A. R. SHISHKINA

Graduate student

L. M. ISAEV

Candidate of Political Sciences

Higher School of Economics

Keywords: Arab world, Internet, censorship, "Arab spring", mass media, social networks, Egypt

Before the events of the "Arab Spring", it was almost generally accepted that in Arab countries, censorship of the media and, in particular, the Internet space, is aimed at suppressing opposition and, as a result, protest activity. At the same time, the governments themselves explained such control by the desire to protect their citizens, in accordance with the criminal legislation of Arab countries, from criticism of Islam and the Muslim way of life, the dissemination of materials that undermine the moral foundations of Arab societies, etc.

Since the wave of protests that began in 2011, the level of Internet censorship in Arab countries that have experienced regime change has significantly decreased. However, this was not always a consequence of the establishment of political stability: the new government also caused popular discontent and, for example, in Egypt, was unable to maintain its position.

Let's try to determine what role censorship and media control played in the processes of socio-political destabilization in Arab countries.

As online technologies have taken a leading position in Arab countries, the authorities have become aware of the risks associated with the spread of digital media and imposed new restrictions on information that could be posted on the Internet.

During the Arab Spring, the level of Internet censorship in the countries most affected by the crisis was unprecedented. In some cases, restrictions on the freedom to use the Internet have given rise to anti-Government protests, and have also been used by the authorities as a tool for suppressing riots. At the same time, the authorities used technical mechanisms, as well as attempts to forcibly influence Internet activists and journalists in order to control the content of certain resources, primarily those of the opposition. During the 2011 anti-regime demonstrations, the authorities detained dozens of bloggers and Internet activists, and suppressed the activities of many journalists.¹

However, communication networks in the Middle East and North Africa have always been under close state control, which was considered by some World Bank experts as one of the key factors hindering the region's economic growth. ² International expert groups and projects such as the OpenNet Initiative and Reporters Without Borders have repeatedly reported on these countries that the authorities have used various methods of control and supervision in the virtual space, including limiting the speed of data transmission, filtering electronic messages, monitoring potentially dangerous websites, etc. ³

Nevertheless, with the traditionally rather strict regulation of the Internet space in Arab countries and the control of specific resources, the complete blocking of communications during the" Arab Spring " became a problem.

The research was carried out within the framework of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2015 with the support of the Russian Science Foundation (project No. 14-1803615).

a fundamentally new mechanism for the government's influence on the opposition.

Compared to traditional media, such characteristics of the Internet space as ubiquitous distribution, the possibility of feedback, the absence of clearly recognizable leaders, etc., form a new logic of public interaction. Accordingly, new forms of expressing discontent and protest activity are also emerging. Most of the communication in this case takes place through the so-called social media (this term is used to describe a new generation of digital network information and communication technologies). These can include Internet forums, blogs, media hosting sites*, and so on. The key characteristic of this type of mass communication media is the ability to simultaneously create content and consume information products.

The main functional and semantic differences between social media and other types of mass media and communication are anonymity, the possibility of feedback, and the absence of pronounced leaders or authors. It is especially important to emphasize the differences between traditional media (print, TV, radio) and new media, which are usually understood as interactive forms of communication between users who have the opportunity to create and consume the content of web resources themselves. Thus, the former, without the possibility of immediate feedback, are more associated with the ruling regime, which often has a monopoly on the dissemination of this or that type of information. Governments also paid considerable attention to controlling traditional mass media during the Arab Spring, but in fact "overlooked" that the real danger comes from the less controlled sphere of virtual communication.

CONTROL IN THE MEDIA SPACE

What are the manifestations of media censorship in the countries most affected by the 2011 anti-regime protests?

The first in this list of countries was Tunisia, whose telecommunications networks are among the most developed in North Africa. In parallel with the expansion of Tunisians ' opportunities to join international information systems, the country's leadership systematically strengthened control over information flows and means of accessing the network. The practice of censoring the media, including digital ones, emerged long before the events of the "Arab Spring", and its main goal was to curb opposition activity.

At the initial stage of anti-government protests in Tunisia, the level of censorship increased significantly. However, under the pressure of demonstrators ' demands, President Ben Ali (1987-2011) was forced to declare freedom of ^the press4. Following his resignation and flight from the country, the Interim Government proclaimed full freedom of information and expression as a fundamental principle.⁵

It soon realized its promises, and the country's main media control mechanisms were effectively frozen.⁶ Following the October 2011 elections, Tunisian politician Monji Marzouk became the new Minister of Communications Technology in the Government of Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, demonstrating his commitment to continuing the stated course of establishing freedom of information and expression.

