Belarus in U.S. Foreign Policy

This article is abridged from the author's paper that will be published in full as a separate chapter in the forthcoming book by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The book will be based on the papers prepared for the international meeting on 16-17 October, 1997, in Minsk, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Committee on International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Development and Security Research Institute.

In U.S. foreign policy Belarus occupies the worst of two worlds. On the one hand, it exists in the largely forgotten recesses of memory. Among top policy-makers it captures little regular attention, and, in the Congress and media, almost none at all, except for, from time to time, the anger of a handful of senators. On the other hand, what there is of a U.S. policy toward Belarus resembles rather curiously U.S. policy toward hostile communist regimes during the Cold War. Because the Belarusian government responds in kind, the relationship between the two countries has slipped from the unassuming start at the time of Belarusian independence to an odd echo of a now dead age.



To be ignored in the broader scheme of U.S. foreign policy scarcely distinguishes Belarus from the bulk of post-Soviet states nor, for that matter, from most states in other regions of the world. The second characteristic of U.S. policy toward Belarus, however, is unusual, and deserves exploration. How could it be that in a region where U.S. policy toward no other state, including Russia, seems a throwback to the Cold War, its policy toward Belarus has taken on so many of these characteristics?



When I evoke the comparison to the Cold War, I have the following in mind: First, the policy of each country toward the other rests on a basic suspicion that leadership on the other side embraces values basically at variance with its own, pursues objectives threatening to its interests, and frequently acts in bad faith. Second, each leadership at moments permits itself a level of recrimination similar to the sharp language of the earlier period. The Belarusian president accuses the United States of trying to destabilise his country (1); spokesmen for the United States government complain of the destruction of democratic aspirations in Belarus and President Lukashenko's "expanding dictatorship."(2) Third, the relationship is regularly marred by incidents characteristic of the earlier era: On the Belarusian side, expulsions of U.S. diplomats for being at anti-government demonstrations; on the U.S. side, granting political asylum to Belarusian dissident politicians based on their "well-founded fear of persecution were [they] to return to [their] country.''(3) And, fourth, and most important, the United States now deals with Belarus chiefly by a combination of carrots and sticks-mostly sticks-closely paralleling U.S. policy toward Soviet allies during the Cold War, and, Belarus, too weak to practice a policy of carrots and sticks toward the United States, substitutes the same hard shell of indifference to American importuning as Warsaw Pact countries once did 15 years ago.



U.S. Objectives


During Belarus's first two years of independence, it is difficult to identify a broad, let alone coherent set of U.S. objectives. Instead the United States pursued a single, decisive concern-namely, removing first the tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus and second the 81 SS-25s. Before independence the Bush Administration preoccupied itself with ridding Belarus of tactical nuclear weapons, seen as a particularly perilous part of the European nuclear balance. After independence, the focus shifted to preventing the emergence of new nuclear-possessing powers among the successor states.



The United States obviously hoped that Belarus, like all the other former Soviet republics, would commit itself to a democratic, market-oriented future, and it was prepared to help the country move in this direction. But here Belarus, as many of the other post-Soviet states, remained something of an afterthought. Russian democracy and market reform constituted the inspiration and focus. Beyond the rather perfunctory commitment to democratisation and the consuming concern with nuclear weapons, Washington had few, if any, other Belarusian-specific objectives.(4)



Later, the list of U.S. objectives would grow, but largely from negative impulses. That is, the greater the number of problems in the relationship, the more complex the U.S. agenda became. Promoting Belarusian democracy may not have been a separate, compelling part of the United States' original agenda, but dealing with its demise formed a critical part of the subsequent agenda. Worrying about Belarus's place in an evolving Central European context was not on the minds of U.S.

policy-makers in 1991 and 1992, but coping with the difficulties Belarus posed for Poland, Ukraine, and others when acting in league with Russia very much was in 1996 and 1997. Along the way, the essentially constructive interaction leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons was replaced by the far less auspicious focus on preventing Belarus from aiding Iran with its nuclear program.(5) And the initially limited U.S.-Belarusian arms control agenda, after 1994, was much complicated by Minsk's fitful implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement and then separate set of demands in the 1997 adaptation of the treaty.



