E. I. DOROSHENKO

Candidate of Philological Sciences

Rossiya Segodnya International News Agency

Keywords: Egypt, Arab spring, Nasserism, elections, Muslim Brotherhood

The purpose of this article is to reveal the historical meaning of the presence of the image of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the presidential campaign of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2014. The article analyzes the historical, ideological and political allusions that accompanied the election campaign, explains why their involvement contributed to the success of al-Sisi, and examines the main directions of political development in Egypt after the "Arab Spring".

History is notoriously prone to repetition. Moreover, it often sends signs in advance to attentive observers that allow them to draw parallels between the past and the present, as if hinting when exactly something will happen again.

For those who are closely following developments in the Middle East and North Africa, 2016 promises to be a particularly interesting year. First, the Arab Spring is 5 years old, and second, the second presidential term of Barack Obama is coming to an end. It may seem that these facts are not connected in any way, but both of them have a decisive influence on the future prospects of research in the region.

On the one hand, the consequences of the" Arab Spring " were so serious that they are still felt not only in the countries where it swept, but also around the world, so its first "anniversary" serves as a good occasion for reviving the discussion, summing up the results and discussing the subsequent "transition period". On the other hand, the "Arab Spring" has already become a "brand" of Obama's foreign policy, just as Bush's invasion of Iraq was earlier. The end of President Obama's term spurs a debate about his political legacy as a whole, and therefore about what the new "overseas adventures" of the United States have turned out for millions of people in the region and beyond.

That is why considering the consequences of the "Arab Spring" taking into account the trends of the current American foreign policy course allows us to more fully and objectively assess the historical significance of the latest "revolutions".

"I WOULD LIKE TO BE LIKE NASSER"

The political and social processes caused by the "Arab Spring" will obviously determine the regional agenda for many decades to come, and their significance and historical meaning will be repeatedly revised. However, it is already clear that what was initially presented by the Western media as a nationwide movement for democracy, in fact turned out to be an effective tactic for destroying statehood. For example, in Libya and Yemen, the main state structures were "blown up" in 2011, which subsequently led to chaos in all spheres of life in these countries, and the situation in Syria still remains stably difficult, despite the emerging positive developments.

In Egypt, the "Arab Spring" was no less dramatic than in other countries of the Middle East and North Africa. The threat of becoming a "failed" state was no less real for him, especially after mass protests against the Muslim Brotherhood and the first "democratically elected" president, Mohammed Morsi, began in 2013. At the same time, this threat has increased many times due to the emergence of new players in the regional arena: DAESH and similar terrorist groups that actively impose themselves on the whole world as a "state", which, according to their ideology, should later replace the existing ones.

In such extraordinary circumstances, outstanding leaders and non-trivial measures are needed. In 1952, when Egypt was experiencing an equally deep crisis of power, Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the role of leader and defender of statehood. In 2013 and during

After the transition, many Egyptians began to draw analogies between Nasser and the current President, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. This vision formed the basis for the widespread use of Nasser's image in al-Sisi's presidential campaign in 2014.

Visual aids were particularly popular, analysts say: "[Nasser and al-Sisi] were everywhere in downtown Cairo: on banners, flags and posters, as well as [souvenirs] intended for tourists and locals."¹. In one of the photos, one could even see "six-year-old al-Sisi... standing next to the great Nasser." ²

At the same time, it is unclear whether al-Sisi himself sought to maintain and develop these associations in his election campaign, or whether the "Nasser theme" was more dictated by public opinion. On the one hand, "in his very first TV interview ... Abdel Fattah al-Sisi addressed those who compared him [to Nasser]: "I would like to be like Nasser. For the Egyptians, Nasser was not just a portrait on the wall. His image and voice are imprinted in their hearts "" ³.

