LIBRARY.BY → ЭКОЛОГИЯ → WATER IN THE MIDDLE EAST: AN OBJECT OF COOPERATION OR A PRETEXT FOR WAR? → Версия для печати
Дата публикации: 04 июля 2023
Автор: A. O. FILONIK
Публикатор: БЦБ LIBRARY.BY (номер депонирования: BY-1688428102)
Рубрика: ЭКОЛОГИЯ
Источник: (c) Asia and Africa Today, No. 4.30 April 2009 Pages 15-22
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC PROBLEM
A. O. FILONIK, Candidate of Economic Sciences
The last third of the last century for many developing countries was a natural continuation of the practice of previous years, when they had to act at the expense of preserving their own natural resources in an attempt to achieve rapid economic growth. This has created a number of new problems that threaten the integrity of the environment, its diversity and undermine the very foundations of human existence. Areas of the most rapid depletion of natural resources were also revealed, including the Arab East. This was facilitated not only by harsh natural and climatic conditions, but also by political circumstances related to the unresolved Middle East conflict, which increased the negative effect of the confrontation in the "man-nature" system in this region. The incessant hostility over territories and borders, and hence over resources, primarily water, has created a strong perception that armed conflicts and even a war over water in the Middle East territories is inevitable.
The similarity of geographical and climatic conditions of the countries of the Arab East largely determined the commonality of problems of its peoples in interaction with the environment. And, first of all, with those natural components that are involved in economic activity as the most important means of production. Along with land, it is also water resources, which have been experiencing exceptionally strong pressure from different directions in recent decades.
In the previous decades, the Middle East has experienced many events that have created a number of problems, including resource problems. Over time, the region has become increasingly convinced that most of them are intractable and chronic. It stems from the fact that the Arab countries that do not have hydrocarbon reserves have formed a kind of regional periphery, and against the background of the well-being of oil-producing states, they are too slow to modernize the economy and get bogged down in problems of demography, food shortages, difficulties with energy development, etc. Until recently, priority was usually given to acute economic and social problems that took away countries were the main forces, while environmental and resource management issues were relegated to the background. They were perceived as a kind of virtual, remote in time compared to tangible in the present and fraught with the threat of hunger and poverty. As a result, one of the most important deficits, the lack of water, which was gradually gaining strength, remained unnoticed.
HOW MUCH WATER DO ARABS NEED?
The tense water situation in the Arab region has not abated for many years, which is supported by objective circumstances. On the one hand, water consumption is increasing due to the economic development of countries that control river sources or underground catchments. On the other hand, Arab projects for the development of river runoff and underground sources are mainly aimed at expanding the use of water from them with limited access to it. In these circumstances, the possibility of using military force to obtain additional water resources does not look so unrealistic.
The most likely sources of conflict are located in border areas where water is shared by more than one country. Here, its deficit, which is itself a powerful generator of contradictions, gains additional power. These contradictions are overlaid with divergences on many other issues. The facts of unauthorized withdrawal of water from the basins of neighboring countries began to cause periodic diplomatic demarches and even provoke border incidents.
The inevitability of a "water crisis" in this region is involuntarily indicated by a simple comparison of several figures. The Arab world occupies 9% of the world's land area, accommodates 5% of the world's population, which has access to only 0.7-1% of the world's clean water reserves. It receives 1.5 trillion cubic meters of water annually, which is mostly absorbed into the ground, evaporated and discharged into the sea. The renewable volume of water resources from surface runoff and underground sources does not exceed 355 billion cubic meters here - much less than in Asia (about 10 trillion cubic meters) or North America (5.4 trillion cubic meters). Of these, only 180 billion cubic meters are actually used. The reserves of natural underground catchments look much more significant and they are estimated at 7.7 trillion cubic meters, of which, however, only 26 billion cubic meters go into circulation, since the available volumes are heavily salted.1
Against the background of the increase in gross consumption in the early 90 - ies of the last century, it became especially clear that water reserves are catastrophically decreasing. At that time, several important factors determined the increased pressure on water resources. First, the 60s-80s were a time of demographic explosion in the Arab East with population growth rates above 3%, which even in official inter - Arab documents were qualified as "terrifying". Secondly, in the process of economic recovery, the quality of water became less tolerant, the attitude towards it remained indiscriminate, and expensive technologies for its use prevailed everywhere. Third, the prospects for solving the problem were poorly seen due to the general situation in the Arab world, which left little hope for collective measures in the field of water security, exchange of resources or their redistribution as an effective means of correcting the situation in related States. In other words, the water problem remains complex, and its solution lies in different planes.
