Автор: Anatoli Rozanov, doctor of History, Professor, Minsk, Alexander Gordeichik, candidate of History, Minsk

The dynamics and development in the formation of the Belarusian-Polish relationship is indubitably of interest as, in one way or another, it's an influence on the general situation in Central and Eastern Europe as well as on the prospects for the integration process in this part of the European continent. Since the middle of the 90-s, the Belarusian-Polish relationship has been characterized by some tension and a comparatively low level of collaboration. The fact that Poland has joined NATO, the activity of the country in terms of EU membership, and the way Polish society is being reformed has restricted the field of common interest for the two states to a certain extent. At present, Polish-Belarusian contacts are being maintained at the consultation level regarding technical matters that pertain to the function of border passageways and mutual visa policies.

This situation does not meet the national interests of the Republic of Belarus. The "cold coexistence" with Poland is creating a potential for conflict and is bringing additional problems into relations between Belarus and Pan-European organizations. Poland is not allowing Belarus to use its favorable position for communication, and impedes on the protection of rights for a number of Belarusian citizens who are working in Poland.

One should bear in mind that Poland aspires to take the lead role not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but in the western part of the CIS as well. This role depends on the political and economic support of the West in many respects. The tension in Polish-German relations, which is carefully being disguised as a dispute connected with former German land, is causing a visible pro-American tendency on the part of Warsaw in the world arena and is using this in exchange for regional leadership. It's significant that about one third of all foreign investments into the Polish economy are from the USA.

Actually, Poland is both a political and an economic springboard for the US. It uses the country to spread its influence to Eastern Europe and the CIS, and as a hampering mechanism which curbs the tendency toward the strengthening of positions for leading Western European states, i.e. Germany. Taking into account Poland's aspiration to take a decent place, in Warsaw's opinion, in the European and World community and the tough policy of the US, the process of normalization for Belarusian-Polish relations looks like a difficult task.

Poland's policy in regard to Belarus' closest partners and neighbors, e.g. Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, should be taken into account when building a relationship with Poland. In this respect, in our opinion, the relations between Moscow and Warsaw are the most contradictory.

The Russian Vector

The conflict situations that have arisen form time to time have led Polish-Russian relations to a position that resembles a deadlock in many respects. There has been a "freezing" in the political dialogue process, a sharp decline in the rate for turnover growth (among Poland's main trade and economic partners for 1999, Russia moved from 2nd to 11th place). The further curtailment in cooperation in the humanitarian field, the slackening in the bilateral

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military and military, and the dimming in technical contact intensity has become more and more evident. Polish-Russian talks within the frameworks of international, regional and sub-regional organizations are of an episodic and unfruitful character. Poland joined NATO and began talks on the possibility for EU membership. It actively supports the further expansion of NATO by means of the Baltic States joining the treaty organization as well as the diametrical divergence of the two countries' positions related to NATO military action in Yugoslavia in 1999. There is an absence of an "Eastern Policy of Poland" as a long-term concept. There are serious contradictions between the Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on one hand, and the President of Poland on the other in terms of relations with Russia. The "Polish-Ukrainian Strategical Partnership" idea was implemented which brings the Ukraine into the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and, accordingly, weakens Russia's role and influence on the post-Soviet area and in Central and Eastern European regions. Poland has a negative reaction to the Belarusian-Russian Union. Attempts were made by Warsaw to secure demilitarization of the Kaliningrad enclave and to strengthen its political influence, and financial and economic presence in the region at the same time. These are the main factors in Polish- Russian relations.

The engagement of Warsaw in the "problem of violation of human rights and freedoms in Chechnya" was an additional source of tension in bilateral relations. The Polish side specially underlined the importance of direct political and economic liaisons with individual subjects of the Russian Federation (Tatarstan, Western Siberia, Saint Petersburg, and the Leningrad and Kaliningrad regions). Moscow's reaction to this foreign political activity vector was far from being one-sided.

In the economic sphere, an increase in mutual turnover in 1993-1998 between Poland and Russia has been observed, but this trend finally slowed (the ratio of 1995 to 1994 is about 30%, 1996 to 1995- about 23%, 1997 to 1996-about 17%). The August crisis in Russia caused a decrease in Russian-Polish turnover. In 1999, as compared with 1998, mutual trade volume dropped by 15% and made up $3.385 million. During the same period, Russian export increased by 12.8%, totaling $2.676 million, whereas Polish export dropped by 56%, but made up $709 million. Mainly, the increase in raw material delivery and chemical good volumes was observed.

Natural gas and oil supplies from Russia are of extremely great importance for the Polish economy, and meet 84% and 60% of the import requirements for the countries, respectively.

