Belarusian-Russian Relations: Historic Experience and Modern Challenges

On of the main thesis used by advocates of the integration of Russia and Belarus is that of the agelong and firm historic traditions of friendship and good neighbourly relations between the two brotherly Slav peoples. However, according to a new historic concept of the Belarusian state, which appeared after Belarus became independent in 1991, this thesis can be strongly questioned, if a number of widely known historic facts are thoroughly examined. Especially, if one assesses the net results for Belarus and for Russia. By so doing, the proponents of the above concept believe that the assessment of the results should not be made only from the perspective of the last decades. Rather, the whole centuries-long history of relations between Russian and Belarusian peoples should be taken into account.

The Reverse of Friendship and Good Neighbourliness

The new national concept of the Belarus' history regards the evolution of the Belarusian statehood in XIII-XVIII centuries in the context of the severe struggle for hegemony in Eastern Europe between the Moscow-Russian and Polish- Lithuanian-Belarusian states. Partitions of the Rzecz Pospolita put an end to Belarusian statehood. Belarus was incorporated into the Russian empire. "Having regained the lost Belarusian lands," the Tsarist government deprived Belarusians of the right to statehood, to the development of their national culture and their language. In 1840 the Russian tsar Nicolas the First forbid reference to this country by its name "Belarus." Instead, he ordered that the geographic term "North-West region" be introduced. Belarusians had been subject to strong policies of assimilation and Russification. Such a policy of "reunification" of Belarusian and Russian people caused the outbreak of a struggle by Belarusians for their national liberation, for revival of their statehood and culture.

Formally, within the Soviet Union the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic was a sovereign state. In practice, it was a national-cultural autonomous entity-part of the unitary Soviet multinational federation, dependent on central authorities in Moscow. In the Soviet Union the policy of assimilation and Russification of the Belarusian people continued. According to the scenario of the founders of the Soviet state Belarusians were supposed to be "melted down" to become part of a "new social and international community of people-the Soviet people," united around Russia.

Therefore, the experience of Belarus' presence in the Russian empire and the Soviet Union proves that on the part of central authorities of these states-both the Tsarist government and the Soviet leadership-Belarusians were actually subject to a policy aimed at weakening their national identity and the "dissolution" of the Belarusian people within a more general supra-national society- "the Soviet people" or "rossiyane", a term referring to citizens of the Russian empire or the Russian Federation-both Russians and non-Russians.

The historic background of Belarus-Russia relationship has another important aspect. Being part of both the Russian empire and the Soviet Union, Belarusians together with the Russians and representatives of other nations have repeatedly fought against foreign invaders trying to conquer Russia. Among the most striking examples are the war of 1812 between Russia and France, World War I and World War II. At the same time, the advocates of the new concept of the development of the Belarusian state believe that from the perspective of Belarus' interests these wars- with the exception of World War II-were conducted first of all in the interests of Russia.

Essentially, since the Northern War of 1700-21, conducted by Russia against Sweden, Belarus has played the role of the Western geostrategic outpost of the Russian state. For Belarus itself this role was reduced to the following: from time to time it turned into a battlefield, providing protection for Moscow and other main centres of Russia from the West. For Belarus and its people it meant that the Belarusian land was just a battlefield for military machines of the opposing forces.

In each of those wars the front lines rolled several times over the territory of Belarus: at first from West to East, then from East to West. Each time the civilian population of Belarus suffered most of all. During the last war-World War II-every fourth Belarusian perished. The strength of the Belarusian population reached a pre- war figure only by early 1970s.

Controversial Attitude to the Union

By the time Belarus declared its independence in 1991 the national consciousness of the majority of the country's population was at a low level. Essentially, most Belarusians were not ready ideologically and psychologically for true independence, for the building and strengthening of their independent state. To a large extent, this can explain the difficulties and deviations on Belarus' way towards independence. Additionally, this can also be a reason for the readiness of the major portion of the population and the political elite to be back to a union of their state with Russia. At the same time, Belarusians are not unanimous in their perceptions with regard to the union with Russia.