Indeed, Tunisia has become an active participant in various international forums, conferences and groups on Internet governance, which demonstrates the country's significant progress in the transparency of the information environment, including at the international level.⁷ And while some Internet activists still believe that control over the media space in Tunisia remains, it can be stated that, compared to the period of Ben Ali's rule, the level of filtering of the media space has decreased - in any case, access to such platforms as Facebook, Twitter and Facebook has been opened. YouTube.

The second country to fully experience the consequences of the "Arab Spring" was Egypt. In this country, traditional media and virtual space have also always been subject to control. However, unlike in Tunisia, censorship was generally more general surveillance than total control of all information flows.

Under President Hosni Mubarak (1979-2010), opposition websites, publications, as well as individual journalists or bloggers who were considered potentially dangerous to the current government were subjected to "targeted" control. However, over time, as the Egyptian blogosphere developed, cases of arrests and harassment of Internet activists became more frequent. For example, in 2007, the blogger Abdel Karim Amer was jailed for "inciting hatred of Islam", a name that many later associated with the repression of Internet activists in the country.

At the end of January 2011, at the height of anti-government protests, security services blocked access to Twitter and Facebook services. And this is absolutely not accidental: the statistics of Egyptian requests to Facebook in recent years (see fig. 1), starting from the second half of 2009, shows a steady increase in the interest of Egyptians in this social network.

The chart reflecting this dynamic actually fully corresponds to the dynamics of the level of protest activity in Egypt. Even after Mubarak was overthrown in February 2011, interest in Facebook continued to grow steadily until the summer

* Service for providing computing power for placing media information on the Internet (author's note).

Chart 1. Dynamics of access to the social network Facebook in Egypt, 2004-2014

Source: Google Trends - https://www.google.ru/trends/explore

2012, when the next presidential election was held in Egypt. The decline in protest activity that followed was accompanied by a drop in interest in Facebook and continued until November 2013, when the situation in Egypt again heated up in anticipation of the adoption of the constitution proposed by M. Morsi.

From then until June 2013, when the "June 30 revolution" took place, there was a period of the greatest popularity of Facebook among Egyptians in its entire history. Then there was a steady decline in interest in the social network, which in April 2014 reached the level of February 2011. And this exactly corresponds to the decline in the level of protest activity in Egypt after the overthrow of M. Morsi. ⁸

A similar correlation between the level of protest activity and the increase in the number of requests to social networks can be traced in the dynamics of the popularity of the Internet service Twitter in Egypt. As can be seen on the graph (see diagr. 2), the four peak points correspond to the four key periods of recent years in the Pyramid Country: the " January 25 revolution "(February 2011), the" June 30 revolution " (June 2013), the adoption of the Islamist constitution (December 2013), and the first presidential elections after the overthrow of H. Mubarak (June 2014).

The "jumpiness" of using this resource, which can be clearly traced on the graph, can be explained by the specifics of content formation on Twitter, where the main role is played directly by user activity (usually corresponding to a particular event), and not by relatively "static" forms in the form of groups or events, as, for example, on Facebook.

On the night of January 27, 2011, the Mubarak Government attempted to shut down the Internet, shut down official government websites,and restrict mobile communications. ⁹ At that time, the Egyptian Government effectively controlled any information flows that circulated within the country, and especially those that went beyond its borders. And while access to internal network resources was still possible, a significant part of external Egyptian networks (as well as the external system as a whole) suffered serious damage due to their dependence on foreign systems such as Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, etc. ¹⁰

The restriction of mobile communication and Internet traffic affected, first of all, ordinary Egyptians, who, without access to the Internet and information about the country's population, were not able to use the Internet.-

Chart 2. Dynamics of access to the Internet service Twitter in Egypt, 2004-2014

Source: Google Trends - https://www.google.ru/trends/explore

According to some sources, they left their homes to find out what was happening on the streets of cities, as well as in search of their relatives. Then, in most cases, they unwittingly joined the protest actions ¹¹. Thus, the measures used by the Government sometimes led to an even greater escalation of tensions within the country. After the resignation of H. Mubarak, the forces that came to power in Egypt, in fact, had no choice but to weaken control over the media space.

