АНГЛИЙСКИЙ ЯЗЫК (ENGLISH) (последнее)
Belarus-NATO: Problems of Cooperation
Актуальные публикации по английскому языку. История Великобритании и других англоязычных стран. Публикации, книги, статьи, заметки на английском языке.
On May 14, 1997, the new Ambassador of Belarus to the United States Valery Tsepkalo presenting his credentials to President Clinton at the White House, indicated Belarus' desire "to develop broad and active dialogue with NATO." He informed that Belarus extended invitations to the United States and other NATO member states to participate in the exercise, planned by Belarus within Partnership for Peace framework. Besides that, the text of his speech released by the U.S. Information Agency contains the following excerpt: "Belarus' openness and its real readiness to pursue cooperation with the United States can be proven by our successful partnership in the area of military-technical cooperation, including the implementation of a number of contracts on shipment by Belarus of advanced defence systems which are of interest to the U.S. Department of Defense."1 President Clinton in his response emphasised that "the future of our relations depends on Belarus" and accentuated the problems of democracy, human rights and market reforms.
The new nuances in the Belarusian position may cause bewilderment with the reader who is used to Belarus' clearly unambiguous assessment of NATO and the Alliance's strong drive to eastward expansion. Suggestion is not ruled out that the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has different interpretations of NATO related matters: one for domestic "consumption," and another for NATO countries. Hardly it would have been regarded as an example of a special achivement of the Belarusian diplomacy. Stability of foreign policy course-in terms of adherence to some principled guidelines and predictability in conducting international affairs-is an inalienable feature of mature foreign policy. In the given case, we can see rather a sort of "pragmatism" which is officially much spoken of.
Reflecting over the current phase of relations between Belarus and NATO it is appropriate to take into account, among others , the following aspects.
First, Belarus is and will continue to be of a certain strategic interest for NATO and especially in terms of the Alliance's eastward enlargement. Sherman W. Garnett, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has all grounds to state that "if Poland becomes a member of NATO, Belarus will increasingly become a matter of alliance interest as well."2 Because of the important geostrategic position of Belarus and trends towards Russian-Belarusian integration Minsk will remain, in the words of Michael Dobbs from The Washington Post, "a long- term strategic headache for Washington."3
Second, the previous too straightforward anti-NATO rhetoric and inflexible linkage to the Russian position have lead to the situation when Belarus found itself in a relatively unfavourable position. Belarus' feeble attempts to build its own constructive relationship with NATO are met rather skeptically; at the same time, Russia and Ukraine manoeuvred in due time and promptly and pragmatically proceeded to institutionalisation of their relations with NATO on a fundamentally new basis. Thus, Belarus, the country which, due to its historical experience, should do its utmost in order to create a "good neighbourly belt" on the perimeter of its borders and to avoid becoming a "grey zone" between NATO and Russia, has failed to adequately adjust its relations with the only weighty military and political alliance which will be increasingly influential in the formation of European security architecture and in the state of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe.
In our opinion, the establishment of an even, stable and dynamic relationship with NATO serves national interests of Belarus. However, such a relationship is impossible to build while refusing to accept the so-called Western values which, as a matter of fact, are laid down in the foundation of NATO. In the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D. C., on April 4, 1949 , it is stipulated that the member states "are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Statements with references to our own interpretation of democracy and human rights may be accepted only among local public. It was not by accident that U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns announced during the State Department noon briefing on April 4, 1997, that the words "free and democratic" which are quite applicable to Russia can hardly be used with regard to Belarus.4 One may not agree with this and argue at length, but it is impossible to disregard the fact that now such judgements prevail in the Western capitals.
Third, the prospects for the establishment, in the near future, of a "special" relationship with NATO, as in the case of Russia and Ukraine, and for advanced formalisation of this relationship, unfortunately do not appear so favourable as one could expect. NATO representatives drop hints that such relations cannot start from scratch and these require an adequate preparation, including through active participation in the Partnership for Peace. The developement of the Belarusian Individual Partnership Programme was neglected for a long time. Only in late May 1997, it was presented to NATO. Such a speed of the dialogue with NATO, conditioned by anti-NATO bias coupled with financial considerations, does not impress.
Fourth, there should be applied maximum flexibility in foreign policy, and genuine pragmatism, the one connected to an openness for different options instead of dashing out of one extreme position to another. The case of drafting the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the way Belarusian leadership was informed on the course of negotiations with NATO by Russian officials give some grounds for reflection. Belarus should not become a hostage of decisions made outside this country and without due consideration of Belarusian interests irrespectively of the place where these decision are made-in Washington, Brussels, or Moscow.