Amidst this more ramified and troubled agenda, the U.S. effort to discourage Belarus's retreat from a democratic option assumed pivotal importance. It is important to understand why. More is involved than simply the general tendency of the United States to make human rights a policy concern when dealing with other governments, and more than the Clinton Administration's renewed emphasis on the issue when it came to office. Clinton and his people altered policy to accommodate human rights concerns not merely toward Belarus, but toward countries from China to Haiti and a number of places in between, including Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. In addition, Congressional politics guaranteed that human rights issues would be an unavoidable part of U.S. policy, particularly with the election of a Republican majority four months after A. Lukashenko assumed the presidency.



By 1995 an economy-minded Congress had already begun to whittle away at funding under the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Belarus was not the only or even the primary inspiration for the cutbacks, but its increasingly unfavourable human rights record stiffened the resolve of the new legislators eager to find reasons not to spend money on the post-Soviet states. Two years later, Belarus was the only and quite specific target of action. On March 21, 1997, one day after the latest demonstration and set of arrests in Minsk, a State Department spokesman announced that additional Nunn-Lugar support would be suspended, halting the remaining $39 million earmarked for nuclear clean-up in the country.(6) The program, he said, required that recipients be certified for human rights compliance, and the State Department could no longer make that claim before the Congress. On April 3, 1997, leaders of the U.S. Commission on Security and Co-operation in Europe sent a letter to A. Lukashenko sharply criticising his government's actions over the last three months.(7) Senators Frank Lautenberg and Alfonse D'Amato, two of the signers, a few weeks earlier introduced into the Senate a concurrent resolution calling on the Belarusian leadership to meet its obligations under the Helsinki Act.(8)



Although but a handful of senators and Congress people were actively engaged on these issues, they would have had no trouble rallying majorities among their essentially passive colleagues, giving the administration good reason to suspend Nunn-Lugar assistance, even had it preferred to keep nuclear and human rights issues separate. If the Administration could or would not overcome congressional opposition to assistance for Azerbaijan, where Caspian Sea oil gave it compelling reasons to do so, there was no chance that it would risk a conflict with Congress over policy toward Belarus.



Ultimately, however, the reason domestic developments within Belarus came to assume such a decisive role in U.S. policy was altogether more profound. A fundamentally new dynamic was at work in post-Cold War Europe, and Belarus was not above its influence. Because democracy had become a critical foundation of modern international relations in Western Europe, Europe's major powers were not willing to admit post socialist societies into their midst unless they reinforced this foundation.

More than this, the West Europeans and Americans had come to believe that democracy- including respect for human and minority rights-constituted an important source of international stability, and, therefore, of European security. As a result they consciously and systematically used the entire architecture of West European institutions-from the Council of Europe to NATO-and the desire of East and Central European states to be a part of it as leverage for promoting democracy in these states. Where the prospect of early membership in neither NATO nor the European Union existed, as in the case of Russia and Belarus, Europe's democracies rolled on other institutions, such as the OSCE, to foster the link between democracy and security. Because this premise lay so close to the core of Western foreign policy concepts, no East European state, from Albania to Estonia, escaped its influence.



The United States, of course, had other aims in relations with Belarus than discouraging a new authoritarianism, but none of these stood on its own legs. For example, until the post-1996 deterioration in relations, the United States sought to increase the opportunity for profitable U.S. investment in the country. As late as May 1996, the U.S.-Belarusian Business Development Committee held its second meeting in Minsk and planned a series of steps to aid U.S. business activity in Belarus.(9) A few weeks earlier a U.S. Chamber of Commerce office had been established in Minsk. Throughout this period the U.S. Embassy in Belarus devoted a good deal of its time and energy to promoting economic ties between the two countries. And in July, James Collins, the U.S. Ambassador-at-large to the CIS states, arrived in Minsk to discuss various joint activities contributing to a better business climate.(10) Nearly all of this activity, however, came under a cloud when the political environment deteriorated in early 1997.



The United States also had a separate interest in encouraging Belarus to develop an effective export-control regime preventing the flight of nuclear materials to third parties and the flow of advanced weaponry to what the U.S. regarded as "rogue" states.(11) But this objective, too, was eventually subordinated to the harder line the United States took on Belarus's general economic and political evolution. To a lesser extent, the same can be said of the remainder of the United States' arms control agenda with Belarus, which after the last SS-25 left for Russia in November 1996 was largely reduced to Belarus's part in the Conventional Forces in Europe regime. Finally, the Clinton Administration had an interest in the nature of Russian-Belarusian integration, although the precise character of this interest was not always easily identifiable. Formally, the administration raised no objection to the two countries drawing together. Provided this was something the people of Russia and Belarus wished, Washington saw no reason to interfere. Others, however, had a more critical view, including the former U.S. Ambassador to Belarus, David Schwartz. They objected in principle to what they feared would be the loss of Belarusian sovereignty, and regarded the whole idea of re-integration among the post-Soviet states as contrary to U.S. national interest.(12) Some went further; determined to circumscribe Russia as much as possible, they opposed any alliance or fusion that might add to Russian power.



