The Donbass, Melitopol, Nikopol-Kryvyi Rih, Crimean, Iasi-Kishinev, Belgrade, Budapest, Balaton, Vienna operations - even behind this meager list, which literally indicates the rich military path of Fyodor Ivanovich, there is a constant and steady growth of his generalship talent, increasingly large-scale tasks that the Stavka trusted him to perform...

Major victories were won by Tolbukhin during his time as commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front and outside the USSR. After the successful completion of the Iasi-Kishinev operation and the withdrawal of the front troops to the Bulgarian border, the command developed a plan for the Bulgarian operation, which the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command approved on September 5, 1944.The land of the fraternal people lay ahead. Therefore, Tolbukhin had a high hope that there would be no resistance to Red Army units when crossing the border. Based on this, during the offensive of the front troops, it was decided to abandon massive artillery and aviation training.

On September 8, the front troops crossed the Romanian-Bulgarian border. At the same time, the radio began broadcasting Tolbukhin's appeal: "Bulgarians! The Red Army has no intention of fighting the Bulgarian people and their army, as it considers the Bulgarian people to be a fraternal people. The Red Army has one task - to defeat the Germans and speed up the time of universal peace..."

The next day, spurred on by the Soviet offensive, a popular uprising broke out, and power passed into the hands of the committees of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. The hopes of our command that the Bulgarians would not fight for the interests of Germany were justified. In just 10 days and essentially without fighting, the Nazi invaders were driven out of the country. Tolbukhin was awarded the epaulettes of a Marshal of the Soviet Union for the masterful implementation of the Iasi-Kishinev operation, as well as the liberation of Bulgaria.

It is rightly noted that the commander's handwriting is developed more than one day. And in the style of the front-line commander, no,no, yes, there will be a flash of what distinguished him when he was a platoon commander. In 1928, when Tolbukhin was still chief of staff of the rifle division, the following remark appeared in his attestation, signed by the divisional commander: "By nature, he is inclined to take cautious actions, and not boldly-risky operations." In November 1942, when Stalin asked the commander of the Stalingrad Front, A. I. Eremenko, to give a review of Komandarma-57, he received something similar in response: "Major General Tolbukhin personally is a trained general and copes with the duties of an army commander. But he somewhat overestimates the enemy and exaggerates his strength."

Time has shown that both chiefs were wrong in their assessments of Tolbukhin's qualities as a commander. They took the necessary caution, prudence, and desire to anticipate the enemy's course of action to the smallest detail as excessive caution and indecision. However, in the opinion of the front commander, fervor could only fail if it was not supported by a sober calculation.

This position was brilliantly justified in the Belgrade offensive operation, which the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front carried out from September 28 to October 20, 1944, together with the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (PLA) and the troops of the Bulgarian Fatherland Front. The nature of the operation and the course of hostilities were largely determined by the mountainous terrain. Of particular importance was the ability to maneuver to encircle and destroy the enemy. In addition, it was the first time I had to work so closely with the armies of other countries.

In these difficult conditions, Tolbukhin was on top of the situation. On September 28, the troops entrusted to him suddenly broke through the enemy's fortifications and, having overcome the Eastern Serbian Mountains, reached the Morava River. The operation unfolded on a broad front, in independent directions, separated by long distances and connected only by a common operational plan. Nevertheless, Marshal Tolbukhin led the troops calmly and confidently. There was no need for him to get excited, "pump up", or push his subordinates, because everything was carefully planned and calculated by him.

To increase the rate of advance on Belgrade, the commander sent the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps into battle. Paratroopers from the 1st Proletarian Corps of the PLA moved on Soviet armor together with Red Army soldiers to their capital-this was Tito's request. On October 20, the capital of Yugoslavia was liberated.

Belgrade was followed by Budapest. Tolbukhin's forces struck along the western bank of the Danube at

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The north and in late December 1944, together with the troops of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, completed the complete encirclement of the Budapest group, but the German fascist command attempted to release the encircled forces. For a month and a half, until mid-February 1945, intense fighting did not stop. At some point, the enemy managed to break through to the Danube south of Budapest. Fyodor Ivanovich was faced with a dilemma: continue to hold the bridgehead or move to the left bank? The Supreme Command Headquarters granted the commander of the 3rd Ukrainian Front the right to make his own decision.