The unfavorable forecasts made a decade and a half ago achieved their goal of stirring up the Arab world and marking the beginning of a new approach to the "water problem" in the Middle East, which has all the chances to be long and difficult in terms of overcoming the many difficulties created by economic, political and many other reasons. Moreover, the water shortage is not disappearing, but accumulating, and the methods of adjusting the Arab water management are still far from perfect, regular and flexible.
This situation is compounded by the fact that in the Arab world there is a kind of preset situation, which is determined by natural and climatic conditions. For States with large arid areas, the situation leaves few options - either to mobilize additional resources with meager budgets in order to ease the drama of the situation resulting from water scarcity, or to turn to external assistance.
This implies a disproportionate amount of effort and additional costs to equalize water supply and demand among the States of the region, which makes their already difficult existence even more damaging. Moreover, if funds for overcoming natural barriers are withdrawn from the most popular expenditure items, and this is exactly what happens most often.
However, the situation is slowly changing in some aspects and may look satisfactory in some areas. In particular, this applies to demographic indicators, which, thanks to birth control programs, by the beginning of this century significantly decreased - up to 1.5 - 2% - in the most populated Arab countries. For example, even in overpopulated Egypt, the possibility of doubling its population is only allowed by the end of the twenty-first century, although according to previous forecasts, this figure should be reached in the middle of the century2. This is a great achievement, and it can have a noticeable effect on the "water front", although other indicators are not so impressive. Therefore, demographic advances alone do not solve the problem, and given the population density, in some cases they do not make it easier to provide water to the population at all. According to the UN, 12 out of 20 Arab countries have already crossed the crisis line in the early 1990s. In this decade, 1 / 6th of the Arab world's population has less than 500 cubic meters of renewable energy per person, and 1 / 10th has regular difficulties in accessing clean water3. Meanwhile, according to international standards, countries with an annual consumption level of less than 1 thousand cubic meters per capita are classified as poor. Reducing this volume to 500 cubic meters means the beginning of the crisis phase of water supply.
The problem is not only disturbing in itself. It is closely linked to others that have a significant economic and social impact. Such, for example, is the food problem, which is becoming an increasing irritant in the Arab region, and its solution is possible only if there are sufficient water resources. Another challenge is the implicit reduction of certain categories of agricultural land in the Middle East due to falling yields due to desertification, erosion and other factors that can only be overcome if there is moisture. This phenomenon reaches its maximum values in Egypt, where a crop shortage of up to 25% of the previous gross harvest is equivalent to the periodic exclusion of up to 250 thousand feddans of land from circulation.4
Due to the lack of water, preserving the agricultural potential of a number of Arab countries is at least problematic. Theoretically, of course, it is possible to "repair" damaged land or replace it with newly developed ones, but this process is not easy, lengthy and extremely costly.
SO WILL THERE BE A WAR?
The relevance of the water theme for the Middle East is not in doubt and is confirmed by the huge lifeless spaces that stretch within its borders.
In fact, the well-being of the Arab region and even the sovereignty of its most vulnerable States are at great potential risk. In proportion to this, the possibility of bringing the situation to a critical point also increases. This problem has explosive potential and, according to some of the most alarmed observers, could trigger major upheavals in the Middle East. Hence the attempts to present the situation as the eve of a new regional and even world war over water. The drama of the problem is amplified by the long-standing hostility between Israel and the Arabs, including over water, and this gives rise to the belief that the solution to any disputed issues lies through armed confrontation.
Of course, it is difficult to dispute the obvious facts that indicate that increased tension around water is quite possible. However, in some cases, an artificial escalation of the alarming situation is noticeable, behind which a certain political order is guessed. But a demonstration of the severity of the problem
it also performs a useful function in this case. Water is a subtle factor in Middle East politics, and even speculation around it shows the danger of any ill-considered decisions and hasty actions.