As the Atlantic Council notes, "it is strange that the most popular analogies were with Nasser. A comparison with Anwar Sadat would be much more appropriate, if only because al-Sisi showed a deep interest in this historical figure in private conversations. In the [unofficial] materials, al-Sisi mentions Sadat at least three times... and his words indicate personal admiration and closeness of political views. " ⁴

Meanwhile, the public really saw al-Sisi as a new Nasser. This is confirmed, for example, by numerous publications in the Egyptian press, where al-Sisi was "...repeatedly and in lofty terms compared to the charismatic leader of the Free Officers movement " ⁵, as well as direct support from members of the Nasser family. Al-Sisi's candidacy for the presidential election was approved "...at a meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser's son, Abdelhakim, and the leaders of the socialist and Nasserist movements on April 27 [2014]. "My family members support [the candidacy] of al-Sisi, because such a person is needed at this stage, and also because he has a set of qualities that represent the core of Egyptian society. This is his service in the Egyptian armed forces and his huge popularity among Egyptians, "Abdelhakim Nasser told reporters after the meeting." ⁶

It is also interesting that both candidates-former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and politician Nasserit Hamdeen Sabahi-were" Nasserists "in the presidential race, so, as some observers note, there was a confrontation between the"two Nassers"⁷. However, Abdelhakim Nasser gives priority to al-Sisi: "Although Sabahi is a representative of the Nasserist parties, at this stage it is a military leader who is needed who can become at the helm of the state."⁸. In this context, the reference to al-Sisi's military career is not only a recognition of his ability to govern during a difficult period, but also a historical analogy.: Gamal Abdel Nasser came to power as a colonel.

The "Nasser vs. Nasser" situation, as strange as it may seem, did not arise by chance: "Portraits of Nasser were raised in Tahrir Square during the January 25 Revolution [2011], which was an expression of deep nostalgia for the 1960s-and this despite the fact that most of today's Egyptians were born during this time President Hosni Mubarak, who became president 11 years after Nasser's death. In the final days of Mohamed Morsi's rule, protesters carried portraits of Nasser and al-Sisi side by side. ...Many called for the overthrow of the "Morshed regime"... and they chanted: "Nasser warned long ago: don't trust the Muslim Brotherhood." ⁹

This feeling of" nostalgia", or rather, the desire of the people to return to the historical" golden age " during the crisis, is quite natural. The essence of the appeal to Nasser was very accurately revealed by an activist of the Nasserite movement in an interview with The British The Guardian: "Despite the fact that Nasser was exposed in a bad light for 40 years, when difficult times come, the people recall his image" ¹⁰. Indeed, Gamal Abdel Nasser embodies the values that Egypt acquired along with independence: national dignity and the right to freely decide its own fate. Moreover, in 2013, disillusionment with the Muslim Brotherhood's rule, coupled with memories of Nasser's policies toward the organization, only reinforced the public perception that Nasser "was right from the start."

To be sure, " there is a lively debate about whether al-Sisi is intentional... He used his similarity [to Nasser], and what the parallels between their life paths mean for post-revolutionary Egypt, " ¹¹ will continue for a very long time. It is worth noting, however, one more thing-

* The Morshed regime , i.e., the supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. In this case, we are talking about Mohamed Badie.

the main feature of al-Sisi's presidential campaign: it was conducted contrary to generally accepted ideas. Unlike his rival Sabahi, who was widely touted as a candidate, el-Sisi "...did not speak to the general public, ...refused to participate in debates, and apparently instructed his assistants to communicate with the media as little as possible."¹² El-Sisi's laconic messages to voters at that time reflect his general view of the situation. A look at the challenges facing the country: "The New Egypt. Revival of production. Return to progress. And an end to the chaos. Submission to the Constitution. Democracy..., development, social justice " ¹³. At the same time, as the Foreign Policy columnist notes, "very few concrete measures were outlined to achieve the goals set ...and the 16-point presidential program of al-Sisi... it includes both overly concretized provisions and completely abstract ones. " ¹⁴

Of course, there are many explanations for why al-Sisi's election campaign was so peculiar. For example, that his "election victory seemed inevitable for several months", or that "the threat posed by the Muslim Brotherhood dictated unprecedented security measures "¹⁵. However, it is also possible that Abdel Fattah al-Sisi did not see the need to repeat what has already been said. His " performances ... after the July 3 coup [2013], Nasser's views are consistent: patriotism, skepticism about the [good] intentions of the West, pan-Arab dignity and a strong government. " ¹⁶

