Integration of Belarus and Russia: Differences in Assessments

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Опубликовано в библиотеке: 2014-04-29
Источник: "БЕЛАРУСЬ В МИРЕ" No.02 07-01-97

The integration moves of Belarus and Russia have gained certain momentum. Large-scale agreements, requiring practical implementation, have been signed. Analysis of parameters, motives, and prospects for development of this integration is being conducted. Different points of view, sometimes opposite, have been aired. To clarify the nature of the problem, to highlight its most clear-cut facets, it is worthwhile to consider relevant approaches and evaluations which can be traced down in the latest publications of prominent Russian experts, as well as Western, primarily American, analysts. This will make it possible to expand a narrowed point of view, characteristic of the discussion on the subject in Belarus.

The Approach of Russian Analysts

A report of the Policy Foundation, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, published in late April 1997, stands out against other Russian research materials on the subject.1 The authors of the report present a comprehensive analysis of positive and negative consequences of accelerating the integration of Belarus and Russia. They justly point out that the first practical steps towards real integration of Belarus and Russia have aroused an explicit enlivening of anti-integration forces both within and particularly outside the boundaries of the two states. In their opinion, a time factor does not benefit the unification. This conclusion does not appear groundless. That is why the question is posed sharply and concisely-"either now or never."

Characterising a domestic situation in Belarus, the Russian analysts believe that a "moderately authoritarian regime" was established in the Republic of Belarus, resulting from the acute political crisis in late 1996 and implementation of the constitutional reform by referendum. On the one hand, it can contribute to unification (because of the complete expulsion of integration's opponents from power structures, etc.). On the other hand, it can discredit the unification process with reformist forces, create an information background, unfavourable for integration, and entail accusations against Russia allegedly "encouraging authoritarianism."

The authors of the report refer to the following as unquestionable advantages of hypothetical unification of Russia and Belarus: direct access to the borders of the Central European region; liquidation of the potential threat of an "isolation belt" from the Baltic to the Black Sea formed against Russia; gaining additional means of influence in relationship with Ukraine; optimisation of the Russia's strategic situation on the western direction; getting room for manoeuvre within the CFE Treaty and so on. Evidently, these advantages from the acceleration of integration process, seen through the prism of Russia's foreign policy and defence interests, are regarded, first of all, within the geopolitical and geostrategic context.

In the same way, according to the standpoint of the authors of the report, the following can be referred to as negative consequences of the unification: Poland's rapprochement with Ukraine and Lithuania, further consolidation of the Baltic states; an increase of attention of the West with regard to Ukraine; escalation of certain contradictions in the relationship between Russia and the West (primarily the United States).

Conducting a realistic evaluation of possibilities and prospects for the integration in its present form, the Russian experts warn that Belarus's course towards integration with Russia cannot be characterised as the one having no alternative; its re-orientation towards western neighbours is not excluded in case of a failure of the policy of integration with the Russian Federation. Frustration of the integration process is fraught with the risk of "ukrainisation" of Belarus's foreign and domestic policy with a more definite orientation towards NATO countries and leaning on "nationally oriented forces."

Russian analysts justly recognise that a strategic opportunity in the integration process between Belarus and Russia was lost last year. On the whole, they support the unification according to 1+1 formula, forming a Union of Russia and Belarus. The bottom line of the report is that the "historic opportunity to begin reunification" should not be missed. The existing problems in "reunification" do not appear unsolvable. Apparently, "peculiarities of the political regime in Belarus, which has some features of authoritarianism, constitute a serious, but not unnegotiable obstacle for the unification of the two countries." Additionally, the incumbent "personal power" regimes in some regions of Russia do not question their status as constituent parts of the Russian Federation. Along the same lines, conclusion is drawn that "the differences between economic mechanisms of Russia and Belarus can be gradually levelled as a result of a Union Treaty and a Union Charter."

It can be noted that the Russian experts avoid extremes in their judgements. In principle, they tend to present a relatively balanced position. Being far from portraying prospects for Russian-Belarusian integration as rose-coloured, at the same time they are evidently in sympathy with the tendency towards acceleration of the integration between the two states.

This is not the case with Western, particularly American, observers. They prefer dark colours whenever the subject of a Union between Belarus and Russia is brought about. The reality is that currently it is difficult to find any serious article in authoritative American journals and newspapers which would positively assess political changes in Belarus. The reason for a clearly disapproving position is well known. This reflects the official U.S. policy towards Belarus after the November 1996 referendum.

The New U.S. Policy Towards Belarus

In February 1997, the State Department announced U.S.'s new policy toward Belarus. This policy of "selective engagement" envisages the curtailment of contacts on high political level and the enhancement of contacts with "de mocratic elements in Belarus, the independent media and non-governmental organisations."2 It is reported that no "direct assistance" to the state sector of Belarus will be provided; non-governmental channels will be used wherever possible. The U.S. technical and economic assistance will be channeled to promote democratisation, protection of human rights, private enterprise, the independent media, as well as humanitarian assistance to Chernobyl victims and to hospitals.

At the same time, according to that announcement, the U.S. policy "is not static." The United States does not seek isolation of Belarus. It is open to dialogue and is prepared to adjust the policy of "selective engagement" if the Government of Belarus takes steps towards economic reform on the lines agreed with the IMF, protection of internationally recognised human rights and principles of democracy, including separation of powers,-those obligations which Belarus, as a member of the OSCE, has voluntarily undertaken.