The question of whether there will be a war for water resources or not remains rhetorical. In the region, there is a desire to adhere to non-military methods of solving this problem, although mutual resentment over sometimes detected unauthorized water withdrawals from disputed sources is smoldering. But everyone understands that another conflict in an area with unstable inter-State relations, exhausted by battles and overloaded with overt and hidden internecine strife, can finally undermine the regional balance, weaken the viability of a number of countries and unpredictably affect a huge segment of the regional political space.
When talking about the peaceful prospects of relations between the countries of the region in relation to water, it should still be borne in mind that, due to the scale of the task and the vast territories it covers, success in solving the problem cannot be achieved simultaneously and in all specific situations. There are enough of them in the region, but none of them is as intense as the Arab-Israeli confrontation, especially over the Golan Heights, which serves as a natural watershed in the region. So far, there is little that is encouraging; the only positive thing is that over decades of conflict and attempts to resolve it, the situation has settled down and is in a cold stage, although dissatisfaction with it is present on all sides.
In the light of such factors that can mute the topic of water, a war for it really seems unlikely. It is obvious that with a limited choice of opportunities, only the option of constructive cooperation remains, which will be the most productive. It is precisely this approach that offers a chance to avoid confrontation and achieve interaction as an effective means of overcoming disagreements. An example was set by Syria and Lebanon, which agreed to share the waters of El-Asa and thereby extinguished the acute issue of quotas for them.
Much indicates that the normalization of interstate relations in the region will take a long time. But the need to overcome contradictions in the field of water use and work for common, vital interests can accelerate mutual understanding. Perhaps it is the acute shortage of water resources that will work as a deterrent to the development of antagonisms, will be more reliable than many previous initiatives, and will force the warring parties to become partners in finding ways to fairly distribute water reserves. Subsequently, the experience gained in this area may lead to the need to replace forceful solutions to problems that lead to inciting antagonisms with confidence-building measures. In the current context, it is more appropriate to focus not on water wars, but rather to focus on an unambiguously peaceful solution to the Middle East problem and one of its most important components - the problem of reasonable and rational water use at the interstate level.
WATER IS AN INVALUABLE TREASURE
But first, we must ensure that water becomes a real commodity in Arab countries. In cities, the fee for water used by the population has long been collected on a regular basis. But in rural areas, this began to be done relatively recently, and only a few years ago, meters began to appear at water taps. In places where there is no running water on private plots, irrigation is carried out without any accounting of the consumed water at all. Irrigation of large areas is paid for by the state, and for many commodity producers, water remains a resource without a price. It is clear why, with a sensitive shortage of this resource, the Arab world regularly faces unproductive use of it due to overspending, excessive soil moisture, and generally uncontrolled water consumption.
The lack of water has been felt here for centuries, and in principle, the entire history of the Arab East is a constant struggle for it and for improving the methods of its use. The last stage began in the mid-50s of the last century, when the agricultural sector here experienced a deep restructuring of the village, which also affected the nature of water use. The inclusion of this resource in a more intensive turnover made it possible to bring the total volume of positive technological changes in agricultural production to a certain critical mass, which gave the development of the entire agricultural sector of the economy a new quality. Major hydro projects such as the High-rise Aswan or Euphrates dams have become an important part of the changes. In parallel, many smaller, but significant, by local standards, water storage and re-regulating dams, reservoirs, catchments, irrigation networks and a large number of related infrastructure facilities were built, which positively affected the nature of water consumption, water use and the entire appearance of the Arab village as a whole.
Collectively, agriculture in the Arab countries consumes 88% of the water pumped from rivers, lakes and other bodies of water. A little more than 8% goes to public utilities, the rest is spent by the industrial5. At the same time, the share of unattended water generated due to unpaid consumption and losses due to leaks in networks and during transportation over long distances is high. Most of all, this is a sin of agriculture, where for various reasons, as well as due to evaporation, huge volumes of water sent to the fields are now irretrievably lost. Resource losses are particularly high in Palestine (60%), Egypt (50%), Jordan (45%), and Lebanon(40%) .6
This volume also includes the amount of water intended for fountains, artificial waterfalls, decorative ditches, etc. that is not officially specified. They, of course, could be considered "architectural excesses", but do not forget that such structures function in countries with very hot climates, where they are not just desirable, but even necessary. Apparently, using-
the use of water for garden needs still generates extravagance. On the other hand, elementary savings in other, more expensive and sensitive areas can undoubtedly significantly increase its productive use, and this will be one of the serious arguments in favor of the fact that a war for this resource is not at all inevitable.