It follows that, in fact, al-Sisi's presidential campaign began long before the official announcement, namely, immediately after the overthrow of Morsi. Accordingly, if the topic of updating Nasser's political legacy had been continuously raised for 10 months, it would have lost all appeal for voters. It is quite possible that al-Sisi did not want to appear overly ambitious to his electorate just before the elections, so he used the associations that had emerged in society in his campaign just as much as it was appropriate, without "overheating" the topic of Nasser. This, in turn, is another parallel. As Mohammed Heikal, editor-in-chief of the Al-Ahram newspaper, a confidant and biographer of Nasser, wrote in his book The Cairo Papers, the leitmotif of Nasser's own speeches at the beginning of his political career was: "I will not beg for a standing ovation. I won't beg for popularity. " ¹⁷

OUTSIDE THE CAMPAIGN: THE STATE IN SEARCH OF A LEADER

So, the desire to see the "new Nasser" in society was strong both before and during the 2014 presidential campaign. Yet the question remains: what exactly made Egyptians draw parallels between Nasser and al-Sisi? In other words, why did people see the new Nasser in al-Sisi?

The historical significance of Gamal Abdel Nasser's personality in Egyptian life extends far beyond the defeat in the 1967 Six-Day War, despite the severity of the consequences. It literally represents the origins of modern Egypt, is the embodiment of its essence and spirit. Nasser's personality, his image in the historical consciousness of the population - not only within the country, but throughout the region - surpasses the successes and failures of a real person, and the events of 2011 and 2013 seem to have only consolidated this.

As noted above, Nasser's portraits were raised in Tahrir Square at the very beginning of the Arab Spring, in the winter of 2011. Indeed,"...Nasserist intellectuals, journalists, and pan-Arabists played a leading role in shaping the political vocabulary of opponents of the Mubarak regime, especially on the eve of its fall."¹⁸ But more importantly, "the rise of opposition to the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood [led by] Morsi and, later, the protests in June and July 2013, were [a direct] consequence of the appeal to Nasser, [materialized] memories ... its political system, its course, and its era in general... Memories of Nasser and his era became a powerful center of attraction for people who opposed President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government. " ¹⁹

Ideologically, this meant that those who were united by Nasserist values ultimately protested against the collapse of the state: pan-Islamism, as interpreted by the Muslim Brotherhood, "does not accept the concept of belonging to any [separate] state." ²⁰ Moreover, in this situational context, the associated state of Islamism is not a single State. With Nasser, the concept of "national dignity" also takes on a new meaning: "[National] dignity... Currently, it is understood as a manifestation of the will of citizens who supported the army at the time of the overthrow of the Morsi regime, despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood ... he supported the West and, in particular, the United States. " ²¹

Consolidation of the popular will around the political symbols and meanings of the Nasser era.-

It created conditions for the emergence of a "strong leader", that is, a figure that the protesting society could perceive as a "new Nasser". This formed a socio-political demand that el - Sisi was able to meet, as far as possible, thanks to a number of characteristics: a career as a professional military man, a strong protest against the policies of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the ability to "take the reins of power in his own hands and fix everything" ²².

It should be emphasized that the" military " parallel also includes the mission of preserving the state, which the army assumed both in 1952 and in 2013.The essence of the crisis in both cases was that the statehood of Egypt was under threat, and this situation clearly required the intervention of the armed forces. Although the reasons for this development were different - Egypt fought for independence in 1952, and presumably for democracy in 2011 and 2013-the scale of the threat to statehood was comparable. The 2011 uprising, according to the Egyptian military, "threatened not only the president, but also the entire socio-political structure of the country. Neutralizing this threat is a difficult task for which the Egyptian armed forces have assumed responsibility. " ²³