Even the administration's more benign position, however, eventually led to reservations over the agreements reached in April 1996 and May 1997. On the surface, these were less over content than process. That is, the Administration accepted the right of the two countries to integrate, but not if the leadership at one country moved in this direction by flaunting democratic procedure. Thus, still again, the issue of Belarus's domestic politics intruded. When asked to comment on the April 2, 1997, treaty on union, Nicholas Burns, the State Department spokesman responded that "we are not reflexively opposed to efforts to bring two countries together, but we do believe any such process should be voluntary, that it should reflect the mutual wishes of the peoples of both countries."(13) He then added, "Obviously, we have great respect for the Russian Federation, which is a free and democratic country. It's hard to join those words, however-'free and democratic'-to Belarus."



U.S. officials, however, knew perfectly well that integration with Russia was popular with the great majority of Belarusian citizens and that A. Lukashenko would have no trouble securing their approval in a referendum. Thus, Burns comments doubtless concealed a deeper level of misgiving. He also said that, if there was to be union between the two countries, the United States favoured one that "does not draw new lines in Europe." By this somewhat more revealing formulation, he appeared to be suggesting that the United States' real worry was of a union built on an anti- Western basis or in a form impeding co-operation with the West.



Since February 1997, the United States has had an explicit strategy for pursuing this pyramid of objectives. Officials have even given it a name-"selective engagement." By any name, however, it is a strategy of carrots and sticks, with even the carrots used largely as sticks. In the original February 1997 statement, the administration asserted that it was not "disengaging from Belarus" nor seeking "Belarus's isolation." Without question, however, it did mean to pressure the regime, to punish it for showing a seemingly growing disregard for democratic practices; and to make it an outcast among European leaderships. This may not have been an attempt to isolate the country but it certainly was intended to make A. Lukashenko and his colleagues feel isolated. (In this the strategy apparently succeeded. When addressing parliament in April 1997 the Belarusian president referred to the "international isolation" of his country, and claimed that it was gradually fading away.(14))



What few carrots the United States kept in reserve were used as prods not as inducements. Aid, now largely turned off, would only flow again if Belarus demonstrated in deed its readiness to advance democratic and market reform. Similarly, the administration held open the prospect that Nunn-Lugar money could resume in late 1997 or 1998, but only if the State Department could assure the Congress that Belarus was in compliance with human rights standards. In contrast, in the first three years of Belarusian independence, U.S. aid was given before the fact, in part, on the assumption that various forms of material support, including food assistance, would reinforce the willingness of the leadership to co-operate on the nuclear issue.



Never, however, had U.S. aid been very large. Through 1996 the United States provided less than $250 million in technical and economic assistance to Belarus, including around $115 million in humanitarian aid, plus an additional $250 million in U.S. Department of Agriculture food assistance.(15) Under Nunn-Lugar program funding, out of a total of $1.5 billion designated for the post-Soviet states by the end of 1996, Belarus had received less than $80 million. Of the four former Soviet republics with nuclear weapons, the $120 million that the Department of Defense proposed to spend on Belarus was the smallest share. It was a pattern that generally held in U.S. aid to the new states of the former Soviet Union. Belarus usually ranked last or close to last whatever the programme not only among Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, but among all twelve recipients. Even in terms of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development funding, to which the United States contributed, Belarus's total, through September 1996, was but $204 million out of $4.2 billion.(16)



Neither as an incentive nor even less as a disincentive were these sums large enough to yield much leverage. As symbolic displays of U.S. preferences and as modest rewards for good behaviour they had their place, but, as a means for compelling Belarusian authorities to change a course they had no desire to change, U.S. aid programs were pitifully weak, even were they to be cut off entirely. And cutting them off entirely would have in some cases-such as the programme to strengthen export controls over nuclear materials-done more damage to U.S. interests than to Belarusian intransigence.(17)



By its nature current U.S. strategy allows for few other forms of influence. France, under Jacques Chirac, has preserved the option of appearing ready to advocate Belarus's cause within the European Union while not breaking ranks with European institutions in their condemnation of the November 1996 referendum and its aftermath. But the United States cannot really allow itself to try to affect Belarusian behaviour by holding open the possibility of defending Belarus's security interests within a Central European context or, more generally, by developing for it a Western option. Nor, to the other extreme, can the United States hope to mount a broad-based coalition against a recalcitrant Belarus, such as it has, albeit imperfectly, against Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Putting the regime at arms length, rousing the international community's indignation when it acts repressively, penalising it for dawdling with economic reform, and hoping something in the domestic politics of the country will channel the country back on a more satisfactory course has come to be its own only option.