In such conditions, the water market, at least in a number of Arab countries, still appears to be growing, with significant niches in which its positions are poorly expressed. This situation cannot be considered normal, as the Arabs themselves believe, dejected by the persistent confusion in water affairs.
The controversy in the sphere of water-land relations is fueled by the tradition of low prices for water supplied through state networks. The nature of these relations is determined by the position of the state as the owner of resources and the social policy of the ruling regimes in the countryside. Currently, the imperfection of this approach is beginning to be realized. But the process of improving water use and overcoming the problems associated with it is extremely slow, and changing the vector in its development is essentially equivalent to a large-scale reform that everyone is afraid of.
Even the fact that the state invests heavily in hydrotechnical construction has not yet led to an increase in the cost of water. This clearly shows fears of negative social consequences, and also suggests the conviction that it is difficult to implement large-scale irrigation projects with the funds received as payment for water. In addition, private Arab capital avoids financing large projects with a long payback period.
The freezing of the situation is also facilitated by the fact that in a number of Arab countries the system of licensing crops, for which the corresponding volumes of water are allocated, has become widespread. In other words, it is centrally distributed and remains a "commodity in itself"in the absence of competition. This is also facilitated by the very approach to the water and land issue on the part of the state, which pursues a policy of free or for a nominal fee distribution of land in areas of risky agriculture. Thus, there is an obvious desire of the authorities to achieve commodity production by providing farms on vast areas with the main means of production in conditions of irregular moistening at the expense of cheap water, and therefore the market for it in extended areas "does not add up".
Another reason for the acute situation in the field of water use lies in the system of relations between water owners and land owners in areas of traditional agriculture and horticulture. In principle, these relations are now ordered. But to this day, there are still situations in which the land owner closest to the upper reaches of the stream actually appropriates the right to water, turning into a kind of monopolist and disposing of this resource in accordance with their own interests. However, in modern conditions, this practice is not widespread. But it indicates a certain lack of regulation of market relations in this area and the disordered use of water in some localities, which makes us talk about this as a phenomenon, albeit not so typical.
When the market is not developed, the stereotypes of wasteful attitude to water are very stable and change only where water really becomes severely deficient. However, changes in social behavior only under the threat of widespread water famine-in the truest sense of the word, a deadly price for desertification of the lands that people will inevitably have to leave. The prospect of such consequences has sharply raised the issue of countering the current trend and correcting the policy regarding water as the most important component of reproductive potential for the authorities and the public.
In the process of modernizing the mechanisms for using water resources, the countries of the Arab East have achieved a certain improvement in the situation on the food market, an increase in the economic indicators of the agricultural sector and its social characteristics. But the positive dynamics on one "flank" did not have the same degree of evidence on the other, i.e. other industries were in a less advantageous position or even lost. In particular, serious interruptions in water supply in public utilities have become more frequent, local watercourses or small rivers and streams have become shallow or heavily polluted, and some of them have ceased to exist altogether. In the light of this, it became clear that only mechanical manipulation of water resources can achieve only temporary successes, the effect of which almost immediately begins to be hidden by the deterioration of the situation in adjacent sectors of the economy due to an insurmountable water shortage. This leads to the conclusion that the elimination of irrational forms of water management and the adoption of more effective water use practices can only mitigate the lack of moisture in the region, but not completely eliminate it.
NATURE COMPLEX AND POLITICS
However, it is probably premature to perceive water scarcity as a catastrophic and universal phenomenon. There is water in the region , but its reserves are extremely unevenly distributed. There are vast territories where there are large water reserves, although they are still inaccessible due to the lack of appropriate technologies or their high cost. It is important to find ways to develop such resources before enormous pressures on them or climate changes have irrevocably changed the hydrology of entire regions.
The Arab countries have already realized the immutable truth that reproduction processes in the economy are closely linked to natural phenomena. Moreover, sustainable economic growth, which these countries consider the basic principle of their development, requires a harmonious integration of all its components into a single whole. One of these components is actually natural
a complex that is an important condition for economic development and a place of generating water resources.
