Автор: Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of "Politika" Fund

Russian-Belarusian relations are developing in a rather intricate way, but nevertheless, there a few constants that will help determine the overall policy as the two states come closer together.

1. Belarus is Russia's closest ally; Russia is Belarus' closest ally. It is very unlikely that either state will have a closer partner.

2. Russia is Belarus' chief economic partner, and Belarus is an important economic partner for Russia. The main transport corridor between Russia and the EU countries lies across the territory of Belarus. 40 % of all Russian foreign trade is with the European Union. At the same time, 80 % of Russian trade with the EU is carried out via the territory of Belarus.

3. In terms of power engineering, Belarus relies solely on Russia. Russian power export to the West, to a great extent, is dependent upon Belarus.

4. The economies of Russia and Belarus have been strongly integrated since soviet times, and there is no viable alternative to this kind of integration.

5. The countries retain, in many ways, a common military infrastructure. The locality will grow as NATO continues its extension. Even if they are the friendliest, when the most powerful military alliance (which has a habit of carrying out humanitarian bombardments) is inching closer and closer to one's borders, but one is not invited to join it, it does not add to a feeling of security.

6. The peoples of two countries are culturally and ethnically close, and have not experienced historical problems nor national hostility towards each other.

7. If we put aside non-significant nuances, the tendency towards integration between Russia and Belarus is widely supported by the public in both countries.

It is the political regime in Belarus which has been considered both a variable and a constant during the last years. Its pattern undoubtedly affects relations between Belarus and Russia, but its influence is not as strong as with relations with the USA and Western Europe. The core reason for such a state of things is the fact that Russia perceives Belarus in the context of its environment (in the same manner as, for instance, Poland perceives Belarus in its own context). In the CIS countries, democracy in its pure form (as it may be described in a children's book) is a very rare specimen. This is why there are not enough reasons to assess the regime in Belarus as less democratic than that of the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kyrghyzstan or Uzbekistan. This, by the way, does not hamper their OSCE membership, and for most of them - their Council of Europe membership. In observing national human rights minorities, the situation in Belarus is better than in Latvia or Estonia. However, these countries not only participate in the Council of Europe, but also are candidates for EU and NATO membership.

It seems sometimes that the West's failure to recognize Belarus' leadership is primarily connected to Belarus' pro-Russian orientation, and not with the respect for democratic freedoms in this country.

Relations between the two countries and the prospects for development are set within the framework Agreement on the establishment of an Allied State which was concluded by Russia and Belarus in 1999. In accordance with this Agreement, the countries maintain their sovereignty, continue to act in compliance with their constitutions and national legislatures, and the national

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governmental bodies and systems remain intact. The most important political issues, including those which are referred to joint jurisdiction, remain in national competence, and legal acts of the Allied State shall not contradict constitutions and national legislatures of either countries. Thus, this agreement did not open new perspectives for rapprochement of the two countries. It only outlined the real state of matters that were established at the moment of its signing, and set a much lower target for integration than exists in the European Union.

The year 2000 has been called the year of lost opportunities. Such an estimate is justified if we take into consideration the potential for integration of the two countries. However, summing up the real assets of the obtained the picture is not so pessimistic. During this time:

? An agreement introducing a common currency, beginning from January 2005, which will be represented by the Russian ruble, and from January 2008 - by a new currency, was signed;

? An agreement allocating credit to Belarus from Russia in the amount of $100 million for the establishment of a national currency stabilization fund and for maintaining a payment balance;

?Belarus renounced its currency's multiple exchange rates which had impaired the finalization of several economic mechanisms;

? A number of programs were realized within the frames of a joint budget for the spheres of the diesel car industry, chemical fiber production, refrigerator manufacturing, TV-sets, and microelectronic devices;

? The public transport and energy power infrastructure was extended. The construction of the Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline presented the opportunity for a large increase in gas supplies to the West via the Belarus-Poland route (until now, the Polish government maintained a negative attitude towards the issue, but recently it has changed its opinion);

? Russia and Belarus became members of the Astan agreement for a Eurasian Economic Community which is showing all the signs that it will become a full- fledged international organization for free trade;

? Both parties joined the Bishkek Agreement on Collective Security which stipulates the creation of a collective regional security force system for the joint opposition of common threats;

? Military and technical cooperation grew actively. 280 organizations and enterprises from the two countries, involving a total of 400 thousand persons, were engaged in the realization of 19 joint programs;

? The common goods turnover decreased because the 1998 crisis had come to an end. Now, rates are on the rise.

The integration between the two countries is continuing to strengthen and breed practical profits to both parties. But meanwhile, there are still deterring factors, conflicts, and failures on the way. For example, disputes related to VAT calculation rules, and the taxation of non-residents of both countries. And Russia's decision on the free use of customs clearance for goods imported from third-world countries on the territory of Belarus, and a similar reciprocal decision on the part of Belarus in the fall of 2000, was obviously a step back from the common customs zone concept. Integration is also complicated by a number of problems in Belarusian-Russian relations which may be referred to as the kinds of problems that are perpetual and intractable. First of all, there are still big differences between the economic models of two countries, between the way their legal systems regulate business operation, and there are discrepancies in legislature. Different game rules won't allow both countries to play the same game.