Fifth, increase in interaction with NATO can be evolutionaty, gradually and on selected directions. For instance, it is common knowledge that the public in Belarus is not favourable with regard to the Alliance because of the stereotypes formed during decades of anti-Western and anti-NATO propaganda. The absence of objective information on NATO and its transformation after the end of the Cold War is a clear factor which precludes from providing for elements of constructive cooperation with NATO. In this regard, it would be expedient to consider the establishment of a NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Minsk, like it has been done in Kyiv. The promotion of this proposal would lead to creation of a more favourable background for negotiations with the Alliance and for discussing the Belarusian draft of the Charter on Relationship between Belarus and NATO, presented to the Alliance on May 12, 1997.
Now, when the issue of NATO enlargement is becoming a matter of practical implementation, one may add some points to the discussion on this issue, keeping in mind that the press, foreign and national, has covered the enlargement very extensively. In principle, positions of the parties have been defined and fixed for a long time; these have been delineated in Belarus, too.
Whatever large-scale, efforts by NATO officials to picture the enlargement rose-coloured could calm down, perhaps, only credulous individuals. Hasty and discriminatory character of the enlargement causes certain doubts on the purity of intentions of Western politicians, and first of all of those from America.
The issue of NATO enlargement, in essence, is not only on declared political leaning or feelings of cultural commonality. This issue is also on deployment of the armed forces and, first of all, nuclear weapons. It is an exaggeration to say that Russia has fully insured itself against possible eastward advance of NATO military structures. No convincing guarantees of non-advance of NATO military infrastructure to Russian (and, naturally, Belarusian) borders have been received. The Alliance "will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members."5 The word "substantial" used in the text of the Founding Act is particularly remarcable.
The NATO position with regard to nuclear weapons, confirmed and slightly detailed in the Founding Act, is more clear-cut, though it does not exclude fully a possibility of changes in the stationing of nuclear forces in the long term.
Of course, the Russian leaders have acted wisely: they managed to avoid deterioration in relations with NATO states; on the contrary, they put these relations at a new level under the circumstances when their verbal opposition to the enlargement, not backed by real resources for meaningful counter-measures, was becaming counter-productive. As was mentioned by Raymond Garthoff, a known expert of the Brookings Institution, "if Russia would have isolated herself as a result of such a provocation as NATO expansion, the U.S. and the West in general could do anything they want without taking into account Russian interests and troubles."6
It is clear that NATO states have made some concessions to Russia, trying to get at least a formal consent of Moscow for not to bring about the "Versailles syndrome" and a dangerous feeling of being driven to the corner. Zbigniew Brzezinski named the Founding Act as a "genuine compromise" and an evidence that "the realism and the spirit of cooperation has begun to prevail" in relations between Russia and NATO.7
On June 12, 1997, President Clinton said that at the Madrid Summit the U.S. would support the invitation for three countries-Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic-to begin negotiations on their accession to NATO. This made it clear who would be the first "strongest" candidates for joining the Alliance. According to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for NATO enlargement Jeremy Rosner, limiting the number of new members will make the process of enlargement "less costly" and facilitate the ratification by U.S. Senate of the decision to admit new members to NATO.8 The Clinton Administration has already started to work with the Senate Observer Group supervising NATO enlargement. This bipartisan group consists of twenty eight senators.
Now, 12 countries are seeking the Alliance membership. Although the U.S. welcomes the progress by Romania and Slovenia, it, nevertheless, emphhasizes that NATO enlargement "must be done in a measured way." No country, including Russia,-as it comes from the speech of Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, at the meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States on May 20, 1997, will be a priori excluded from the list of candidates willing to join the Alliance. Russia has not applied for NATO membership; however, if this issue is considered in the long term, it would be a mistake to exclude at all such a a possibility, Talbott noted.9
As far as forthcoming expenses related to the enlargement are concerned, a preliminary U.S. official study mentions $27-35 billion over the next 13 years. A more detailed study will be undertaken after Madrid. However, representatives of the Clinton Administration say that the figures are unlikely to change significantly. According to Jeremy Rosner, new NATO members would have to pay about one-third of the mentioned sum. The U.S. contribution is expected to be of about $200 million paid annually over ten years. The remaining funding, as the Clinton Administration officials say, should be the responsibility of European members of NATO.10
NATO enlargement, turned into a central problem of international security and world politics, is the equation with many unknown quantities. The time will show to what extent the decision to expand NATO's area of responsibility eastwards is thoughtful and adequate to the new realities.
1 USIS. Embassy of the United States of America, Minsk. Wireless File . ERF 202, May 20, 1997.
2 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 106.
3 Michael Dobbs, "Political Shift in Belarus Poses U.S. Policy Dilemma," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p. A18.
4 Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, USIS Washington File , April 4, 1997.