The first states to take care of the situation in this field were those that felt the water shortage more than others. But expressions of concern alone are clearly not enough - we need "targeted" and multi-pronged actions to really ease the situation. The fact is that the sources of significant waterways in the Arab East are located outside their own borders. Underground spring basins can also be located under the territory of more than one country. Therefore, it is inevitable that the Arab States will be "tied" to external water sources based on intergovernmental agreements, although the degree of this link varies greatly. To assess this phenomenon, international statistics apply the so-called "dependency ratio", which reflects the extent of the threat to countries that receive water to some extent from neighboring States. The most vulnerable countries in the region have the following "dependency ratio"::
Kuwait - 100
Iraq - 53.3
Qatar - 3.8
Egypt - 96.6
Jordan - 22.7
Algeria - 2.9
Syria - 80.3
Tunisia - 8,7
Lebanon - 0.8 7.
This shows that the States that seem to have the most water resources are actually more dependent on their inflow from outside.
The situation is similar with general underground aquifers. The nature and methods of their exploitation (for example, the huge aquifer located between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) are subject to dispute within the water aspects of the Arab-Israeli confrontation. There are also known Arab-Turkish tensions over the deterioration of the quality of groundwater flowing into Syria. Discontent is simmering in relations between the Arab countries themselves, in particular, between Jordan and Saudi Arabia, over the excessive use of the Rum Sak (Ka Dizi) underground catchment area.
WATER AND ARAB SECURITY
Numerous disagreements over the use of water have led Arab countries to conclude that individualization of water supply problems is impractical and should be replaced by collective efforts that are more appropriate to the nature of the water problem and the rate of its aggravation. Their Governments are finally getting closer to understanding the need for a unified Arab water security strategy. By the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of such security was formulated as a set of collective measures that contribute to the maximum possible satisfaction of water needs by further rationalizing water use and saving this resource in specific areas of economic activity. But at the same time, it was recognized in advance that no matter how successfully the Arab countries acted in this direction, they would not be able to achieve absolute water security in any case. This leaves no other choice but to focus on achieving relative safety, which applies to each country according to its characteristics, in particular in the field of agricultural production, which acts as the main consumer of water.
At the same time, we are not talking about quotas for water consumption or any centralized restrictions on its use. The case essentially concerns only the self-restrictions of each country. However, this approach involves many interpretations in its implementation, practically without changing anything in the existing concept of water resources functioning.
Discussions continue to this day, revolving around the most pressing issues, such as the depletion of a number of underground basins in the Arab countries themselves, the increasing salinity of water and soil in some large areas and the resulting desertification, serious disturbances in the balance between water reserves and the rate of its use in different zones, etc. All this points to one common problem - poor water resources management, even at the national, let alone regional level.
Taking into account the current situation, a range of pan-Arab actions has been outlined so far, including reducing water losses, rationalizing the use of water resources, creating joint projects for their development, and searching for new water sources. In order to strengthen the motivation for such steps and achieve the necessary effectiveness, they should be implemented in parallel in two dimensions - regional and country.
However, even if they are designed in the form of certain programs, they bear the imprint of declarativeness and assume a long period of gathering forces and preparatory actions, only after which the actual solution of the problem can begin. And this, of course, delays the achievement of regional water security. This prospect is expected because measures to improve the use of water resources, which are indeed very significant for the Arab world, if developed, will most likely be implemented according to the traditional scheme, i.e. through cumbersome state mechanisms that are not designed for an emergency regime, and not through a supranational structure with great powers.
Keeping the water problem at the stage of modeling possible situations does not mean, of course, that the Arab countries are not concerned about its severity in principle. But so far, much suggests that some perceive it as a rather distant threat, while others, having come close to it, have found a solution in the form of desalination and are content with it. Therefore, water management interstate organizational and research structures in the Arab world work mainly not as decision-making centers, but as data banks that "store" information for future use. Even such a large regional institution of a special profile as the Arab Center for the Study of Arid Zones and Arid Territories, located in Syria, operates on this principle.
In the mid-70s, the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science included in its program the development of topics related to the development and protection of natural resources, primarily water. Since then, ministerial conferences have been held on a regular basis to discuss the problems of water resources development, and numerous meetings and seminars have been held with the involvement of local and foreign experts, analysts, and practitioners. As the problem matures, more and more regional forces are being drawn into its study; however, regional security is not yet becoming more reliable.