A Two-Track Policy Versus "Selective Engagement"


For two reasons, anyone faulting the Clinton Administration for settling on its present course must make the argument with some modesty. The first reason is the state of American politics and their effect on foreign policy-most notably as manifest in the actions of the Congress. Neither the public nor the Congress has the patience or attention-span for subtle, complex policies, particularly toward middle and smaller powers, and were the administration to come forward with a less stark, indeed, a less harsh policy toward Lukashenko's Belarus, the selling job would be formidable. Indeed, it could not be done without a compelling argument, and, for some reasons, the Administration is a poor candidate to make the argument.

The second reason is Aleksandr Lukashenko. Precious little suggests that he would be moved by an alternative strategy. If Russians have trouble getting him to do what they want even when his actions stir their genuine concern, as during the presidential-parliamentary crisis before last November's referendum, or their genuine anger, as with the arrest and detention of Russian television news personnel this past summer, how can Washington hope to do better? If Belarus's leader feels no special need to indulge his country's closest friends, what could make him bend to the United States' desires? Watching Boris Yeltsin, three months after signing the union treaty, fume over the arrest of Russian journalists-Lukashenko "is young and lacks the ability to handle criticism"-does give a critic of U.S. policy pause.(18)



It all depends on basic assumptions-in particular, the way one calculates the United States' stakes in this part of the world. If one starts from the assumption that what happens in and around Belarus is of marginal significance to U.S. national interest, there is very little reason to quarrel with current policy. If then to this is added the conviction that the Belarusian leadership, alas, cannot be influenced, a tough, aloof policy seems about right. Although the United States has little leverage over Lukashenko, it still has reason to maintain principle, to avoid any impression of coddling post-Soviet regimes that refuse to embrace democracy and market reform, and to make plain to Belarusian elites and others in the region that certain behaviour entails a price. Holding the line in dealings with the Belarusians does not prevent the United States from addressing topics of concern, such as Belarusian defence policy or trends in its relations with Russia. They can be attended to indirectly by focusing on Russia. The easier and better way to influence Belarusian choices in these areas is through the Russians. For the rest, there is simply no reason not to let the regime stew in its own juices.



If one's basic assumptions are different, however; if one starts from the assumption that Belarus is integral to a crucial political and security environment, one that merges the peace and stability of the post-Soviet space with the peace and stability of East-Central Europe, then Belarus ceases to be marginal in the larger scheme of U.S. national interests. Then Belarus becomes the hole in a rather important doughnut. How Belarus behaves, the kind of alliance that it seeks with Russia, the degree of its alienation from the West, and the measure of stability within the country bear directly and critically on the security of its neighbours- Lithuania and Latvia to the north, Ukraine to the south, and Poland to the west.



But if the doughnut itself is not part of one's consciousness, there is no basis for the assumption. In most U.S. circles, including to a degree the Administration, the doughnut is missing. That is, little thought goes into the linkage between security in the post-Soviet space and security in East-Central Europe. This is not to say that the administration fails to appreciate the Russian dimension as it goes about enhancing Polish, Hungarian, and Czech security through NATO enlargement or that it ignores the security concerns of the Baltic states and Ukraine. Policy in the post-Madrid period does, indeed, care about managing the next phases of NATO's development in ways sensitive to the hopes and fears of these countries, while not worsening matters with Russia.



Recognising the fallout from NATO expansion in the states of the former Soviet Union and attempting to address it constructively, however, is not the same as seeing an integral link between security in the post-Soviet space and security in the remainder of Europe. This linkage stems less from the sentiments of the post-Soviet states toward NATO, the West, and the United States than from the dynamics among these states. If mutual security among them grows, so does security elsewhere in Europe. If it declines, so does security elsewhere.