Of course, in the context of the impending collapse of state structures, security issues are in the first place for any leader - both civilian and military. To deal with the crisis, el-Sisi chose the historical precedent set by Nasser, thereby reinforcing the parallels that already existed in the public consciousness. However, according to Amr Moussa, a former Egyptian foreign minister, this is not the only explanation. He says that " society was crying out for patriotism. ..[In the minds of Egyptians], the army is the personification of patriotism, and al-Sisi is its concrete embodiment. Therefore, it was not so much a matter of strengthening the Nasserist trends as of raising patriotism and broad public support for the army. " ²⁴

Nevertheless, at present, the similarities between al-Sisi and Nasser, the parallels and associations brought to life by the crisis and the "repetition" of the historical moment, largely constitute public credit for the new president. Whether he can maintain his status as the "new Nasser" in history, time will tell.

HISTORY IN DEVELOPMENT: NASSER'S THEME IN AL-SISI'S POLITICS

Earlier, we were talking about the fateful events that unfolded in Egypt in the recent past. However, what do they mean for the country's future? Does Gamal Abdel Nasser's political course develop in the way in which Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, now as President, addresses the challenges and challenges he faces? In other words, is the main theme of his election campaign being implemented in concrete political actions?

Although al-Sisi draws on significant aspects of Nasser's course, this does not necessarily indicate his personal political preferences. Certain steps can be dictated both by external factors and by the fact that the problems that have arisen as a result of the crisis dictate a few strictly defined solutions. It is too early to draw definitive conclusions, but there are several indications that al-Sisi is continuing and developing the Nasserite theme of his election campaign.

So, "...in July 2013, when al-Sisi announced that Morsi was no longer president, the prospects for Egypt looked sad: the economy was in a deplorable state (the foreign currency reserve remained for less than 3 months of imports), society was divided (supporters and opponents of [Morsi] were fighting on the streets), the Sinai Peninsula was shaken by terrorist attacks, and border states were falling apart. " ²⁵ Accordingly, security, national unity, the economy, independence, and democracy were the main issues that required the new leader's immediate attention. Let's briefly discuss each of them.

In terms of security, the main problem was, on the one hand, the militants of DAESH and other groups operating in the Sinai Peninsula. ²⁶ On the other hand, more and more Morsi supporters, disappointed by the total defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood, became extremists, thereby creating an environment for the spread of radicalism and terrorism in society.

The Muslim Brotherhood, now officially recognized as a terrorist group in Egypt, is unlikely to become a moderate opposition in the foreseeable future and gain the right to participate in the country's political life. Their short-lived rule proved that their views have not changed over many decades, and their understanding of democracy as a set of tools to meet the ever-increasing need for personal power is strongly rejected by Egyptian society. Most likely, the way of thinking of the supporters of this organization will not change, which, in turn, will not change.

However, it will require the current government to take deterrent measures for an indefinite period of time: at best, political, at worst - military.

The next issue - the issue of national unity-is directly related to the consequences of the"Arab Spring". Radical Islamists use differences in the religious and political orientation of various groups of the population in order to strengthen existing contradictions, which can later lead to a split in society and the destruction of the state. Therefore, the promotion of national reconciliation and unity seems to be an adequate measure here. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi "became the first Egyptian president to attend the [Coptic] Christmas Mass. ...In his speech, el-Sisi stressed that the differences that exist between people should not be the basis for [inequality]. ...Referring to the issue of destroyed churches, President al-Sisi acknowledged that the Government is not acting quickly enough. "The restoration and restoration of burnt churches is progressing too slowly... this [2016] year, everything will be completed."²⁷. This attitude demonstrates the Egyptian President's intention to create a society with equal opportunities for all its members, capable of effectively dealing with both external and internal threats - an approach that guided Nasser.

The country's economic problems are also closely linked to security. DAESH and other terrorist groups pose a real threat to the tourism industry, a traditional source of income. This is sadly confirmed, in particular, by the bombing of a Russian plane over Sinai on October 31, 2015, which, according to al-Sisi, ²⁸ was a blow not only to the Egyptian economy, but also to relations with Russia.