WAITING IS NOT THE BEST CURE FOR THIRST
Other inter-Arab institutions are not left out of the problem. In order to consolidate efforts, in 1986, at the initiative of the Economic and Social Council of the League of Arab States, all specialized inter-State Arab organizations related to the problem of water use were involved in the development of multi-purpose national water resources research plans. A Commission on Arab water security was established, which later became the Arab Water Council, ties with international organizations were strengthened, and Arab representatives participated in the activities of relevant international institutions. The UNESCO International Hydrological Programme, whose members are the national water committees of the Arab States, has come to play a prominent role; its activities can be considered to some extent an example of cooperation in the field of hydrology and hydrography in the Arab world.
In other words, the Arab world has taken a number of steps to bring some kind of organizational and information base to the problem of water. A number of specialized structures were created, but also various funds and banks were involved, and the entire institutional block was involved in international cooperation projects in the field of theoretical and practical understanding of ways to resolve the region's water problem. These and other organizational steps provided the Arab world with access to modern methods of studying the natural water cycle and research methods, a strong presence in the community of relevant international organizations, and drew the attention of the world community to the region's urgent problems in the field of water supply and use.
However, in the aggregate of all these actions, certain incompleteness and duality can be seen. They manifest themselves in the fact that, on the one hand, large funds have been invested in a system of organizations designed to register the hydrological features of the Arab countries, the usefulness and need of which is undoubtedly great. But, on the other hand, the practical impact of them is hardly significant for solving the strategic task itself - establishing interstate cooperation in solving water problems. Almost all of their activities are tied to individual projects that do not answer the global question of how to balance the supply and demand of water in the face of the possibility of turning it into a threat to regional security. The emerging solutions to the problem, for example, projects for transporting water in giant tanks from Antarctica, or delivering water from Turkey via the "water pipes of the world", are clearly not feasible for technical and political reasons.
So far, the Arab policy on water in its general manifestations has a review-observation and wait-and-see nature. This position is determined not only by the natural Arab prudence, but also by the desire to better understand what foreign thought can offer on this issue.
There are quite a lot of international organizations and various Western corporate institutions that develop a modern ideology for the use of water resources in the world. Today, the main direction of their activity is to find ways to improve water management systems as the main means of increasing productivity and mobilizing internal reserves in the field of water supply and satisfying water hunger. This topic has long occupied the minds of the West and has become popular in the East. It is now considered almost an axiom that in almost all sectors of the economy, following the usual path of increasing infrastructure and capacity has already outlived its usefulness and cannot lead to an unambiguously positive result. In particular, a simple increase in water consumption, giving an impetus to production, with inadequate quality of network maintenance, actually leads to even greater water losses. In addition, the practice of water distribution itself clearly needs a serious rethinking and revision of water resources management methods. The validity of such judgments is increasingly felt in the Middle East. In light of this, postponing specific actions for the future only worsens the situation on the "water front" and, in the worst case scenario, can give rise to another wave of extremism, but not religious, but "drinking".
But, while paying tribute to collectivism, the Arab countries still proceed from the fact that getting rid of thirst is a matter for the thirsty themselves and do not sit idly by.
WATER "IN THE LAW"
Water is now high on the list of Arab national priorities. In accordance with this circumstance, practical work continues in every Arab country, but the intensity of this work is not the same everywhere. The most striking, and most importantly, a real example is provided by Libya, where for almost a quarter of a century, a colossal project of flooding 400 thousand hectares of land in the coastal zone and a number of cities through a pipeline capable of pumping 4 million cubic meters of water per day has been gradually implemented.
The creation of such large infrastructure facilities under the auspices of the state, among other things, contributes to the streamlining of water management, which is by no means an easy problem for the modern world.-
Table
|
Max, height |
Min. height |
Reduction |
|
Algeria 26-38 |
Libya 9-11 |
Bahrain 80-77 |
|
Qatar 49-60 |
Oman 56-61 |
Kuwait 62-58 |
|
Egypt 29-43 |
Saud. Arabia 52-57 |
United Arab Emirates 74-59 |
|
Morocco 66-73 |
Syria 12-15 |
|
|
Tunisia 65-74 |
Yemen 24-28 |
|
the entire Arab world. According to the latest data, the so - called "public sector management quality index" (and water management is a part of it) in the Arab world in the period 2000-2005 increased, but not quite evenly, and in some cases its decline was recorded (see Table).
