production actually remains the only means of survival of peasants.

Meanwhile, according to the Afghan press, in Kabul alone, according to research by the United Nations Drug Control Program and the UNICEF office, there are 60 thousand drug addicts who use heroin, hashish, opium, and various narcotic drugs.¹⁵

A radical American proposal to destroy opium poppy crops by air force (bombing or spraying defoliants) was rejected by President X. Karzai, because this would lead to a complication of the internal political situation and outrage of the population. As for the attempts of relevant international organizations to block national drug smuggling channels from Afghanistan through neighboring countries, despite all their efforts, this task has not yet been solved, the deadly flow continues to move to the west, north and south.

¹ Bulletin of the Middle East Press. Books 6-7. Tashkent, 1928, pp. 164-165.

² Ibid., pp. 152-153.

³ Ibid., books 14-15. Tashkent, 1930, p. 89.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Aktual'nye problemy afganskoy revolyutsii [Actual problems of the Afghan Revolution]. Moscow, 1984, pp. 364-365.

^Davydov 6 The Taliban movement and problems of achieving peace. - See collection: Afghanistan: problems of war and peace, Moscow, 1996, p. 160.

⁷ Anis, 12.09.2004.

⁸ Kommersant, 05.04.2005.

^{Arunova M. R.} 9 Voina i narkobiznes [War and drug business]. - See collection: Afghanistan: war and problems of peace, Moscow, 1998, pp. 31-38.

¹⁰ Azad Afghanistan, 1999, N 10, p. 50.

^{Kazem S. A.} 11 Afghanistan in the spell of the devil's Circle of Misfortunes ("Afghanistan dar telesme daireye sheitaniye mosibat"). Peshawar, 1997, p. 47.

^{Sikoev R. R.} 12 The Taliban. Moscow, 2004, p. 140.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Iktidare melli, 05.09.2005.

¹⁵ Kabul, 02.08.2004.