The main problem for Russia in the field of trade with Poland (and for the Republic of Belarus as well) is the increasing disproportion in the access of Russian goods to the Polish market as compared with other countries, namely, its closest neighbors. Poland took a number of purpose- oriented measures directed at trade with their Western partners and at the liberalization of economic relations. As a result of the tariff barriers being lifted, the trade liberalization process is opening up little by little in the Western direction, but hasn't even begun in terms of the Eastern direction yet.

In conditions where external competition is enhanced, being under lobby pressure and lacking a means for direct support of crisis branches in the economy, the Polish government resorts to various forms of domestic and foreign protectionism, e.g. tariff and non-tariff import restrictions. These methods relate to Russian goods as well. Within the framework of Central and Eastern Europe, Poland takes on the quality of an initiator of restrictive measures as it relates to Russian exporters.

Irrespective of the chilly relations in the political sphere, Poland's Ministry of Defense is showing a careful interest in the development of contacts with Russia in the field of military and military-technical collaboration. In December of 1998, the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, N. Mikhailov, paid a visit to Poland. The Polish party showed an interest in acquiring spares and completing parts for military equipment from Russian manufacturers on a regular basis within the next 10-15 years. Poland suggested the set up of a Polish-Russian Committee, or acting team, for military technical collaboration. At present, this matter is under practical consideration. Military product supply volumes from Russia to Poland grew from $8 million in 1998 to $33 million in 1999. Repair work on Russian vessels in the Republic of Poland may become a priority guideline in military technical collaboration with Poland in the near future.

The Polish party is also showing a definite interest in establishing contacts with Russia on an

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expert level regarding trans-border military cooperation, interaction with the Kaliningrad region's Land Forces at head-quarters level, and seems to want to establish permanent contacts with the Baltic fleet. It's also interested in conducting consultations on the working out of new architecture for Euro-Atlantic security.

At the same time, the Polish government asserts that it does not have any need to purchase new Russian samples of armaments and military equipment. All contacts with the Russian military and industrial complex participation in the proposal and realization of an anti-aircraft and rocket complex within the framework of the Polish state programme have been terminated due to Polish initiative. Russia was not invited to participate in the proposal for the purchase of a multipurpose fighter by Poland.

The Russian trade relations situation with Poland is similar for the Republic of Belarus, with the exception that there is a lack of raw materials in the Belarusian export structure. Access to the Polish market grows more and more difficult each year for Belarusian goods in comparison with goods from other countries. A process that introduced protective measures for the import of Belarusian goods is also active. The matter of trade relation liberalization with Belarus is linked by the Polish government to World Trade Organization membership, agreements within the Belarusian-Russian Union, and the relationships between the Russian Federation, Republic of Belarus, and the European Union.

Polish-Ukrainian relations are developing rather successfully. They are based on common anti- Russian interests and the aspiration to become both organizationally and psychologically a part of civilized Europe. But the situation in Ukrainian economy reform cannot be compared with analogous Polish indices. As a result, Poland took the lead position in the Warsaw-Kiev tandem.

Relations between Poland and the Baltic States are not developing so successfully. Common interests, such as integration into the EU and NATO, lead to a rapprochement in Polish and Baltic State positions relative to the basic all-European and Euro-Atlantic matters. But in comparison with the Ukrainian vector, competition is stronger as the differences in economic development levels is less, and also because of Germany's intention to reconstruct its strong, former position in the Baltic States. In addition, there are definite problems in Polish-Lithuanian relations pertaining to the Polish minority situation in the Vilnius region.

The Outlook for Relationship Normalization

One should bear in mind that the fact that Poland joined the Northern Atlantic and European structures raises a question about the stability of relations between Poland and its Eastern neighbors, including Belarus. After Poland joins the EU, it will probably still be interested in interaction with Belarus. This interest may even grow under the pressure of Western European goods competition and by the force of an objective factor: orientation both to the West and to the East is the best way to secure economic development in Poland.

In our opinion, the process of normalization will become possible following a number of measures. The main measures are:

-normalization of relations in Belarusian-European structures. Without this, Belarusian-Polish cooperation is a rather laborious task;

-coordination of Belarusian and Russian actions in terms of Poland; the joint realization of preventive measures directed to the protection of vitally important interests for both countries is necessary, including the security sphere;

-bringing the main parameters of the Belarusian economy in taxation and monetary spheres as well as in the field of state regulation into line with European standards. Without this the Polish- Belarusian economic cooperation is hardly possible;

-working jointly with the Polish party on agreed approaches to minimization of possible repercussions for the Belarusian economic relations caused by Poland's membership in the EU; to achieve this, the "Bug" and "Neman" Euroregions should be used;

-stimulation of Belarus-NATO cooperation within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, "Partnership for Peace" and other structures. This will soften contradictions in relations between Minsk and Warsaw caused by Poland's membership in the alliance;

-working jointly with the Polish party on a package of measures and agreements that will safeguard Belarussian-Polish border security, and on matters related to the travelling of both countries' citizens; simplification of border trade and travel regulations for members of the border region

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population; counteraction to illegal migration, trans-national crime, and unlawful arms and drugs trafficking and people-trade;

-coordination of activity directed toward the protection of legal rights and interests of, and the creation of favorable conditions for, the national-cultural development of the Belarusian national minority in Poland and Polish national minority in Belarus.