Overall, the index rose from 46 to 49 and is now comparable to other developing regions, although it lags behind the registered level for industrialized countries (80-89) .8
The idea of improving water capacity management mechanisms is already quite deeply rooted in the Arab East. This happened both because of the understanding of the need for a prudent attitude towards it, and not without the influence of the ideology of rational use of water resources that has spread in the West. Arab experts now consider water not as an ordinary means of production, but as a national treasure that accumulates a charge of great social significance. Moreover, water resources have recently acquired a powerful political voice, overshadowing the problem of land resources, which at various times was the subject of active political and social manipulation for many Arab regimes.
The idea of "proper management" is also reflected in intergovernmental Arab documents. However, they do not have a social accent that is consistent with what is formulated in international texts. In any case, the social theme in its connection with water resources is limited "in the Arabic version" exclusively by references to the illiteracy of the population and the low level of its consciousness and does not contain provisions on the need for a broad public discussion of the water topic. This approach clearly reflects the past, but it is unlikely to stand the test of the future, especially since water may soon receive a new, much more dramatic sound in the series of familiar values.
In fact, water is already acquiring an emergency status in the economy. This directly follows from the fact that in Arab practice, its deficit, when it reaches its lowest point, immediately becomes an absolute physical constraint on economic growth, and also a generator of social discontent. Hence the intention to introduce economic, social and environmental components into water policy and, possibly, to strengthen its effectiveness through new forms and methods of water resources management and control over their quality and expenditure. Such a strategy, as the only possible one, has a chance to take root in the Arab East. The only question is how fast the region is growing into this process.
In fact, we can expect two important events in the modern history of Arab water management. First, the transition to a modern interpretation of the content of the water problem. Secondly, a significant step towards the transformation of water resources into a commodity, in order to achieve a balance between supply and demand in this area. This is indirectly evidenced by the fact that such a concept as virtual water appears in the water statistics of Arab countries. It is understood as a resource spent on the production of agricultural products exported across the state border, and accounted for in a converted form as part of national water resources. In other words, water becomes the object of the most scrupulous measurement, which can be a harbinger of a new round in water management policy.
The emerging changes have not only an economic or environmental aspect, but also a political aspect. It is seen in the fact that the main problems of life support for the state and, perhaps, first of all, the problems of access to clean water, are less amenable to solving purely bureaucratic methods and require more drastic measures to achieve an acceptable result.
WATER AND DEMOCRATIZATION
At international seminars and business meetings on water management issues, the problems of optimizing water resources consumption are now increasingly considered through the prism of mastering the concepts of market economy, democratization, and civil society. Such sentiments also permeate the Arab expert community, although in general this approach has not become a common point of view for them. However, it is reflected in the materials prepared by Western experts in cooperation with Arab institutions, such as the Arab Water Council. In other words, the purely economic problem of resource provision is overgrown with political layers that unwittingly perform, in general, an important function, directing public opinion in a channel that is convenient for spreading a liberal vision of the Arab future in general, and not just a future related to water. It has a water feature
Western experts believe, not without reason, that the water problem in the Middle East is so complex and diverse that it is extremely difficult to solve it exclusively by administrative methods, and the risk of irreparable mistakes is very high. They believe that optimal solutions in this area are possible only on the basis of broad public discussions, taking into account many, sometimes contradictory, opinions. Regimes based on the principles of a rigid vertical of power (and there are an absolute majority of them in the Arab world), as is well known, are not inclined to discuss issues of political power and state structure.
The theme is connected with political actions and, as such, serves as a touchstone for finding out how receptive the ruling regimes may be to reforming public life - an urgent and painful process for Arab society.
Naturally, the question is not raised directly, but is limited to the requirements of protecting natural resources from excessive pressure, increasing public responsibility for the preservation of natural resources, economical use of non-renewable materials and substances of the ecosphere, while relying on public participation in decision-making processes on environmental issues. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Justice in Environmental Matters, signed by 35 countries, is a concentrated expression of this approach.