5 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, in Rossijskaja Gazeta , May 28, 1997.
6 A. Shitov. On the Paris Summit results. ITAR-TASS, Kompas . No 24,1997, p.11.
7 Ibid., p.10.
8 USIS. Embassy of the United States of America, Minsk. Wireless File . ERF 206, June 17, 1997.
9 Ibid., EUR 206, May 20, 1997.
10 Ibid., EUR 206, June 17, 1997.
The new nuances in the Belarusian position may cause bewilderment with the reader who is used to Belarus' clearly unambiguous assessment of NATO and the Alliance's strong drive to eastward expansion. Suggestion is not ruled out that the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has different interpretations of NATO related matters: one for domestic "consumption," and another for NATO countries. Hardly it would have been regarded as an example of a special achivement of the Belarusian diplomacy. Stability of foreign policy course-in terms of adherence to some principled guidelines and predictability in conducting international affairs-is an inalienable feature of mature foreign policy. In the given case, we can see rather a sort of "pragmatism" which is officially much spoken of.
Reflecting over the current phase of relations between Belarus and NATO it is appropriate to take into account, among others , the following aspects.
First, Belarus is and will continue to be of a certain strategic interest for NATO and especially in terms of the Alliance's eastward enlargement. Sherman W. Garnett, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, has all grounds to state that "if Poland becomes a member of NATO, Belarus will increasingly become a matter of alliance interest as well."2 Because of the important geostrategic position of Belarus and trends towards Russian-Belarusian integration Minsk will remain, in the words of Michael Dobbs from The Washington Post, "a long- term strategic headache for Washington."3
Second, the previous too straightforward anti-NATO rhetoric and inflexible linkage to the Russian position have lead to the situation when Belarus found itself in a relatively unfavourable position. Belarus' feeble attempts to build its own constructive relationship with NATO are met rather skeptically; at the same time, Russia and Ukraine manoeuvred in due time and promptly and pragmatically proceeded to institutionalisation of their relations with NATO on a fundamentally new basis. Thus, Belarus, the country which, due to its historical experience, should do its utmost in order to create a "good neighbourly belt" on the perimeter of its borders and to avoid becoming a "grey zone" between NATO and Russia, has failed to adequately adjust its relations with the only weighty military and political alliance which will be increasingly influential in the formation of European security architecture and in the state of affairs in Central and Eastern Europe.
In our opinion, the establishment of an even, stable and dynamic relationship with NATO serves national interests of Belarus. However, such a relationship is impossible to build while refusing to accept the so-called Western values which, as a matter of fact, are laid down in the foundation of NATO. In the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D. C., on April 4, 1949 , it is stipulated that the member states "are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Statements with references to our own interpretation of democracy and human rights may be accepted only among local public. It was not by accident that U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns announced during the State Department noon briefing on April 4, 1997, that the words "free and democratic" which are quite applicable to Russia can hardly be used with regard to Belarus.4 One may not agree with this and argue at length, but it is impossible to disregard the fact that now such judgements prevail in the Western capitals.
Third, the prospects for the establishment, in the near future, of a "special" relationship with NATO, as in the case of Russia and Ukraine, and for advanced formalisation of this relationship, unfortunately do not appear so favourable as one could expect. NATO representatives drop hints that such relations cannot start from scratch and these require an adequate preparation, including through active participation in the Partnership for Peace. The developement of the Belarusian Individual Partnership Programme was neglected for a long time. Only in late May 1997, it was presented to NATO. Such a speed of the dialogue with NATO, conditioned by anti-NATO bias coupled with financial considerations, does not impress.
Fourth, there should be applied maximum flexibility in foreign policy, and genuine pragmatism, the one connected to an openness for different options instead of dashing out of one extreme position to another. The case of drafting the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the way Belarusian leadership was informed on the course of negotiations with NATO by Russian officials give some grounds for reflection. Belarus should not become a hostage of decisions made outside this country and without due consideration of Belarusian interests irrespectively of the place where these decision are made-in Washington, Brussels, or Moscow.
Fifth, increase in interaction with NATO can be evolutionaty, gradually and on selected directions. For instance, it is common knowledge that the public in Belarus is not favourable with regard to the Alliance because of the stereotypes formed during decades of anti-Western and anti-NATO propaganda. The absence of objective information on NATO and its transformation after the end of the Cold War is a clear factor which precludes from providing for elements of constructive cooperation with NATO. In this regard, it would be expedient to consider the establishment of a NATO Information and Documentation Centre in Minsk, like it has been done in Kyiv. The promotion of this proposal would lead to creation of a more favourable background for negotiations with the Alliance and for discussing the Belarusian draft of the Charter on Relationship between Belarus and NATO, presented to the Alliance on May 12, 1997.