Syria had to experience the severe consequences of the information confrontation, despite the fact that it managed to avoid repeating the fate of Tunisia, Egypt and even Libya. A special feature of Syria is that the telecommunications networks on its territory are not so developed compared to the countries mentioned above. And this, coupled with the traditionally high degree of control over virtual space, has effectively paralyzed any online activity.

One of the most effective (albeit not officially proclaimed) channels for censoring information flows is the so - called "Syrian Electronic Army", an organization that takes responsibility for hacking and blocking Internet resources that are opposed to the regime of President Bashar al - Assad. A significant number of electronic resources, primarily foreign ones, were blocked. Official permission to use high-speed access to previously banned services and social networks appeared only in early 2011, and activists of Internet communities did not fail to take advantage of this: almost immediately, in 2011, groups began to appear on Facebook calling for "days of anger".

A characteristic feature of the events of the "Arab Spring" in Syria was that civil activity and online journalism began to develop most actively there, compared to other countries that experienced the crisis, which actually merged during the protracted Syrian conflict. Ordinary residents of Syria who were involved in certain events on the territory of the country documented what was happening and distributed their materials on the Internet. Due to the limited distribution of foreign media reports or their inconsistency with reality, this kind of activity began to play the role of almost the only news source.

A peculiar situation has developed in Libya, where during the time of Muammar Gaddafi (1969-2011), media resources that were a potential threat to the current government were controlled, as they broadcast criticism of state mechanisms, as well as information related to the most acute problems of the country - in particular, ethnic and tribal issues.

Under Gaddafi, the legal and political environment in the country encouraged self-censorship in the online media: for example, any messages that contained criticism of the current regime, as well as related to the situation of the Berber minority or the level of corruption in the country were banned.¹²

At the beginning of the 2011 Libyan events, the emphasis was placed on international broadcasting, since a relatively small number of residents of the country (about 5%) had access to the Internet, which, in turn, suggests that the degree of restriction of Internet traffic in Libya is relatively small, compared to countries with a higher level of Internet distribution. In addition, by the beginning of the protests, the content of the websites was already controlled by the Government, and by March 2011, the content of the websites was already controlled by the government. The Internet was almost completely disconnected ¹³.

When the anti-government protests began, some activists moved to Egypt to be able to spread information about events in the country. Following the Egyptian example, Libya has taken the path of shutting down the Internet during protest movements. However, instead of completely blocking all forms of Internet communication, selective restriction of access to some sites was used, while access to State resources was preserved.¹⁴

After the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, censorship in Libya was significantly weakened - with only one caveat: in fact, telecommunications networks in the country actually ceased to function due to international military intervention in the Libyan crisis and subsequent protracted conflicts between representatives of various tribal associations.

Yemen has not remained aloof from the practice of information confrontation. In an effort to maintain public order and curb anti-government activity, the Yemeni authorities blocked access to resources containing political or prohibited information even before the events of the Arab Spring. With regard to the use of Internet resources during a series of anti-Government protests in Yemen, despite the Government's attempts to restrict access to social media, demonstrators continued to coordinate their actions smoothly.¹⁵

Opposition-minded youth in Yemen have not only escaped serious restrictions on access to and dissemination of information since the protests began, but have also been very successful in promoting their ideas and organizing protests. For example, a tent camp near the University of Sanaa was provided with autonomous power supply systems and Internet access - despite the fact that power outages often occurred and still occur in the city itself.

Depending on the degree of filtering of political web resources, according to the rating of states prepared by experts of the OpenNet Initiative project, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates fall into the category of countries with a significant level of Internet censorship.

There are three main prerequisites for filtering web pages: to preserve political stability (Libya, Jordan); to strengthen national security (Morocco); and to preserve traditional social values (Oman) ¹⁶.

The Civil Society Development Foundation * conducted a study on the causes and tools of censorship in various countries around the world, based on which five models of Internet censorship were identified: Asian, Middle Eastern, Restrictive, Continental and Liberal ¹⁷.

For the Middle East, it was typical to highlight the religious factor as a determining factor when governments turned to the method of filtering websites. The main sites that are subject to censorship are those whose content contradicts existing values and moral norms, as well as encroaching on the dominant religion - Islam.