The Egyptian leader began to make attempts to overcome the economic crisis already in 2014: a large-scale infrastructure project was launched, which has a special symbolic significance for the country - the new Suez Canal. In about a year, a "new riverbed, about 25 km long, was laid. In addition, the " old " canal was widened and deepened for 23 km. According to the Egyptian government, [the capacity] has increased by a maximum of 50 vessels per day. " ²⁹ At the opening ceremony on August 6, 2015, el-Sisi emphasized that the project was completed during a critical period of resistance to terror: "This will be written in the history books... Egypt rebelled against it ... the most dangerous extremist and terrorist ideology... The Egyptian people have defeated this ideology. " ³⁰

It is hardly an accident that Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, already in the first year of his presidential term, addressed the project with such strong historical connotations: "The Suez Canal itself is a symbol that carries a huge charge. It represents resistance to foreign imperialism, the independence of Egypt. [The channel] is associated with Gamal Abdel Nasser and Egypt's victory in the 1956 war against the Triple Aggression. " ³¹

In connection with the events of the "Arab Spring", the issue of state independence of Egypt is currently associatively "tied" to the foreign policy of the United States. Washington, which 5 years ago began to actively promote democracy outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, is now deeply disappointed with President al-Sisi: "Egypt is now ruled by a military dictator... who has more blood on his hands than the general who ruled before the Arab Spring. All his thoughts are only about how to hold on to the power that eludes him. " ³² However, no matter how "dictator" al-Sisi is portrayed by the American media, this is far from the person to whom the White House could simply give the command to leave.

In this regard, an article published in the online magazine Politico earlier this year is very revealing. It assesses Obama's political achievements in relations with Egypt: "[In early 2011,] ... Obama's beliefs were seriously tested in real time. He was far more sympathetic to the young, Internet-savvy rebels than the 82-year-old dictator running a brutal police state. ...[There are also young advisers from the administration.].. They urged Obama to choose "the right side of history" and push Mubarak to resign with all his might. ... Obama told Mubarak to step down, and on February 11 [2011] the Egyptian president left office. " ³³

Similar language, albeit in a slightly different context, is found in an interview with Frank Wiesner, the former US Ambassador to Egypt: "We should have focused on an organized transfer of power, and not ordered Mubarak to "hide from sight and from the government", without having a strategy for the future. We needed ... a path to stability and evolution, not a revolution. " ³⁴ Adding weight to this comment is the fact that Wiesner met with Hosni Mubarak on January 31, 2011, when, apparently, he was supposed to pass on Obama's order to him.

While the American president's decision to side with the rebels was " understandable, "it is now regarded as a" no-brainer."..one of the biggest mistakes of his reign. " ³⁵ Indeed, it is strange to see this connection between the idealistic personal preferences of the President of the United States and the crisis of power in another State that threatens his very existence - now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It is surprising that Egypt - like many other countries - still has to defend its independence almost 100 years after they officially ceased to be colonies.

To "punish" al-Sisi for his actions against the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, Obama "first canceled joint military exercises between the United States and Egypt, then ... announced a partial freeze on military aid, citing the lack of" credible progress "towards free elections and a"democratically elected civilian government."³⁶ El-Sisi responded briefly and harshly: "You have turned your back on the Egyptian people. He will never forget it. " ³⁷

Subsequently, when John Kerry replaced Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State, the American position on Egypt softened. Kerry "declared... that the Egyptian generals were 'restoring democracy' in the country, and actively worked to unfreeze military aid to Egypt. " ³⁸ In the same year, 2013, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Obama announced a new policy of relations with Egypt, which remains in force 3 years later: In his speech, he acknowledged that the transition to democracy in the Middle East has been painful, especially in Egypt, which ... in turn underscores "a more global conclusion: The United States... they will cooperate with Governments that do not meet - at least in our view-the highest expectations of the international community, but at the same time work with us in the area of our main interests""³⁹.