Poland's official position in terms of a gas pipeline crossover, the "Kobrin-Velke Kapushany (Slovakia)" which plans to be laid around Ukrainian territory, has given rise to anxiety. The negative Polish reaction is caused, first of all, by political reasons and by Poland's wish to show its support to the Ukraine as a "strategic partner" in the Eastern European region. But today, as the European states set themselves to the task of doubling gas supply volumes from Russia for the next 20 years, Poland is actually trying to play the "Ukrainian card" in order to make the maximum profit from laying a new gas pipeline on its territory.

According to The Polish-Russian Agreement of 1993, regarding the Polish part of the "Yamal- Europe" gas pipeline, a second 700km line is to be laid parallel to the acting one through the territory of the country from the East to the West. This was something the Polish party insisted on during its talks with Moscow.

However, no matter what further events will show, Poland remains vitally interested in the development of the "Yamal-Europe" gas pipeline infrastructure which already exists in the country. Political dividends are evident. Besides, as we know, the Polish government is the owner of the Polish oil and gas company which, in association with "Gasprom", is the co-owner of the "Europol-gas" company, an operator of the Polish section of the "Yamal-Europe" gas pipeline. Undoubtedly, this key factor will be the determinant when making the final decision regarding the erection of the new pipeline.

Talks on the construction of a gas pipeline from Norway to Poland through the North Sea, Denmark, and the Baltic Sea (Shchetsin) within the framework of The National Diversification Power Energy Carriers Source Program are being conducted. According to Polish experts, in case the talks are successful, Poland will receive about 5 billion cubic m of gas annually from 2006. But, taking into account the fact that the prices for Norwegian gas are considerably higher, this guideline will hardly become a serious alternative to Russian gas. The signing of the "Gas Memorandum" in December 2000, which was formed on the basis of agreements reached by Presidents V. Putin and L. Kuchma, are considered by Polish observers as a definite, positive sign that is indicative of coincidences on Russian and Ukrainian grounds regarding the matter of gas transit to the West. At the same time, this will not seriously affect the route choice for the new pipeline since no considerable growth in transit volumes through the Ukrainian territory is planned (in 2001, transit volume is planned at the rate of 111.5 billion cubic m, whereas in 2000, this index equaled 110 billion cubic m).

Belarus' position relative to the Russian version of the "Kobrin-Velke Kapushany" gas crossover pipeline is based mainly on the economic expediency factor of this project. Thus, according to estimates, the length of the pipeline's arm through the territory of Belarus will be 575km, and through the Ukraine-1,200km. Therefore, the gas transit will be three times cheaper. According to the forecast, the by-pass transit corridor may be built in as soon as two years. The Belarusian part of the pipeline will be about 70km and will cost about $ 70 million, and its construction will be completed in approximately two months. At this time, it will be possible to increase Russian gas export volumes to Europe in the short term, with minimal cost, and can be done without the construction of the very expensive second "Yamal-Europe" pipeline.

Incidentally, Belarus long ago acquired the positive image of a country with safe trade and economic exchange as it transported Russian power through the "Russia-Europe" line. On October 18, 2000, "Gasprom" entered into an agreement with "Ruhrgas AG" (Germany), "Gaz de France" (France) and "ENI" (Italy) that set up a consortium for the construction of an export pipeline around the Ukraine through the territories of Belarus and Slovakia. The new line will increase the rate of Russian gas transit volume through Belarus to 55-60 billion c.m.

The world market price for 1,000c.m. of gas transit is $1.75/100km. Compared to European tariffs, the cost for Belarusian transit is three times less for Russia. An amount in the neighborhood of $35-40 million is being worked off by Belarusian specialists as they build new pipeline branches for gas settlement accounts.

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We would like to underline that the process of normalization and positive development for Belarusian-Polish relations is an immediate task. It would be incorrect to assume that there would be no grounds at all for the development of events in this direction. But nevertheless, it's quite evident that it would be unreasonable to cut off Belarusian-Polish relations in the context of "Belarus-EU" and "Belarus-NATO". Therefore, in our opinion, a reasonable correction in Belarus' position within the framework of cooperation with the EU and NATO, first of all, as well as with other European structures, is necessary.