In this equation the evolution of Russia remains decisive, Ukrainian security, the core problem, but Belarus, the pivot point. For Ukraine, Russia, in the worst case, constitutes the essential threat, but Belarus in league with Russia converts a general threat into the far more concrete danger of encirclement. Long before any of this becomes a reality, its mere spectre affects for the worse the security dynamics within the region. For Lithuania and Latvia, how Belarus chooses to define its international role forms a vital part of their foreign policy setting. Small states have been often before buffeted by the uncertain gusts in relations between an overshadowing power and a troubled neighbour, as, for example, between Germany and Poland in the inter-war period. For Poland, Belarus brings the physically remote issue of Russia into its living-room. And, let it not be forgotten, for Russia, Belarus represents a crucial strategic salient, either as a forward wedge of Russian influence in Europe or as a pathway by which others can threaten its peace of mind.



Belarus, as a result, stands at the centre of a series of overlapping circles, each important to the international politics of Europe's eastern half. First and foremost it forms with Russia and Ukraine a critical triangle. Tension along any leg of this triangle would threaten stability throughout the European portions of the former Soviet Union and cast a shadow over neighbouring areas to the West. Belarus, either as the foot-loose object of Ukrainian-Russian competition or as the partner of an aggressive Russia, would be particularly pernicious. Belarus also figures in the Ukrainian-Polish relationship, either as an objective of concern or as an interlocutor, and by extension, therefore, also in the German-Polish (or potentially the German-Polish-Ukrainian) relationship. And it plays a role in a Baltic cluster that brings together Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland and, at times, Russia.



Thought of in these multiple contexts and as a key variable in each, Belarus takes on a much greater significance to the overall stability of East- Central Europe. "Hole in the doughnut," "pivot point," Belarus is crucial if European security depends on what happens from the Atlantic to the Urals-and if Western leaders mean it when they speak of a continent whole and at peace. If , in turn, Belarus matters this much then U.S. policy should be calculated accordingly. The trick is to formulate a policy that allows the United States to pursue these larger stakes, without compromising its opposition to antidemocratic and anti-reform actions on the part of the Belarusian leadership.



Given the nature of the challenge, the best alternative almost certainly involves a two-track approach. On one track the United States would strive to build a relationship with Belarus enhancing security in East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, a relationship giving the United States a larger role in shaping the international relations of the region. On the other track, the United States would continue to seek ways of nudging Belarus along a democratic, market- oriented path.



To this, officials in the current U.S. administration would doubtless say that a double-track approach is already in place. While reacting firmly to offences the entire West condemns, they nonetheless remain engaged in Belarus. They continue to deal with the leadership on a number of important fronts, including arms control, while at the same time making plain their disapproval of its human rights record and obstruction of economic reform. "Engagement" represents one track, "selective" characterises the other.



This misses the point. A genuine two-track policy is genuinely two-track. One track is not subordinate to the other. In current U.S. policy all other aspects of the relationship take a back-seat to Washington's critical view of domestic developments within Belarus, all are ultimately mobilised to underscore its disapproval or, at a minimum, slighted because of its disapproval. Thus, Belarusian concerns over NATO expansion or thoughts about mechanisms for enhancing European security get no hearing, because Washington sees no reason to give the Lukashenko regime this respectability. When U.S. defence officials make no effort to engage their Belarusian counterparts on military matters, because they, too, are part of the general boycott, again, one track is being subordinated to the other.



Although difficult to accomplish, the two spheres need to be kept separate. Each track must have its own integrity. Efforts to work with Belarus in promoting European security (including the post-Soviet space) should not be half- hearted, dilatory, or second-order. This implies several changes. First, Belarus should be treated, as much as Ukraine or the Baltic states, as an independent actor in the unfolding diplomacy of European security. Its conceptions of European security and proposals for strengthening it as well as its critical reactions to others' ideas should be explored and negotiated seriously. In the end the United States may resist much in the Belarusian position, but engaging Belarus on these issues is an important aspect of a two-track approach. Second, Belarusian defence planning, military co- operation with others, and place in Europe's arms control regimes should be of direct concern to the United States and a subject of continuous discussion between senior defence officials from both countries. Third, Minsk should be put back on the travel itinerary of U.S. policy-makers working on problems of European security. Fourth, the United States should welcome and encourage forums drawing Belarus into a dialogue with neighbours on issues of European security. Sustained bilateral and three-way conversations between and among Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland deserve U.S. support. So, too, the initiative of Algirdas Brazauskas for a summit of East European leaders in September, to which Aleksandr Lukashenko was invited.