INTERNET CENSORSHIP AFTER THE ARAB SPRING

In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, after a wave of anti-regime protests and the overthrow of leaders who had been in power for many years, there were some tendencies to weaken censorship in the media space, including on the Internet. Even such politically biased international expert groups as, for example, the OpenNet Initiative or Reporters Without Borders noted in their reports that almost immediately after the flight of Tunisian President Ben Ali, the country actually turned off the information filtering system, both electronic resources and traditional media. ¹⁸ A Reporters Without Borders in 2011 moved Tunisia from the category of "enemies of the Internet" to the category of "under surveillance" ¹⁹.

In the Land of the Pyramids, political pluralism was fully manifested after the "January 25 revolution". About 40 new political parties** have been created in Egypt, not to mention numerous political movements and associations. 26 parties, including the Salafi al-Nour party, took part in the 2011-12 elections to the People's Assembly and entered Parliament. And in 2012, 13 candidates from a wide range of political forces applied for the highest state post, which is in sharp contrast to the X-era. Mubarak, when, say, in the last election with his participation in 2005, only 3 candidates competed with him.

A similar situation developed in Libya, which did not have a party system for all 40 years of Gaddafi's rule, where, as a result of the 2012 general elections, representatives of 21 political parties joined the General National Congress. This undoubtedly indicates the elimination of traditionally existing information and communication barriers.

It is worth noting that media censorship is also one of the fundamental characteristics of the development of society in Arab countries, and this is largely due to the strong position of the Muslim religion in the region. The authorities of Arab countries are usually guided by a certain set of "rules" or reasons for censorship. First of all, these are intentions to preserve traditional social values and political stability, strengthen national security, prevent attacks on religious aspects of state life, and protect the population - especially children - from unwanted content, especially pornographic content. In addition, web resources may be censored for security reasons, i.e. sites related to terrorist and other extremist groups are blocked.

However, the Arab regimes were widely criticized for censoring the political rights of citizens in practice, under the pretext of protecting the moral foundations of society. The preservation of traditional social values became only a showcase of the true intentions of the Arab dictators - the suppression of political pluralism and the possibility of self-expression on the Internet.

In this regard, it would be interesting to refer to the data of the Internet resource Google Trends. This system shows the frequency of requests for a particular query in the Google search engine in a certain country in a given period of time. This resource makes it possible to find out exactly the interest of citizens in a particular issue. For example, the website of a political movement may be blocked by the authorities, but if the movement itself does not enjoy public interest, then it is hardly appropriate to talk about the serious impact of censorship on the exercise of political rights of citizens.

After the departure of H. Mubarak and a significant decrease in the censorability of the Internet space in Egypt, there was no increase in the growth of requests for previously banned resources of a political nature. However, requests for pages containing pornographic content increased dramatically immediately after the "January 25 revolution" (see map).

As can be seen on the map, in the first half of 2011, there was a sharp increase in requests to Internet sites of immoral content, while the level of requests to websites of previously banned political movements was similar to the level of pre-revolutionary years. We emphasize once again that this map does not show the absence (or presence) of censorship on the Internet in the countries under consideration, but rather demonstrates the interest of citizens in a particular content.

* * *

Thus, it can be concluded that the actions of the board-

* A Russian non-profit organization engaged in research in the field of politics and media (approx. author's note).

** This figure shows only the number of officially registered parties after the " February 25 revolution "(author's note).

July-December 2010

January-June 2011

Map. Dynamics of Google searches in Egypt for the word porno (by province)*

* The darker color corresponds to the highest number of requests.

Source: Google Trends - https://www.google.ru/trends/explore

There were not so few reasons for such measures to filter virtual resources in accordance with the moral and ethical guidelines of a particular country. Interest in banned resources, particularly those of a pornographic nature, increased significantly immediately after restrictions on access to them were lifted. However, there was no significant increase in interest in political issues, which indicates a significant role of "routine" preferences of netizens rather than opposition ones. Often, it is precisely the restriction of the habitual information preferences of the majority of the population that is considered a powerful catalyst for protests. ²⁰ Accordingly, the removal of these prohibitions means some stabilization of the situation due to temporary satisfaction of information needs.

The periods of the greatest popularity of Internet resources exactly coincided with the peaks of protest activity, which is especially clearly seen in the example of the Facebook resource. This indicates that the latest methods of communication and information transfer are actively involved in socio-political processes, forming new channels and techniques of interaction between the authorities and society. The study and proper use of these channels can reduce the risk of political destabilization.

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