President Clinton in his letter to Frank Pallone, Jr., U.S. House Representative from New Jersey, dated March 15, 1997, shared the legislator's concerns over "the trend of increased authoritarianism" in Belarus.3 The President wrote that due to the changes after the November referendum the American economic assistance to Belarus had been sharply reduced to about $5 million. Clinton confirmed that the United States did not certify Belarus in FY 1997 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programme, suspending allocation of $40 million to Belarus. From the perspective of the U.S. President, the current Government of Belarus has moved away from the international community and reduced the scope for constructive relations with the U.S. The United States has informed its Western allies over its new policy towards Belarus.

According to The Washington Post , political changes in Belarus posed a dilemma to the U.S., typical for its relations with "authoritarian governments": whether to isolate or engage them in a process that might entail changes in the regime.4

Perceptions of the Belarusian-Russian Integration in the U.S.

The development of the Belarusian-Russian relationship is being closely followed. It is notable that Washington's official evaluation of the Belarusian-Russian integration is rather cautious, although there is an implicit concern linked to a possibility of re-creation in some form of a union of states on the territory of the former USSR and restoration of a power centre in the key region of Eurasia which could challenge the United States in the future. Additionally, as Sherman Garnett of the Carnegie Endowment pointedly noted, "a change in the status of Belarus would shift the regional balance of power."5

Stating the U.S. position with regard to the documents, signed in Moscow on 2 April 1997, the State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns said that the United States is not "refletively opposed to the efforts to bring the two countries together." He added, "But we do believe that any such process should be voluntary; it should reflect the mutual wishes of the peoples of both countries..." The agreement, Burns noted, should not be "divisive at a time when we are trying to unify Europe."6 Reflections on dividing lines in Europe are particularly notable at the time when the United States is pressing persistently for NATO eastward enlargement, which would lead to real rather than imaginary divisions in Europe.

In his insightful analysis from Washington, titled "Integration As The Final Stage Of Disintegration" and devoted to the signing of the Charter on Russian-Belarusian Union on 23 May 1997, Paul Goble mentioned that "like all previous efforts to promote integration in the post-Soviet space, this one does little to change the situation on the ground."7 Earlier, he made a conclusion that President Lukashenko's "campaign" aimed at closer integration with Russia may have just the opposite effect. Specifically, Lukashenko's efforts, in Paul Goble's view, "have had the unintended consequence of highlighting just how far apart Minsk and Moscow are on the question of integration."8

However, some American experts agree that the Belarus's path of integration is conditioned by objective reasons, first of all economic. It is remarcable that the former U.S. Ambassador to Belarus David Swartz in his discussion paper "Belarus-Problems of Integration" noted that "there are compelling reasons for Belarus to seek closer economic integration with its NIS counterparts, especially Russia." But closer economic integration into the world economy is an even greater imperative.9

Western economists believe that achieving a real union of Belarus and Russia is an extremely difficult task, including because of an extremely difficult economic situation in Belarus. For instance, although population of Belarus is about 1/15 of Russia's 150-million population, its GDP was only 1/40 of that of Russia in 1996.10 Belarus's going backwards to the command economy, lack of progress in privatisation made the International Monetary Fund suspend relations with Belarus, and this is far from contributing to economic development of the latter.

Lee Hockstader wrote in The Washington Post that Belarus's Soviet- style economy, nearly untouched by market reforms, is among the most backward on the European continent.11 That is why reformers in the Kremlin, being afraid of negative consequences of the unification with Belarus for the economy of Russia, are not enthusiastic, to put it mildly, about the prospects for Russian-Belarusian integration. According to opinions in the West, pro-reform officials in the Government of the Russian Federation, including Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, have been against real integration, since the latter would be contrary to national interests of Russia. Liberals in the Russian Duma give these people their support. Vladimir Lukin, a member of the Duma and former Ambassador to Washington said, "The proposed union is dangerous for Russian democracy."12 At the same time, public opinion polls in Russia suggest that the idea of integration with Belarus is generally popular with the Russians.

The integration between Belarus and Russia is a complicated and controversial process, requiring not a one-sided, but rather a multifaceted vision. Controversial interpretations of this process both in Russia and in the U.S. reflect the fact that it is perceived in a different manner. It is certain that this is typical for any complicated deal, when parties involved are driven by different and sometimes opposite interests.

1 NG-Stsenarii. A monthly supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta , April 29, 1997.

2 U.S. New Policy Toward Belarus , Belarusian Review, Spring 1997, p. 11.

3 President Clinton Reiterates U.S. Position , Belarusian Review, Spring 1997, p. 11.

4 Michael Dobbs, "Political Shift in Belarus Poses U.S. Policy Dilemma," The Washington Post, April 4, 1997, p. A18.

5 Sherman W. Garnett , Keystone in the Arch (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 106.

6 Transcript: State Department Noon Briefing, April 4 , USIS Washington File, 4 April 1997.

7 Paul Goble, "Belarus/Russia : Integration As The Final Stage of Disintegration," RFE/ RL, 26 May 1997.

8 Paul Goble, "Belarus/Russia: Between Integration And Disintegration," RFE/ RL, 13 March 1997.

9 David H. Swartz, "Belarus-Problems of Integration," Integrated Strategies International, Discussion Paper 2.1, April 25, 1996.

10 Belarus Economy Seen Hard to Integrate With Russia , Reuter, March 18 , 1997.

11 Lee Hockstader, "Belarus, Russia Move Toward a New Union," The Washington Post, April 3, 1997, p. A23.

12 Ibid.

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© Anatoli Romanov, political scientist, Minsk () Источник: "БЕЛАРУСЬ В МИРЕ" No.02 07-01-97

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