However, the commander could not be swayed even by Stalin's permission to withdraw troops. "To go to the left bank of the Danube in such a situation is like death for the front troops," he said. "It was a wise and only right decision," recalled the former commander of the 17th Air Army, which was part of the front, Air Marshal V. A. Sudets, " because the withdrawal to the opposite bank of the Danube in the conditions of the enemy's offensive threatened with major losses and would have deprived us of the opportunity to quickly restore the situation in the area of the enemy breakthrough." But the Germans did not succeed in either unblocking the Budapest garrison or driving the Soviets back across the Danube. And on February 13, the Hungarian capital was liberated by Soviet troops.

It so happened that it was the troops under the command of Tolbukhin who had to withstand one of the most large-scale counter-offensives launched by the Nazis in the final war. In an effort to cover the approaches to Southern Germany at all costs, the Fascist command tried to push the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front across the Danube in March 1945 in the area of Lake Balaton. For this purpose, a large number of mobile troops were concentrated, which gave the enemy more than double the superiority in tanks and assault guns.

The order from Moscow was categorical and required a transition to defense in these conditions. Performing it, Tolbukhin was able to correctly determine the direction of the offensive of the main enemy forces - in the defense bands of the 4th Guards and 26th armies, where he concentrated his reserve - two tank, mechanized, cavalry corps and a rifle division. In addition, the marshal, in an effort to minimize losses, paid great attention to the careful preparation of troops and control bodies to repel massive air strikes and tanks. He was well aware of the feelings of soldiers and officers who went under enemy fire when the war was clearly coming to an end. "I worked with Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin for a long time," Lieutenant General N.E. Subbotin recalled, " he, like no one else, took care of the personnel of the front army, always tried to get victory with little blood."

From the first hours of dawn on March 6, 1945, the battle became extremely fierce. It happened that the enemy threw up to 350 tanks and assault guns into the attack at the same time. Having no tanks or self-propelled guns in the first line of defense, our troops responded with artillery fire and air strikes. Tolbukhin was sensitive to the dynamics of events and followed them punctually. As soon as the direction of the enemy's main attack was determined, he ordered mobile reserves to be moved to the pre-prepared defense. Artillery units were also transferred here from secondary directions.

Military historians note the most characteristic feature of the Balaton defensive operation - a sharp and frequent change of situation. During the entire nine days of the battle, the enemy tried to break through in one direction or another. But everywhere he was met with powerful retaliatory blows. On March 15, the enemy stopped attacking and, under continuous pressure from the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front, began to withdraw its troops hastily.

That's when the 9th and 4th Guards armies, thoughtfully preserved by Tolbukhin in reserve, came in handy. It was they who, according to Stavka's plan, were to play the role of a strike group in the upcoming offensive on Vienna. Which began on March 16, it was unexpected for the enemy. The Marshal kept building up his attack. On the third day of the operation, the 9th and 4th Guards Armies were joined by the 6th Guards Tank Army. Already in the first days of April, Soviet troops reached the Austrian capital.

Wanting to preserve Vienna, its historical and cultural monuments, Tolbukhin appealed to the city's population to help the Soviet soldiers and not allow the Nazis to destroy the city. The actions of artillery and aviation were as sparing as possible. Nevertheless, on the seventh day of the fighting, the front troops completely captured Vienna.

And on April 26, 1945, Commander Marshal Tolbukhin was awarded the Order of Victory "for skilful performance of tasks of the Supreme High Command to lead large-scale combat operations, as a result of which outstanding successes were achieved in defeating the Nazi troops". He also became the owner of a unique" collection " of orders of those countries in the liberation of which the troops entrusted to him played a key role-Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary.

Unfortunately, Fyodor Ivanovich Tolbukhin lived only four years after the war, passing away only fifty-five years old. Holding the post of commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, the marshal courageously resisted the onslaught of a serious illness. "I will never forget," A. M. Vasilevsky wrote with feeling, " how Fyodor, lying on a hospital bed, literally a few minutes before his death, assured me that tomorrow he would go to work."

Colonel Yuri RUBTSOV, Candidate of Historical Sciences

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