Those who are against Belarus and Russia drawing closer believe that the consequences of Belarus' being part of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union provide losses, rather than any gains for the Belarusian people. This is the very reason for an extremely careful approach by a considerable part of population and particularly by the national political elite towards the formation of inter-state unions with the new Russia. For them, it is quite clear that within any kind of joint entity with Russia the Belarusian state is unlikely to have a genuinely equal status.

The results of the national referendum on 14 May 1995 and subsequent opinion polls confirm a controversial attitude to the union with Russia. On the one hand, the idea of integration with Russia is quite popular in the Belarusian society: in May 1995, at the referendum, 4 million citizens of Belarus- which amounts to 83.3% of people on electoral rolls-favoured the course towards economic integration with Russia. 602,000 people voted against it, which amounts to 12.5%. However, in summer of 1996 at the national opinion poll conducted by NISEPI, the Independent Institute for Social-Economic and Political Research, to the question "Would you like Belarus to be an independent state?" 64.6% of those polled answered positively and 34.4% gave the negative answer. To the second question-"Do you want Belarus and Russia to merge into one state?"-62.5% said "yes" and 32%-"no." Therefore, approximately equal number of respondents gave an affirmative answer to the mutually exclusive, by nature, questions, having supported both the sovereignty of Belarus and the unification with Russia.

According to the results of the above poll, most respondents support primarily the economic integration. 64.4% favoured the absence of border controls between Belarus and Russia; 64.3% were supportive to the introduction of a common currency. The ideas of political and military integration are far less popular. Single legislation received the support of 41.8% of respondents; 27.3% voiced support to the joint armed forced; and about 20% of the poll voted for a single president and one government.1 The idea of creating joint supreme state bodies received the support of only one fifth of the polled. Additionally, the results of the poll prove that after the May 1995 referendum the number of those supporting the economic integration with Russia has declined by almost 20%. Disagreement with the official course towards the integration with Russia was displayed at the demonstrations of protest of many thousands people in Minsk in March-April 1996, staged on the occasion of the signing of the Union Treaty between Belarus and Russia.

The Real Way

In 1990-97 the relations between Belarus and Russia came a long way, from the status of the inter-republican relations within the USSR to international legal relations between sovereign and independent states which decided to reunify within the framework of a state union. The main landmarks of forming the new inter-state relations are represented in the bilateral and multilateral agreements, concluded within that time frame: the Inter-Republican Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Byelorusskaya SSR and the Russian Federation in December 1990; treaties and agreements on the dissolution of the USSR and formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in December 1991; Inter-Governmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of Economy and Military-Political Sphere in July 1992; Belarus' accession to the Treaty on Collective Security of the CIS Participating States in December 1993; the agreement on the merger of monetary systems of the two states on 12 April 1994; the Treaty on Friendship, Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation on 21 February 1995; agreements on the creation of the Customs union of the two countries in January and May 1995; the Treaty on the Creation of a Community of Belarus and Russia on 2 April 1996; the Union Treaty and the Union Charter on 2 April and on 23 May 1997 respectively.

The character of the current relations between Belarus and Russia proves that after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and formation of the CIS the highest level of integration in the post-Soviet space has been achieved in the relations between these two states. A number of factors of a different nature contributed to that.

Having freed itself from the burdensome commitments of subsidising the other former Soviet republics within the USSR and given up direct control over them, the Russian leadership has worked out and began putting into action a new concept of its relationship with the former Soviet republics-the so-called "near abroad." Exploiting an advantageous geopolitical and economic situation, Russia began surrounding itself with a system of friendly dependent states. The first practical case of the implementation of this new foreign policy strategy, which can be expressed by the formula "leadership instead of direct control," was the case of Belarus. Not the least reason for this is the fact that the advantageous geopolitical position of Belarus naturally places it among the top priorities of the Moscow's foreign policy towards the "near abroad."