The Arab countries have not signed it, although they are willing to cooperate with EU members in the framework of the Mediterranean process and have concluded many agreements with them on cooperation in various areas. The reaction of unanimous rejection of the convention, it seems, can be explained by the fact that its provisions contradict the political practice of Arab countries and can stimulate phenomena that are undesirable for the ruling regimes. In particular, in accordance with the Convention, citizens should be guaranteed the right to participate directly in the protection, preservation and improvement of the natural environment. That is, it can also be understood that the initiative of public actions is placed in the hands of forces that can compete with the authorities on this basis, at least in the environmental and related spheres. Further, transparency is required as a necessary element of decision-making, which is combined with unconditional access to information on topics of interest to individuals or their groups. This puts in a special position non-governmental organizations, which in this case will be able to exercise their right to actively participate in environmental protection activities, and may want to expand it to other areas. In addition, participants in the environmental movement should have an effective opportunity to seek through the courts to determine the extent of any damage, which may entail claims not only in the field of ecology. In other words, the convention's philosophy is based on principles that are not entirely consistent with the nature of the current stage in the political development of Arab society, and therefore it has not aroused the enthusiasm of the ruling class in the Arab world.
The Arab East really faces the need to improve its political foundations, as well as the principles of economic development, including water management. And this is a multi-faceted task. The choice of ways to implement it in the region is in line with a general, very cautious approach to the problem of liberalizing the economy, political life and creating the prerequisites for a democratic society. In light of this, it is unlikely that a liberal strategy can be developed immediately on a broad front, and even more so that it can be established through the mechanisms of managing natural resources and their water component. Especially if we take into account the nature of the Arab states, their rigid political orientation and strong regulatory and distributive role in the economy, with relatively low political activity of the population. It is clear that with such traditions, borrowed trends still have little prospects in the near future.
However, in some cases, the authorities are beginning to experiment with mechanisms for managing the environmental component of development, including water resources. It allows for the participation of interested parties, but at the same time cuts out opposition elements and replaces them with representatives of private national and foreign capital and lobbyists for irrigation projects, which are not the mouthpiece of society and reflect purely technological aspects of the water issue.
However, in most cases, the previously unusual leniency of authoritarian regimes in dealing with informal forces within society shows that the authorities in modern conditions can no longer solve many problems of life support, including the problem of water, by their own volitional efforts. Today, it faces the need to involve more sophisticated mechanisms and expand the decision-making base in order to reduce the possibility of crisis situations that can be perceived as the result of miscalculations of a leadership that is disconnected from real problems. The authorities in Egypt, for example, are beginning to realize this and even allow outright criticism of the regime from opposition-minded circles, in which the Greens are a striking force, perhaps as an invitation to them to share responsibility.9
Probably, in the changing conditions, the Arab regimes will strive to choose the least risky development option, if possible. Most likely, this will be a creeping reform of the entire set of social and industrial relations without getting ahead of yourself, promising unpredictable consequences. Within the framework of such promotion, the ruling forces will try to protect themselves from any, first of all, political and social upheavals and find a way so that they do not have to choose between water and war in the region, both within and between countries.
1 Finance Development. 2001, Sept., vol. 38, p. 1.
2 Al-mysriyah al-yaum, 17.06.2007.
Shatanawi M. 3 Capacity Building and Research Needs in Water Resources in the Arab Region Towards 21st Century. 7tn Regional Meeting of the Arab National Commities of the International Hydrolic Programm of UNESCO. Rabat, 8-12 September 1997; Gashev B. N., Zudina L. P. Bo-doobespechenie v araby stranakh Severnoi Afrika [Bo-doobespechenie v araby stranakh Severnoi Afrika]. M " 2009, N 38.
Muhammad Magda Mirgani. 4 Anmat tada-khwur at-turba wa zahirat-t-tasahhur fi-l-watani-l-arabiyah, Al-daura at tadribiyah li idarat-il-mawarid-il-ardiyatwa-l-maya. Khartoum 1993, p. 113.
5 Counted by: Making the Most of Scarcity. Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank, 2007. Washington D. C.
6 Ibid., table A.2.2.
7 Ibid., table A.1.7.
Tortajada C. 8 The Case of Stakeholder Participation and Public Awareness. Water Governance in the MENA Region: Critical Issues and the Way Forward. Cairo, June 2006, p. 5.
9 Al-Gumhuriyyah, 26.02.2008.
Опубликовано 04 июля 2023 года