To argue that the first track should be taken seriously assumes that it can be taken seriously. It assumes, first, that Belarus is and will remain an independent state, and, second, that the current Belarusian leadership cares about the nature of its relationship with other European powers and the United States. It is far from clear that either of these assumptions prevails among U.S. policy-makers. On the contrary, slowly over the last several years, the feeling seems to have taken hold that Belarus will not likely endure as a separate state, that processes leading to the country's absorption into the Russian fold are already far advanced. Policy-makers find it even more difficult to believe that Lukashenko and his group care about defending Belarus's independence, and, therefore, have any real stake in ties to the West. Both suspicions should be challenged.



It does not take much first-hand experience in Belarus to sense how rapidly the sinews of independence are developing. While the Belarusian sense of nationhood does not reverberate in conspicuous nationalist symbols and sentiments, its quiet, practical manifestations are everywhere, but above all in the attitude of political elites, the trappings of state power, the discourse of intellectuals, and the demeanour of youth. With every passing month, Belarus is taking shape as an idea and a daily reality for its people.(19) The widespread sympathy for Russia and eagerness to have special ties with it, particularly in the countryside and among older generation, should not be mistaken for a readiness to become again a part of Russia. Moscow elites frequently make this mistake, taking it for granted that forces are leading inexorably to reunification or something very close to it.(20) Perhaps this widely shared view together with a misreading of Lukashenko's intentions are what create the impression in the United States that Belarusian independence does not have much substance nor long to endure.

In two respects Lukashenko, far from derogating Belarusian independence, appears to be strengthening it. First, and doubtless inadvertently, he and the regime have compromised the idea of integration with Russia among a widening range of politicians, intellectuals, and activists who now associate it with a regime that for other reasons they reject. No longer is opposition to the submergence of Belarus in a greater Russia confined to a narrow strata of Belarusian nationalists. Second, from all indications, Lukashenko himself has no intention of sacrificing Belarusian independence. Whatever may be his conception of Russian-Belarusian integration, it does not include turning Belarus into Russia's ninetieth subject. In late February, in a speech before parliament, he said, "Belarus has always been and will be an independent, sovereign state. It will never be a province of another country."(21) If there is to be union, he added a few days later, it will have to be on the basis of "equal republics based on the one-republic-one-vote principle."(22) Whenever B. Yeltsin begins stressing how soon and on what terms integration will take place or some exuberant group in the Russian Duma casts Lukashenko in the role of governor of a Russian province, the Belarusian president hastens to set the record straight. In January 1997, he said that Belarus would form an alliance with another state, including union with Russia, only on the basis of three fundamental principles: First, that it be an "equal partnership" guaranteeing Belarus's sovereignty and statehood; second, that Belarusian citizens "never be sent to fight outside the country" (a popular stance that long antedated Lukashenko's presidency); and, third, that it be mutually beneficial.(23) Earlier the same day Aman Tuleev, Russia's minister of CIS Affairs, had boasted that the two countries would be united by the year 2000.



His critics say that A. Lukashenko would in moment merge the two countries if it served his personal ambitions. But even this charge rests on the assumption that his personal ambitions would only be realised in a union in which Belarus were genuinely equal-and he, the equal of the Russian head of state-or in the still less likely case of an amalgamation that he came to lead. He, one assumes, knows as well as anyone the odds of either happening.



Similarly, the basic thrust of Belarusian foreign policy toward the West poses no significant obstacle to a two-track U.S. policy. Lukashenko has often maintained that Belarus wants to pursue what he calls a "multi-vectored" policy, in which the West forms one crucial vector, and Russia and the CIS another.(24) He does not deny that, between the two, Belarus assigns greater importance to the second, but not to the extent that Belarus's stake in Europe and the West in general is without real significance. In conversations with senior foreign policy officials in May 1997, one after another stressed the importance of developing what one called the Western "wing" of Belarusian foreign policy. Belarus, it was repeatedly stressed, does not want a unidimensional policy focused only eastward.



There are good reasons for this, beyond the aid and trade benefits that Minsk might hope to secure from the West. First, despite the casual assumptions of Washington, Bonn, and Brussels, Belarus's place in the outside world remains inchoate. Its relationship to the CIS is ambiguous because the future of the CIS is ambiguous. Union with Russia is an idea on paper, but one that falters continuously in practice.(25) At a deeper level, the question exists whether either country really wants it. To Belarus's north, south, and west, it has vital interests at stake with countries whose future is as part of a larger Europe. Second, thoughtful Belarusian foreign policy specialists recognise that existing arrangements among the CIS states are not adequate for dealing with potential instability in the region or other security threats, and that additional mechanisms, including the Partnership for Peace, may be essential.(26) And, third, whatever Belarus's ultimate place in the post-Soviet space, its westward location exposes it to the fundamental processes shaping European politics, an awareness more naturally present among Belarusian foreign policy elites than among their Russian counterparts.