Now, when the issue of NATO enlargement is becoming a matter of practical implementation, one may add some points to the discussion on this issue, keeping in mind that the press, foreign and national, has covered the enlargement very extensively. In principle, positions of the parties have been defined and fixed for a long time; these have been delineated in Belarus, too.
Whatever large-scale, efforts by NATO officials to picture the enlargement rose-coloured could calm down, perhaps, only credulous individuals. Hasty and discriminatory character of the enlargement causes certain doubts on the purity of intentions of Western politicians, and first of all of those from America.
The issue of NATO enlargement, in essence, is not only on declared political leaning or feelings of cultural commonality. This issue is also on deployment of the armed forces and, first of all, nuclear weapons. It is an exaggeration to say that Russia has fully insured itself against possible eastward advance of NATO military structures. No convincing guarantees of non-advance of NATO military infrastructure to Russian (and, naturally, Belarusian) borders have been received. The Alliance "will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces on the territory of new members."5 The word "substantial" used in the text of the Founding Act is particularly remarcable.
The NATO position with regard to nuclear weapons, confirmed and slightly detailed in the Founding Act, is more clear-cut, though it does not exclude fully a possibility of changes in the stationing of nuclear forces in the long term.
Of course, the Russian leaders have acted wisely: they managed to avoid deterioration in relations with NATO states; on the contrary, they put these relations at a new level under the circumstances when their verbal opposition to the enlargement, not backed by real resources for meaningful counter-measures, was becaming counter-productive. As was mentioned by Raymond Garthoff, a known expert of the Brookings Institution, "if Russia would have isolated herself as a result of such a provocation as NATO expansion, the U.S. and the West in general could do anything they want without taking into account Russian interests and troubles."6
It is clear that NATO states have made some concessions to Russia, trying to get at least a formal consent of Moscow for not to bring about the "Versailles syndrome" and a dangerous feeling of being driven to the corner. Zbigniew Brzezinski named the Founding Act as a "genuine compromise" and an evidence that "the realism and the spirit of cooperation has begun to prevail" in relations between Russia and NATO.7
On June 12, 1997, President Clinton said that at the Madrid Summit the U.S. would support the invitation for three countries-Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic-to begin negotiations on their accession to NATO. This made it clear who would be the first "strongest" candidates for joining the Alliance. According to the Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State for NATO enlargement Jeremy Rosner, limiting the number of new members will make the process of enlargement "less costly" and facilitate the ratification by U.S. Senate of the decision to admit new members to NATO.8 The Clinton Administration has already started to work with the Senate Observer Group supervising NATO enlargement. This bipartisan group consists of twenty eight senators.
Now, 12 countries are seeking the Alliance membership. Although the U.S. welcomes the progress by Romania and Slovenia, it, nevertheless, emphhasizes that NATO enlargement "must be done in a measured way." No country, including Russia,-as it comes from the speech of Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, at the meeting of the Atlantic Council of the United States on May 20, 1997, will be a priori excluded from the list of candidates willing to join the Alliance. Russia has not applied for NATO membership; however, if this issue is considered in the long term, it would be a mistake to exclude at all such a a possibility, Talbott noted.9
As far as forthcoming expenses related to the enlargement are concerned, a preliminary U.S. official study mentions $27-35 billion over the next 13 years. A more detailed study will be undertaken after Madrid. However, representatives of the Clinton Administration say that the figures are unlikely to change significantly. According to Jeremy Rosner, new NATO members would have to pay about one-third of the mentioned sum. The U.S. contribution is expected to be of about $200 million paid annually over ten years. The remaining funding, as the Clinton Administration officials say, should be the responsibility of European members of NATO.10
NATO enlargement, turned into a central problem of international security and world politics, is the equation with many unknown quantities. The time will show to what extent the decision to expand NATO's area of responsibility eastwards is thoughtful and adequate to the new realities.
1 USIS. Embassy of the United States of America, Minsk. Wireless File . ERF 202, May 20, 1997.
2 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 106.
3 Michael Dobbs, "Political Shift in Belarus Poses U.S. Policy Dilemma," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p. A18.
4 Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, USIS Washington File , April 4, 1997.
5 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, in Rossijskaja Gazeta , May 28, 1997.
6 A. Shitov. On the Paris Summit results. ITAR-TASS, Kompas . No 24,1997, p.11.
7 Ibid., p.10.
8 USIS. Embassy of the United States of America, Minsk. Wireless File . ERF 206, June 17, 1997.
9 Ibid., EUR 206, May 20, 1997.
10 Ibid., EUR 206, June 17, 1997.
Опубликовано 29 апреля 2014 года
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