These" core interests", accordingly, include not only Egypt's peace with Israel, but all the same security issues - while the United States is looking for allies in the fight against Daesh both on its own territory and abroad. American society recognizes the seriousness of the threat: On February 25, 2016, "The Lower House Legal Committee approved a bill calling on the State Department to recognize the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist group." ⁴⁰

Finally, speaking about the establishment of Egypt's own democratic forms of government, it should be noted that President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi is taking significant steps in this direction, clearly following the "road map" declared after the overthrow of Morsi. Among its main provisions are the new Constitution, presidential and parliamentary elections. The first two points were implemented in 2014, and on January 23, 2016, the new parliament met in Cairo - for the first time after almost 3 years after the dissolution. While it is still too early to talk about establishing a functioning democratic system in Egypt, these three achievements are impressive given what is happening in the region.

El-Sisi himself admits that while the country is on the road to democracy, it still has much to do. At the beginning of 2016 He noted that "democratization is a long, consistent process that will take from 20 to 25 years, which, according to el-Sisi, is a short time to achieve this goal." ⁴¹ In an interview with the BBC in late 2015, el-Sisi stressed the" exceptional "nature of the current situation and called on audiences in the West to"listen to our point of view in order to have an idea of what the true reality of life in Egypt is." ⁴²

In an interview with the leading news program of the American company PBS in September 2015, the Egyptian President said:: "The standards that [Americans] live by are not necessarily applicable in our country. It takes time to reach this level. ...The Americans view us from their own perspective. " ⁴³ Indeed, it is difficult to disagree with President el-Sisi's desire to ensure that the country develops according to its own internal laws, rather than accepting unconditionally ready-made standards imposed from the outside.

Thus, while there are visible parallels with Nasser's policies - both external and internal - al-Sisi does not simply copy his course. The actions of the current Egyptian president indicate a desire not to repeat those decisions that turned out to be unsuccessful:"...The essence of al-Sisi's presidency is not simply to reproduce [Nasser's course]... For example, there is no longer a one-party system that enforces uniformity of political thinking. Mass demonstrations are not held for the sole purpose of increasing popular support: Egypt's modern government has called on its citizens to take to the streets only once, in 2013, when it was fighting Islamists. Now his main message to the population is to resume work ... " ⁴⁴.

About what he has to do before-

El-Sisi says: "I was called by the people of Egypt to save the country from failure. ...I hope that my role will be to protect Egypt and the Egyptians, to fulfill their hopes... the people's right to live in a free, stable country with a strong economy... that the Egyptians will have freedom-real freedom - within the framework of democratic practices, that I will be able to provide people with jobs and create millions of new jobs for them ... young people who don't have them now " ⁴⁵.

At the moment, al-Sisi is the "new Nasser" just as much as the current socio - political conditions require, and only the future will show whether he will leave such a bright mark on history.

^{Chulov M.} 1 Egypt wonders if army chief is another Nasser // The Guardian. August 07, 2013 - www.the-guardian.com/world/2013/aug/07/egypt-morsi-nationalist-general-sisi

^{Malashenko A.} 2 Al-Sisi's Job will be Harder than Nasser's // Carnegie Moscow Center. May 14, 2014 -http://carnegie.ru/2014/05/14/al-sisi-s-job-will-be-harder-than-nasser-s

³ I wish I was Gamal Abdel Nasser, El-Sisi says // Ahram Online. May 05, 2014 - http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/100583/Egypt/Politics-/I-wish-I-was-Gamal-A bdel-Nasser, -ElSisi-says.aspx

^{Dale T.} 4 Sisi: A New Nasser or a New Sadat? // Atlantic Council. May 22, 2014 - http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/sisi-a-new-nasser-or-a-new-sadat

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ Egypt: Families of Mubarak, Sadat and Nasser endorse Sisi for President // Middle East Monitor. May 01, 2014 -https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/africa/11209-egypt-families-of-mubarak-sadat-an d-nasser-endorse-sisi-for-president

^{Kotb A.} 7 Searching for Nasserism in Egypt's Elections // Atlantic Council. May 26, 2014 - http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/searching-for-nasserism-in-egypt-s-election s

⁸ Egypt: Families of Mubarak, Sadat and Nasser...