No U.S. policy toward Belarus will be soundly based, however, unless it rests on an understanding that, with or without Lukashenko, Belarus's foreign policy will not resemble Ukraine's, the Baltic states', or any of the more Western-oriented former Soviet republics. Too many forces are at work dictating that Belarusian foreign policy will remain in tandem with Russian foreign policy-that is, respectful of Russian interests and inclined to see trends in Europe in similar ways.

Its conception of European security, the role of NATO versus that of alternative institutions, and arms control as well as its reaction to structures of which it is not a part will inevitably bear a greater likeness to Russian positions than not. Hence, as a final observation on the first of the two tracks, no matter what the regime in Belarus, success, in part, will depend on the direction of Russian foreign policy. If Russia continues to value its relations with the West and strives to play a constructive role in promoting European security, a two-track policy toward Belarus can work. If Russia, in anger or frustration, turns its back on the West, the chances of success rapidly diminish.



U.S. policy, however, cannot ignore the other side of the relationship, the problems raised by the Belarusian leadership's domestic course. How the United States reacts to the fate of democratic choice in Belarus is not simply a matter of a particular administration's tastes. For the United States to look the other way on this issue would not only invite sharp criticism in Congress and elsewhere, but, more importantly, would work at cross purposes with the kind of Europe that is in its interest to see emerge. To excuse or minimise steps threatening a democratic future for Belarus would, intact, undermine one of the fundamental building blocks of European security as conceived by the United States and its allies.



However, to ease the inevitable tension between the two tracks, the United States should consider carefully the way it goes about this objective. It is possible to convey U.S. disapproval without taking on the role of Belarus's most strident critic. U.S. condemnation, in fact, would surely be more effective if Washington was seen by Lukashenko and his colleagues as acting with restraint. Their problem, after all, is not confined to the United States. They are criticised by nearly the whole of Europe. At the Lisbon OSCE summit in December 1996, Belarus escaped formal censure only because of the veto it and Russia could cast. A. Brazauskas, in calling the East European summit for September, encouraged participants to make an issue of the situation in Belarus, although not by using "hard measures" to deal with a "delicate situation."(27) The OSCE, in an effort led by the Europeans, has worked hard to keep the pressure on Minsk by pushing for an OSCE monitoring group to be established in the country.(28) Under this pressure, Belarus has agreed to explain itself before the Permanent Council of the OSCE in last September in Vienna with all 54 members attending. Thus, this is one case where the United States could, to better effect, follow the lead of others who have no less of a stake in guiding Belarus back on to a democratic path.



If the administration or Congress resists this conclusion, because people believe other forces-such as, a deteriorating economy or rising public opposition-will bring A. Lukashenko around, if only the United States hews to its present course, they appear to be quite wrong. The Belarusian economy last year was one of the few in this region to experience economic growth (2.8%), a tempo that appears to have increased in the first six months of this year. As significant, although a majority of Belarusian citizens continue to see their economic lot as difficult, the percentages are declining.(29) And 45% of the population, when surveyed, express support for A. Lukashenko, a far higher percentage than received by his Ukrainian and Russian counterparts. If Belarus is to get in step with the patterns of change underway in neighbouring post-Soviet states-none of which is without failings-it is far more likely to occur because the leadership comes to recognise that their country's place (and security) in a modern European order is at stake. The question for the United States is whether it wants to be a part of the process.



Notes



(1) The Lukashenko comment was in a televised comment on September 23,1996 (See Ustina Markus, in OMRI Daily Report , September 24, 1996.



(2) The U.S. comments are from State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, March 6, 1997, and his colleague, John Dinger, March 28, 1997.



(3) See Ustina Markus, "CIA Conspiracy in Belarus," OMRI Analytical Reports , July 1996.



(4) As noted by a significant Belarusian participant, the failure of the United States to develop a more balanced and comprehensive policy at this point disturbed the Belarusian side. See Sergei Martynov, "Voprosy yadernoi besopasnosti v otnosheniyakh Belarusi i SShA," Belarus v mire , Vol. 1 (December 1996), p. 90. Martynov, now a deputy foreign minister, was Belarusian ambassador to the United States.



(5) This concern is explored in Vayutovich, "Vzglyad SshA na mesto Belorussii v sovremennom mire i sostoyanie Amerikano-Belorusskikh otnoshenii," in E.M. Kozhokin, ed., Belorussiya: Put k novym gorizontam , (Moscow: Rossiiskii institut strategicheskikh issledovanii, 1996), pp.189-90.