Still significant are the differences between Russia and Belarus in macro-economic activities (inflation, gold currency reserve dynamics, and foreign trade balance). Payments for energy carriers supplied by Russia are a constant headache for the two countries.

The development of Russian-Belarusian relations is a complicated process from the point of view of the arrangement of domestic power in the two countries - there are a number of influential opponents in Russia, as well as in Belarus, that are against the tendency toward integration.

In the highest echelons of Russia exist three "governments" which sometimes have absolutely contradictory priorities and agendas. The first one is economic. In its ranks, we find liberal economists setting the mood in the Russian Federation's Government. This influential group hardly has a clear strategy for integration with Belarus, but the liberals have secret misgivings related to the possible negative repercussions of integration on market

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reforms in Russian economy. The second one is a political "government". This is the Presidential Administration where the influence of Boris Yeltsin's "family" is still impressive. Traditionally, Lukashenko is not in their sympathies, as they think that he intends to occupy the Kremlin. And finally, there is a "security government" - The Security Council of Russia. This structure is definitely interested in rapprochement with Belarus, regarding geopolitical and defense order. The President of Russia acts as the resultant force of all of these three powers.

Outside of the executive branch, the opponents of integration with Belarus can be found only in the Alliance of Right Forces and, to a small degree, in "Yabloko". However, liberals have disproportionately influential positions in non-governmental mass media. Taking into account the "political government" sentiments that set the mood of state-owned mass media, an informational background for Belarus and its leaders is not very favorable in Russia.

In Minsk, at state and government levels, there are no overt opponents to integration. But the majority of the Belarusian elite can't even hope to become, even later, as little as members of the regional elite in Great Russia. This, in part, is the reason for the slowness of the integration process.

On a political level, we can cite Belarusian liberals as the opponents of rapprochement with Russia; they consider an alliance with Moscow as a conservation step for Lukashenko's regime, which is so hated by them. Nationalists who experience fear for a loss of sovereignty are also bitterly criticizing the integration idea. In Belarus, liberals and nationalists often go together.

Regarding the established bodies of the Russian-Belarusian Union, they are very passive and bureaucratized, and thus, have little influence on the integration process.

And of course, the process of Russian-Belarusian rapprochement, to put it mildly, can hardly rely on international support.

In conclusion I would like to mention the most important point. As of today, the final aim for the fusion of Russia and Belarus is not clear. "When you don't know your point of destination, neither wind will be favorable", Seneca once said. It is not clear to what degree final integration has been supposed by our countries: a common state, a kind of European Union, or are we just building relations as two friendly countries? And finally, what is our answer to the crucial question - what will be the strategy for linking Belarus and Russia to the globalized world?

Globalization not only implies the maximized internalization of economic and informational contacts. In practice, it's an alienation from the rest of the world by three central powers: the USA, Japan, and a united Europe, whose shares in the world's economy are increasing year by year. And 80% of all the world's economic and informational flow are formed by the mutual communication between these centres.

In such conditions, Russia and Belarus, to provide the most favorable position in the principal sphere, has three strategies:

1. To join one of the three world centres (most likely Europe).

2. To develop a reliance upon their own strength.

3. To attempt to change the rules of the game by allying with other outsider countries.

Russia and Belarus cannot count on EU or NATO membership in the near future. Russia and Belarus are not even mentioned on the final documents of EU December 2000 summit which convened in Nice and defined the projects for European construction for the coming decade. Belarus has some chance provided it alienates itself from Russia, i.e. with pro-west government. Nevertheless, as the Ukraine and Moldova furiously knock on the EU and NATO doors, it doesn't look very inspiring.

For their own development, neither Russia nor Belarus possess sufficient forces and resources. This is one variant for the stagnating development.

Association with other outsiders is possible only within the frames of the CIS (many countries of which have no place to go). But in the long run it, doesn't differ much from the independent development solution for Russia and Belarus.

Thus, the present situation seems rather unclear, and resembles more a dead-end for Russia and Belarus. Belarus will be able to integrate into the globalizing world to the same extent in which Russia will succeed. This is what distinguishes it from Poland and Latvia, who already have one foot in the EU door. The "Shengen curtain" and NATO expansion have cut us off from Europe and don't leave another alternative for Russia and Belarus but to stick to each other and try to integrate into the globalizing world by utilizing all of their own capacities. Today, it is feasible, by means of

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strengthening of Russia's membership in the "Great Eight", to see a joined Russia and Belarus join the WTO and possibly the OECD by means of consolidating a partnership with the EU, and the creation of a favorable investment environment in both countries. And undoubtedly, Moscow is as interested in the development of democracy in a brotherly nation as well as it is in international recognition.