^{Nawara W.} 9 Sisi runs for president in Nasser's shadow // Al-Monitor. March 26, 2014 - http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ru/originals/2014/03/sisi-egypt-president-nasser.html

^{Chulov M.} 10 Op. cit.

¹¹ Ibidem.

^{Kenner D.} 12 Sisi's Big Day is a Bust // Foreign Policy. May 27, 2014 - http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/27/sisis-big-day-is-a-bust/

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ Ibid.

^{Chulov M.} 15 Op. cit.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

^{Heikal M.} 17 The Cairo Documents. The Inside Story of Nasser and His Relationship with World Leaders, Rebels, and Statesmen. New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1973. P. 24.

^{Adly A.} 18 The Problematic Continuity of Nasserism // Jadaliyya. March 31, 2014 - http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/17135/the-problematic-continuity-of-nasserism

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

^{Bell J.} 22 Egypt's future in the shadow of Nasser // Aljazeera. May 07, 2014 - http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/05/egypt-future-shadow-nasser-20145753149 864213.html

^{Brown N.J., El-Shimy Y.} 23 Did Sisi Save Egypt? // Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25, 2016 - http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/25/did-sisi-save-egypt/it6v

^{Chulov M.} 24 Op. cit.

^{Brown N.J., El-Shimy Y.} 25 Op. cit.

²⁶ For more information, see, for example: Meshcherina K. V. "In a state of war": the fight against terrorism in North Sinai// Asia and Africa today. 2015. N 12. pp. 26-32. (Meshcherina K.V. "V sostoyanii voyny": borba s terrorizmom v Severnom Sinae // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian)

²⁷ Egyptian President Sisi Attends Christmas Mass, Wishes Copts Merry Christmas // Egyptian Streets. January 06, 2016 - http://egyptianstreets.com/2016/01/06/egyptian-president-sisi-attends-christmas-mass-wishes- copts-merry-christmas/

^{Nour Y.} 28 In Reversal, Egypt Says Terrorists Downed Russian Jet Over Sinai // New York Times. February 24, 2016 - http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/world/middleeast/in-reversal-egypt-says-terrorists-down ed-russian-jet-o.html

^{Carr S.} 29 President Sisi's Canal Extravaganza // Foreign Policy. August 07, 2015 - http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/07/sisi-dredges-the-depth-egypt-suez-canal-boondoggle/

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Ibid.

^{Bird K., Goldmark S.} 32 Obama got it right on the Islamic State // Foreign Policy. November 19, 2015 - http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/ll/19/obama-got-it-right-on-the-islamic-state/

^{Crowley M.} 33 We caved // Politico Magazine. January 06, 2016 - http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/we-caved-obama-foreign-policy-legacy-213 495

^{Ignatius D.} 34 Hillary Clinton was right on Egypt // The Washington Post. January 28, 2016 - https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hillary-clinton-was-right-on-egypt/2016/01/28/fe7 fe922-c609 - 11e5 - 8965 - 0607e0e265ce_story.html

³⁵ Ibidem.

^{Crowley M.} 36 Op. cit.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ House panel OKs bill to call Muslim Brotherhood terror group // Ahram Online. February 25, 2016 -http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/188480/Egypt/Politics-/House-panel-OKs-bill- to-call-Muslim-Brotherhood-te.aspx

⁴¹ Democracy will be achieved in 20 - 25 years: Sisi // Egypt Independent. February 16, 2016 - http://www.egyptin-dependent.com/news/democracy-will-be-achieved-20 - 25-years-sisi

⁴² Egypt's President Sisi defends sweeping security laws // BBC. November 04, 2015 - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34712217

⁴³ Egypt's President on fighting Islamic State, U.S. relations // PBS Newshour. September 28, 2015 -www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/egypts-president-fighting-islamic-state-u-s-relations/

^{Brown N.J., El-Shimy Y.} 44 Op. cit.

⁴⁵ Egyptian President el-Sisi backs U.S. attacks on ISIS // CBS News. September 23, 2014 - http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/egyptian-president-el-sisi-backs-u-s-attacks-on-isis/. Full video of the interview: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dwbc_Rai4UA