(6) Nicholas Burns, Noon Press Briefing. U.S. Department of State, March 21, 1997.



(7) Congressional Record , April 10,1997, p. E634-E635. The signers were Congressmen Christopher H. Smith and Steny H. Hoyer as well as Senators Alfonse D'Amato and Frank Lautenberg.



(8) Congressional Record , March 20, 1997 (Senate), p. S2718.



(9) The committee was led, on the U.S. side, by Jan H. Kalicki, Department of Commerce Counselor, and, on the Belarusian side, by Mikhail Marinich, Minister for Foreign Economic Relations. (See "Report Of The U.S.- Belarus Business Development Committee," June 3, 1996, Fm Usdoc Washdc, on Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States (BISNIS) Web Page.)



(10) While there he gave a relatively uncritical interview to Minsk television. (See FBIS-SOV-96-142 , July 23, 1996, p. 33.)



(11) See Suzette Grillot, "Belarus," in Gary Bertsch, ed., Restraining the Spread of the Soviet Arsenal: NIS Nonproliferation Export Controls (Athens, Ga.: Center for International Trade and Security, 1996), pp. 31- 35.



(12) See David Schwartz and David Evans, "Belarus: Problems of Integration," Washington, May 1996.



(13) Nicholas Burns, Daily Press Briefing. U.S. Department of State, April 4, 1997.



(14) "Belarus: President Addresses Parliament; Sends Message to Clinton," RFE Research Report , April 11, 1997.



(15) Derived from Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to the NIS. U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. FY 1996 Annual Report (January 1997). The $115m in humanitarian assistance involved mostly private donations ($109 million). ( Ibid ., p. 141.) The bulk of the USDA assistance was in concessional sales under Public Law 480, Title 1.



(16) Ibid ., p. 155.



(17) Having reduced or suspended many assistance programme on the grounds of intolerable abuses of human rights in February, it was not clear what the Administration would do about certification under section 498A(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 come the end of 1997. That Act asks whether a potential recipient has "engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or of international law." In the 1996 report, filed in January 1997, the Administration had answered: "No. While there have been serious shortcomings in human rights observance (as discussed above), we do not believe that the Government of Belarus is engaged in such a pattern." [ Ibid ., p. 172.]



(18) [His televised interview on] August 1, 1997. A statement from the Russian government the previous day had referred to damage done to the prospect of Russian-Belarusian integration by the "banal provocation of one man."



(19) For a more thorough account that hedges on the long-term prospects of Belarusian independence, but that supplies evidence of an emerging Belarusian nationhood, see George Sanford, "Belarus on the Road to Nationhood," Survival , Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), esp. pp. 138, and 149-50.



(20) One who wishes to see Russia and Belarus again unified, but who understands that time is working against, not for such an outcome, is Sergei Karaganov.



(21) Quoted in Jan de Weydenthal, "Lukashenka Wants Autonomy And Union With Russia," RFE Analytical Reports , February 25, 1997.



(22) After the "Agreement on Union" was signed, Ural Latypov, the Belarusian President's foreign policy advisor, underscored that "the principle 'one- state-one-vote' means that not a single decision touching the interests of Belarus can be taken without the consent of the Belarusian leadership." (See his interview in Belarus v mire . Vol. 2, No. 1 (March 1997), p. 41.)



(23) Sergei Solodovnikov, OMRI Daily Report, January 23, 1997. He was speaking to the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry.



(24) See Vayutovich, "Vsglyad SshA na mesto Belorussii v sovremennom mire," p. 171.



(25) The most recent illustration is the decision of the Russian Central Bank to cut off negotiations with the National Bank of Belarus, because none of what had been promised in March agreements had been done. (See Kommersant- Daily , August 2, 1997.)



(26) See, for example, A. Rozanov, NATO: Problemy transformatsii i rasshireniya (Minsk: "Zavigar," 1996), pp. 29-31.



(27) RFE/RL Newsline , Vol. 1, No. 96, Part II, August 15, 1997.



(28) The initiative has not been easy. After months of discussions and an agreement in principle to allow the establishment of the office, the Belarusians on July 17, 1997, announced they were breaking off further negotiations, apparently because of a critical report separately prepared by the OSCE.



(29) Richard B. Dobson, "Opinion Analysis," USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction the Newly Independent States, July 18, 1997.