As far as Belarus is concerned, because of several circumstances it turned out to be the most suitable country to set up a new model of Russia's leadership among the former Soviet republics. In naming the most striking of these, one can refer to the low national consciousness of the majority of Belarus' population, a weakness of national statehood, the former Communist nomenclatura's dependence on Moscow, the unquestioned popularity of the ideas of "living together with the Russian people," common Slavonic roots, the Orthodox religion professed by most people in the two countries, similar languages, etc.

The Belarusian leadership, represented by V. Kebich, the former head of the executive power and ex-Prime Minister of Belarus, and now President A. Lukashenko have been consistently pursuing and continue to pursue steadily the policy of a comprehensive integration with Russia. This policy is effected under the slogans of "reunification of the two fraternal Slavonic peoples" and "restoration of the broken ties."

The consistent policy of getting closer to Moscow resulted in the signing of the Treaty on the Creation of a Community of Belarus and Russia in April 1996. However, one year after the signing, it can be seen that both sides have failed to get a big success in terms of real integration of the two nations. The general provisions of the Treaty have not been backed by substantial concrete moves, except the writing off of Belarus' considerable debt for supplies of natural gas from Russia.

Moreover, different interpretations of a number of provisions concerning the Customs union resulted in the Russian government threatening to introduce in March 1997 customs control on the border with Belarus, i.e. actually threatening to withdraw from the Customs union.

One of the few areas where the two states actively cooperated was that of foreign policy. Moscow and Minsk stood against NATO eastward enlargement. However, it did not prevent Russia, whilst playing its own diplomatic game with the West, from signing the Founding Act with NATO in May 1997. With the planned agreement between NATO and Ukraine, the expected admission of Poland and, in the foreseeble future, the Baltic states to the North Atlantic Alliance, Belarus remains the only country of the region which has no agreement with NATO, and, consequently, remains not involved in the process of forming the new system of European security. Consistently and honestly playing the role of the junior partner of Moscow in its struggle with NATO's eastward expansion, Minsk has lost diplomatically.

Latest Moves

The signing of the Union Treaty between Belarus and Russia in April 1997 and the Union Charter in May 1997 completed one of the most dramatic phases of the integration policy by the leadership of both states. Obviously, the Russian leadership has come to this "intermediate finish" with better results. Having voiced its intention to create a single federal state, Moscow put off this objective from its agenda for an unspecified term. The present Union can neither be referred to as a "soft" federation, nor a confederation. This Union is a specific inter-state entity. As a result of the public debate of the Union Charter some proposals submitted for consideration were taken into account. Along with the rights, the obligations of the participating states were outlined, such as provision of freedom of speech and the media, legal guarantees to political parties, including opposition parties, the inviolability of private property and rights of investors, and observation of other human rights and freedoms. Belarusian advocates of integration will have to take account of these provisions.

The final text of the Charter contains less social rhetoric. The market is mentioned more often and the powers of Union's bodies have been reduced. The Belarusian leadership has managed to secure the decision-making principle "one state-one vote." However, the position of the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Union has become more of a symbolic character.

The creation of the Belarusian-Russian Union took place under conditions of economic and political crisis in Belarus. This stage of integration has further polarised the Belarusian society. In the declaration of the Second National Congress of the Democratic Forces in Belarus "On the Union of Belarus and Russia" political opponents of President A. Lukashenko characterised his integration policy as a "large-scale campaign aimed at liquidation of Belarus' statehood."2 A number of politicians both in Belarus and in Russia paid attention to the illegitimate nature of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus which ratified the founding documents of the Union. Under the circumstances, when the constitutional and political crisis in Belarus is not yet over, this factor is far from contributing to the strengthening of the legal basis of the Belarusian-Russian integration.

The creation of the Union between the two states-Belarus and Russia-which are incomparable both in terms of their resources and influence can become a serious challenge to a yet not firmly established Belarusian statehood. It is clear that along with the strengthening of Belarus' national statehood and the foundation for its independent development, as well as with further strengthening of democracy both in Russia and Belarus, more viable conditions may emerge for a long- term and stable Union of Belarus and Russia.

1 Svaboda, 24 January 1997.

2 Narodnaya Volya, 29 May 1997.